谁能够获得从中国转移到市场驱动的信用分配系统？这是北京和大陆和世界各地的投资者面临的重要问题。
正如我们已经看到的那样，最近的企业违约可能会变成一个相当大的流，或者，如果国家规划者严重关于自由化利率并改革一项金融体系，淋浴效率低下国有企业（国有企业），具有廉价信贷。随着中国谚语所说，你必须杀死一些鸡来吓唬猴子。
The gorillas are going to resist like hell. The managers of the giant SOEs, with their vast networks of factories, party committees and patron client networks that climb up through the state and Communist Party structures in a vast tangle of influence and power, are dead set against marketized credit. So are the国家控制的银行，特别是大四，现在是世界上最大的资产银行之一，迄今为止由分支机构或员工计数最大。
“Financial repression has created economic rent that has been distributed to favored borrowers and nurtured vested interests,” observe the writers ofChina 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society.473页的Tome由世界银行和国务院的发展研究中心（DRC）共同撰写，并在2013年释放了相当大的粉丝。
“Banks已经享有舒适的商业环境，由高入境障碍，利率控制和对信贷需求过剩，允许信贷配给，“IT指出。“官员控制银行的权力及其信贷分配是对经济和社会权力的一个来源。所有这些都将努力调动对金融改革的抵抗，并建立系统惯性或回归旧系统的趋势。“读者几乎可以听到DRC的改革者的紧急声音刘世金和张建国撰写本段;研究机构的副部长刘和张被认为是与世界银行团队一起共同作者。
“深圳开发银行前主席兼首席执行官Frank Newman说：”深圳开发银行的首席执行官弗兰克纽曼曾担任过贷款，因为我们啜饮绿茶俯瞰着香港的灰绿色港湾。“基于市场的信用风险系统将要求他们努力工作并面临后果如果他们弄错了。所有的激励措施都在另一种方式工作，“他说。
When you ask why China is trying to price risk into credit, it’s amazing how quickly the conversation turns from technical finance to matters of raw political power. The deeper and more knowledgeable about China, the faster the cut to the chase. Which is why few of my usual China sources, government or private sector, are willing to go on the record about China’s great credit experiment.
“Xi和政治家组中所谓的改革者将不得不接受该国最强大的权力中心，改革这些国有企业，”基于北京的智商争论，他喜欢大多数消息人士都发言由于主题的敏感性，匿名的条件。他建议党员纪律和清除，党员始于习近平的初步竞争对手，竞争对手，博思海，最近包括周永康，曾经担心的安全服务负责人，是这个优秀的过程的一部分。“周的最大的犯罪并没有堕落，”智者说。“党领导人或至少他们的家庭都是羽毛的巢穴。周的最大的犯罪是坐在石油公司的巨大力量金字塔上 - 当然，与Bo Xilai盟军。“
Many China watchers (including me) were puzzled when the leadership reshuffle dust settled last year to find Wang Qishan, widely regarded as a prominent economic reformer among the leadership, with new duties as secretary of the party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. That’s far removed from his former post as vice premier in charge of economic, energy and financial affairs. But in the party discipline job, he’s the man in charge of the purges. In a recent act of quietly dramatic organizational redesign little noticed in the West, Wang arranged for the provincial party discipline functionaries to report directly to him in Beijing, thereby short-circuiting the party’s provincial chiefs and thus dramatically tightening the reins of power.
We have, in fact, seen this movie before: 15 years ago, to be exact. “Wang has some experience in this SOE moral hazard line of work,” said one Shanghai banker. “He knows where every single body is buried in the financial system.” He was governor of China Construction Bank, mayor of Beijing, party secretary of Hainan province — the ultimate Mr. Fixit. When the highflying Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corp. (GITIC) went broke in 1998, roiling global financial markets with the first big bankruptcy of a state-affiliated enterprise, then-premier Zhu Rongji summoned Wang, who was vice governor of Guangdong province, to preside over the messy cleanup. Creditors ultimately received about 12.5 cents on the dollar.
正如它所发生的那样，当Gitic遭到胸部的时候，我在上海，对我的博士进行了实地考察。在普林斯顿，并从最近建造的浦东酒店观看戏剧。I remember hearing complaints from indignant foreign bankers when Wang appointed a liquidation committee of government insiders and the Bank of China that put foreigners at the end of the line with all the other unsecured creditors, behind the priority claims of workers’ wages and taxes — precisely as set forth in China’s 1986 State Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. The numerous so-called comfort letters issued by Guangdong authorities to foreign bankers that implied a Beijing put for GITIC were instantly rendered useless for purposes other than wrapping fish or personal hygiene.
