今年9月,挪威财政部长Sigbjørn约翰森做了有趣的声明的时间范围该国4430亿美元的主权财富基金分配资金。在面试中对政府全球养老基金的投资陷入困境的欧洲经济体的主权债务,他说,“有人会说我们是投资无穷。“无穷?如果只!一个投资者与一个真正的无限时间范围,由一个主权财富基金的规模,将无与伦比的长期流动性较差的资产类别。如果长期投资者可能超越零至24个月的时期,绝大多数的知识马力专业资金管理集中,从而避免资产类别水平不相称的竞争——它可以,理论上,发展跑赢市场技能在长期缺乏流动性的资产类别。然而,挪威的基金尚未真正利用其无限的地平线,暴露于非流动性资产,如基础设施和林地,仍然比较有限。上面列举的主权债务(不具备流动性。)公平地说,挪威不是独自一人。主权财富基金的整体曝光非流动性资产类别仍然相对较小。与家族理财室相比,捐赠基金和基金会,也有类似的责任档案,主权财富基金大幅减持非流动性资产。 According to a recent report by the World Economic Forum, family offices invest 35 percent of their assets in illiquids; endowments and foundations invest 20 percent; and sovereign funds invest just 10 percent. It seems that sovereign funds are focusing more on short-term returns than their time horizons would suggest. As China Investment Corp. vice chairman Gao Xiqing recently put it: “Theoretically, we are a long-term investor. . . . but you can’t really function on a ten-year horizon.” But why not, Mr. Gao? If SWFs really do have infinite time horizons, shouldn’t a ten-year time frame be easy? And more to the point, why would sovereign funds give up the risk premiums that can be reaped from long-term illiquidity? Multiple factors are shrinking the time horizons of sovereign funds. To begin, public officials can be just as demanding of short-term performance as their private counterparts. So rather than take the chance that a single bad year could prompt politicians to shut their funds down, SWF managers focus on short-term returns that bolster their legitimacy. In addition, sovereign funds face serious principal-agent problems with external managers in long-term asset classes, as managers’ incentives are understandably based on a much shorter time horizon. To circumvent managers, some sovereign funds have decided to launch internal investment programs for long-term assets. As one SWF executive told me earlier this year, “Why should I pay all of these fees if I plan to hold the investment for the life of the asset?” Sovereign funds must do several things to fulfill their potential as the true kings of long-term investments. First, they must communicate with and engage their domestic constituencies. If the public understands and supports the operations of a sovereign fund, then it will not — in theory, at least — question its legitimacy during market downturns. Next, sovereign funds will have to be creative in structuring their manager agreements. For example, a fund might cap the amount of leverage an infrastructure manager can use, or it might choose to drop the typical 2-and-20 compensation structure — a 2 percent management fee and a 20 percent performance fee — and instead establish a model that rewards managers for keeping volatility low and cash flows steady. Last, those funds intent on setting up direct investment programs should plan on allocating considerable resources to organizational design, institutional governance, management and talent. Interestingly, the allure of certain asset classes — namely infrastructure — has already driven a handful of funds to develop sophisticated internal capabilities for sourcing, structuring and managing multibillion-dollar infrastructure assets. Whatever the path chosen — internal or external — sovereign funds should be investing for the long haul. In line with Norway’s Finance minister, I think sovereign funds could have infinite time horizons. With the right design and governance principles, a time horizon stretching out for decades is within their grasp. As it currently stands, however, only a select few SWFs have managed to achieve this.
因此,主权财富基金无处不在,我说,“去长。“这将是值得的。
阿什比和尚是一个牛津大学的研究员,主任牛津SWF项目和斯坦福大学访问学者。