After GITIC, the rest of the other “red chip” ITICs, as the trade and investment firms were known, were cleaned up, at least in terms of their foreign obligations, though none as dramatically (or as costly) as GITIC. This was just one act in a more complex play that involved the recapitalization of the big state-owned banks; their partial listings and sales of minority stakes to foreign banks; and the creation of so-called bad banks, or asset management companies, to work off the dreck loans.
“在许多方面，为”国际销售的财富管理产品“发出的智能信件非常相似，即他们今天销售的财富管理产品的隐含保证，”香港沙利文和克伦威尔·克罗姆韦尔的合伙人迈克尔德莫布雷斯说在基地重组中。“最终政府需要允许一些失败证明WMPS不是无风险的存款。”
那么，将为猴子的管制牺牲哪些企业或信任产品鸡？谁在上海Chaori太阳能科技有限公司和浙江兴润房地产有限公司
我在这一点上判断一系列银行家，贸易商和经济学家。他们都同意违约将涉及三角形：借用困难的公司，一个过度的信贷信托信托和一些担心的投资者持有WMPS。但我听到了几个不同的鸡肉名单候选人，每一个都需要在中国制定决策以及北京的目标是众所周知的不同观点。
“我们认为这将是那些具有最大产能过剩的部门的公司，”北京的日本银行家建议。“中国在铝制到造船或石化的铝制中，中国拥有巨大产能过剩的公司。这些部门将不得不迟早合理化。从产业结构政策的角度来看，如果允许其中一些公司才能下降，政府可以用一块政策击中两只鸟。“
“We will certainly see more defaults in 2014, especially in sectors where overcapacity in a major issue,” agrees Andy Liu Qiang, China analyst at Teneo Intelligence. “For example, the Zhejiang Huatesi Polymer Technical Co. filed for bankruptcy last month but may avoid a default in the end. Highsee Iron and Steel Group Co. is struggling under a 3 billion yuan ($482 million) debt. But I don’t see that additional defaults will cause contagion or pose a systemic risk unless a really major SOE in real estate associated with a local government financing vehicle runs into trouble. Until then, it is unlikely that the People’s Bank of China will react.”
Sullivan & Cromwell’s DeSombre sees wider motives in play. “Allowing small coal miners and smaller property developers to default is also consistent with the various environmental and affordable housing initiatives of the current government and thus can accomplish other policy objectives while improving credit allocation in the long term,” he says.
An alternative view contends that firms whose manager-owners are flagrantly corrupt, or flagrantly opulent, are most likely to be flushed down the credit drain. This will reinforce the moral lesson of Xi and Wang’s anticorruption campaign.
然而，第三次观点将可能与党组电力结构最不受保护的公司的默认手指指向，因为金钱耗尽，那些无法响起省级党委书记甚至北京的帮助。这意味着公司没有太多员工，远离关键的城市地区，一般都不见了。
第四个和更多的逻辑视图（至少对我）相信违约候选人是进入基本业务困难的公司或仅仅是无能的或不幸的，而不是腐败或政治上脆弱的公司。“如果您希望中文银行系统要学习贫困信用导致违约的课程，那么您需要让公司在可能的信用问题下进行分析前赌注那“says former banker Newman. “If they just blow up for some other reason, as a matter of industrial policy or some anticorruption campaign, there is no institutional learning.”
David Cui and his team of Chinese equity strategists at Bank of America Merrill Lynch in Hong Kong analyzed 12 potential trust defaults mentioned in Chinese media, and then reviewed the top 200 trust products by size in the database of China’s Wind Information Co. They found the trusts concentrated in three sectors: property developers, coal miners and local government financing vehicles, or LGFVs. The total outstanding credit of each sector coming due in 2014 or 2015 amounted to 52 billion yuan, 20 billion and 47 billion, respectively. Surprisingly, most of that credit is concentrated in just five provinces: Jiangsu, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, and Tianjin; peak maturities fall in May and June 2014 and in the fourth quarter of this year.
“Coal mining could see the most defaults, as many of them are private and coal prices plummeted,” the analysts contended in a February note to clients. “LGFVs will have the most government support/intervention and may see limited defaults. Property trusts could diverge, as smaller developers with single-city operations in tier-3/4 cities could be in trouble, but large national developers should be fine.”
Allowing such defaults isn’t for the faint of heart. There is a contagion risk and a policy risk in launching China’s Great Credit Experiment. Each risk unfolds to a different clock, but both carry potentially grave consequences.
“如果您是PBC，则希望在其余部门或地点的任何默认默认中最小化溢出，”我在上海大学的经济学家朋友说。“你知道，当Mah-Jongg瓷砖在一条线上互相敲击时。您想要避免的所有费用是一个完整的信贷危机。“
这就是“不能从这里到达那里”的评论家恐惧会因为传统和影子银行系统之间的多个管道而发生。这就是“一个制度，两个市场”捍卫者坚持认为改革缓慢的地方很重要。最重要的是，他们警告说，不要拆除国有银行业，或者强迫它进入竞争激烈的市场。
“金融改革导致银行愿意突然转变这些贷款 - 例如，由于更高的成本责任结构强迫他们寻求更高返回的资产 - 可能导致广泛的公司和地方政府破产和在北京布鲁克斯 - 清华中心高级研究员的亚瑟·克罗伯警告Arthur Kroeber警告Arthur Kroebers的土地价值崩溃的永久崩溃。China Economic Quarterly,在2013年的论文中，“中国的全球货币：金融改革杠杆。“
“危机的唯一重大风险将从私有化银行和其他机构的方向造成猛烈的私人，或者在大西洋委员会高级研究员的高级研究员中开启中国到过早资本流入和流失的私有化的困境。has watched the evolution of China’s financial system for decades, first as a consultant for the United Nations and the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s and then at the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
“中国的商业银行不是真正的银行。尽管他们的IPO和外国战略投资者，但它们基本上是政府控制的存款机构，“他解释道。因此，大多数银行系统实际上是央行的延伸，当然没有独立于政策制定者。高度持续的政府所有权和控制实际上是隐藏在这些所谓的银行书籍的书籍上的无限数量资产池。这不是一个有冒险风险的系统。
“I would tone down the在中国金融部门改革中面临中国面临的选择的Sturm und drang，“凯德尔补充道。“他们在过去十年中做了很多，他们将在未来十年中做得更多，但现在对戏剧性突破的需求就在我卑微的意见中。然而，它确实向企业全球销售了对冲仪器。“
一些市场参与者分享这种乐观的观点。“除非第一个世界股票市场纠正超过10％至15％，否则我不希望中国的大规模违约值得注意，除非是我不期望的10％至15％。总部位于康涅狄格州的交易员说，将有个人违约，但他们可能是“良好的”违约，从错误的商业模式，无能等等，“康涅狄格州的交易员说。“因此，2014年默认可能是一次性的事件，除非在全球范围内酝酿困境。中国仍然是一个装配的游戏，他们[当局]有杠杆来拉动和移动，以便包含传染。“
Cui和他的Bofa Merrill Lynch分析师同样放松。“我们认为，最具风险的产品涉及私人借款人，无利可图的行业，高度债务区域，这些地区在全国范围内的经济上不太重要，当地政府命令很少资源，”他们在其报告中写道。“随着市场听到更多随后的信任违约事件，煤矿矿工或开发人员破产和更高银行不完整贷款，可能存在股票市场的恐慌和传统时刻。”
然而,他们的结论是,“我们不认为它会勒ad to systematic risks in China. Assuming a 25 percent default ratio on trust loans, potential bad debt would be roughly 4.7 trillion RMB, or 6 percent of bank loans.” This has already been fully priced into the valuation of Chinese banks, they believe. Moreover, “from a long-term perspective, this should be a very positive milestone event to establish the ‘credit culture’ among Chinese depositors/investors, curb the shadow banking market, facilitate the cleaning up of zombie companies, reduce banks’ implicit guarantee of off-balance-sheet risks, channel money back into bank deposits and restore global investors’ confidence in China’s financial system and banks.”
“日本的”延伸和假装“在20世纪90年代和欧洲延伸的政策展示了政策制定者几乎无限期地推迟疼痛的能力，”一个康涅狄格州对冲基金经理说。“中国政策制定者显然对信贷和银行体系的控制比其日本和欧洲的开放式同事更加控制，因此更有能力管理”调整“过程的时间。因此，我个人不是一个信徒在一个即将到来的信贷训练中，只是在中国在中国实施改革和自由市场自由化随着时间的推移缓慢流血。目前的领导层迄今为止，他们的改革议程执行了令人印象深刻的技能，因此激发了信贷体系的自由化将得到很好的管理的信心。“
“最终，”一个系统“，两个市场将失去其目的，不再需要存在，”预测田中的安迪刘强。“最终这将只是”一个系统和一个市场“。政府通过促进与私人资本的混合所有权并迁移到银行借贷以外的资金来源的改革国有化的计划将随着时间的推移改变这一模型。”
专家意见的共识，包括上文如上所述，这表明2014年将有违约，可能是其中一些，但更广泛传染的风险是苗条的。关于这一风险的人群的智慧，或至少对市场的判断，人群的智慧是什么？
外国债权人可能是难题的一小部分，但他们会在中国的整体信用评级上投票。在Chaori Solar的违约之后，在3月中旬的五年内债务的信贷违约债务价格跃升至99个基点，而截止日期为63个基点。价格在4月中旬的价格缓解回到89个基点。
但中国储备员的想法是什么？如果我们的专家是正确的，中国国内焦虑对信贷违约呈现出最大的传染风险。为了衡量这一点，我的前普林斯顿Faaez Ul Haq设计了一个软件工具，可以随着时间的推移提取中国社交媒体对话的音调和体积。它采用自然语言处理技术来搜索中国微博影片中的关键词模式，从新浪微博上抽取1％的谈话，这是中国最大的中国微博服务，每天约有1亿张柱。这是同一个Sino Weibo，筹集了2.86亿美元，并于4月16日在纳斯达克上发行公开发售。
Strikingly, a search for Weibo posts with the character compound for “shadow banking” leaped from low background noise up to a sharp peak on January 7, when the State Council’s Directive 107, laying out measures to bring the shadow banking system under control, leaked to the public domain. The frequency of citations has eased since then.
但是，在1月4日和3月16日和3月16日，突然在Chaori Solar和浙江兴战违约后突然飙升，为“信用违约”持续的Weibo帖子。
From these Weibo filters, it looks as if the State Council directive focused China’s blogosphere on shadow banking, and then the first actual credit defaults seized bloggers’ collective attention. Any subject that has the attention of tens of thousands of Chinese netizens is likely to catch the attention of party leaders, who themselves use Weibo to monitor the pulse of the public, given that reliable opinion polls on sensitive subjects are few and far between.
The political risk of the Great Credit Experiment is harder to judge and moves more slowly than the flash-crash of a financial contagion, but it could be even more threatening to those at the apex of the Politburo.
“四大银行形成了党的政治权力的核心;他们在一个封闭的系统中工作，风险和估值由政治菲亚特管理，“在他们的书中得出结论Carl Walter和Fraser Howie，红色资本主义。“Any material liberalization of this framework would strike at the heart of a system that is designed to benefit the party and these same oligopolies.”
换句话说，为了使经济增长，从而保持与中国公众的合法性，党将不得不冒险破坏自己的权力基础。这对任何政治制度的任何领导者来说都是一个急剧挑战。
The first step for success is taking charge and eliminating all challengers. As Brookings-Tsinghua’s Kroeber observes in a March paper, “After the NPC: Xi Jinping’s Roadmap for China”, “Perhaps the biggest surprise of Xi’s first year was the speed with which he consolidated his power and signaled his policy intentions. He achieved this through two big housecleaning drives.”
前中央情报局与长experienc我的同事e in China agrees. “Every cadre and every SOE manager in China has his head under his desk, hoping his name isn’t on one of Wang Qishan’s lists,” he mused over a cup of green tea in Hong Kong. “I’ve never seen it so tense, not for decades.” The newsstands from Beijing to Hong Kong are loaded with magazines about the infighting, with glossy cover photos of a smiling, confident Xi Jinping (clearly enjoying a triumphal, almost imperial tour of Europe), a glum Bo Xilai and an even grimmer Zhou Yongkang.
 |
InChina 2030，刘和张某及其DRC同事警告说，即使没有金融部门的基本改革，也可以想象中国可以想象的高度经济增长。最终，这些扭曲和失衡会破坏社会稳定，减缓生产力增长和侵蚀竞争力。未来迫使经济自由化的潜在衰弱效应，以及政府缺乏综合方法和协调一致的行动，只能用于加剧负面后果。“
I can imagine the unhappy faces of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee absorbing this stern economic medicine, only to have Liu & Co. raise the ante again, this time to politics, as they further advised: “Financial reform can progress successfully only when accompanied by institutional and organizational reforms. Liberalizing market rules without changing old institutions can deepen distortions.”
勇敢的话。作为沃尔特和howie得出结论红色资本主义“中国的所有机构安排都是无常的;由于情况和政治权力的平衡，一切都可以改变。所有机构都在发挥，甚至是最古老，最重要的。“除了中国共产党当然。
詹姆斯唱is lecturer at Princeton University’s School of Engineering and Applied Science (jshinn@princeton.edu）纽约市Teneo Intelligence的首席执行官。在华尔街和硅谷的职业生涯之后，他担任中亚的国家情报官在中央情报局，担任五角大楼亚洲助理助理秘书。他在Kensho Technologies，剑桥，基于Massachusetts的数据分析公司和CQS，基于伦敦的对冲基金的CQS的咨询委员会提供服务。