Why Argentina Chose Default Over Paying Off Holdouts

这是本不该发生的违约。就在一周前，专家们满怀信心地预测，阿根廷将同意向拒不履行债务的债权人支付他们一直要求的15亿美元，这源于阿根廷上一次违约发生在2001年。作为回报，阿根廷最终将重新进入资本市场，重新激发投资者对其农业和油气资源的兴趣，并恢复经济增长。布宜诺斯艾利斯著名经济学家米格尔·基格尔（Miguel Kiguel）说：“这将是白天和黑夜的区别。”。

但7月30日，解决僵局的谈判破裂，总统克里斯蒂娜·费尔南德斯·德基什内尔（Cristina Fernández de Kirchner）选择了新的违约，而不是违约caving in to the holdouts,who are led by hedge funds NML Capital, an arm of Paul Singer’sElliott Management Corp.,and Aurelius Capital Management. They had won a ruling by New York District Court Judge Thomas Griesa that their bonds be paid at face value before Argentina makes payments on any of its restructured debt. If other holdouts had joined the suit, it might have cost Argentina up to $12 billion to settle with them; the government probably would have paid with new long-term bonds.

“For a country that isn’t otherwise carrying a large debt load, that really isn’t much,” says Alberto Ramos, New York–based co-head of Latin America economic research for Goldman Sachs. Argentina’s debt stood at a manageable 45.6 percent of gross domestic product at the end of last year, and the country has $29 billion in reserves.

So what went so terribly wrong? The government and even many of its political adversaries argued that paying off the holdouts might open the floodgates to far more onerous demands by the majority of creditors, who years earlier had agreed to swap their bond holdings for new issues of deeply discounted bonds.

随着危机接近高潮，这一可怕的替代方案的最有影响力的支持者之一是前经济部长罗伯托·拉瓦尼亚（Roberto Lavagna），他负责监督阿根廷在2001年债务违约后的巨额债务重组。2005年，拉瓦尼亚通过了一个持怀疑态度的阿根廷立法机构，将债务重组法案中的“未来出价权”（即RUFO）条款付诸实施。该措施向2005年接受减持高达75%股份的债权人保证，在2015年1月1日之前，政府不会向任何持牌人提供更好的交易。如果政府在那一天之前反悔，它将不得不赔偿所有接受减记的债权人。到2010年，只有7%的原始违约债券仍在持守者手中，他们继续要求按面值全额支付。

拉瓦尼亚告诉记者：“如果没有鲁福条款，我们就永远无法获得绝大多数债权人对债务重组的同意。”亚博赞助欧冠在违约前几天。“而现在，所有那些金融部门的骗子都有意忽视向顽固分子支付他们所要求的款项所涉及的风险。”

根据拉瓦尼亚的说法，这些风险最终可能导致阿根廷损失高达1200亿美元，这一数字包括2001年创纪录的950亿美元主权债务违约加上应计利息。不管这个国家是否真的要为如此巨大的一笔款项负责，政府和反对者都几乎肯定地接受了这一论点。拉瓦尼亚的一句话也是如此，即阿根廷在1200亿美元的“海啸”和“台风”之间面临一个痛苦的选择，即因未能全额支付持反对意见者而导致违约。拉瓦尼亚说：“台风不会像海啸那么严重。”。

There is a consensus both in Argentina and abroad that a default this time around would not be nearly so devastating as the last one. In 2001 the country had already suffered through three years of recession that left a quarter of the workforce unemployed. “Back then, Argentina had terrible problems of liquidity and solvency,” says Kiguel, executive director of EconViews, an economic consultancy. “Today, Argentina is facing a much smaller debt. Whatever liquidity problems it has can be remedied quickly through a better economic policy. And the country is a lot more solvent than, say, Greece.”

即便如此，新一轮违约仍将严峻考验阿根廷。失业率是7%，而这个国家刚刚进入衰退期，到年底可能会使国内生产总值（gdp）下降4%。通货膨胀率已经达到了35%，可能会飙升到40%以上。在黑市上，美元兑比索的汇率比官方汇率高出50%，预计还会继续攀升。

In the days leading up to the default, cabinet chief Jorge Capitanich disclosed the government’s plans in the coming months. It will continue paying interest to holders of restructured debt through deposits at the Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase & Co., among other banks, even if those institutions withhold payments in keeping with Judge Griesa’s directives. The government will also continue to negotiate with the holdouts until January 1, when the RUFO clause expires — leaving open the possibility of reaching a deal next year.

An earlier resolution is also possible. Banks including Citigroup and JPMorgan were reportedly in discussions with the holdouts about buying their defaulted paper, which could pave the way for Argentina to resume payments on its restructured debt. Prices of that restructured debt took a hit after the default but still traded at levels that indicated investors were betting on some kind of private sector solution.

与此同时，在国内，政府将通过向消费者提供购买住房、汽车和家用电器的宽松信贷，以及向中小企业提供低息贷款，努力缓解日益恶化的经济衰退。

但是，只有15个月任期的费尔南德斯总统可能会面临越来越多的政治指责，因为经济恶化。省长们，大多数都是像总统这样的贝隆主义者，会发现发债即使不是不可能，也是很困难的。这将对定于2015年10月举行的大选造成更大的伤害。政治风险咨询公司欧亚集团驻华盛顿分析师丹尼尔·克纳（Daniel Kerner）说：“我认为克里斯蒂娜没有自己政党的支持，无法跟随她展开一场漫长而疯狂的战斗。”。“我的感觉是，他们只是希望这一切尽快结束。”

但总统依然坚定。“我没有t going to be threatened by warnings that the world will collapse, because what most concerns me is my historic responsibility to my children, grandchildren and the millions of Argentineans,” she said on national television a few days before the default.

Polls indicated that most Argentineans preferred a deal with the holdouts over another default. At the annual exhibition of the Argentine Rural Society in Buenos Aires last week, Alberto Mazzoli escorted his wife and two daughters past a display of prize pedigree cattle and recalled his own experience in the aftermath of the 2001 default. He was finishing up a degree in engineering at the University of Buenos Aires when that crisis exploded, leaving him with no prospects of employment in that field, so instead he became a mechanic at an auto repair shop in Avellaneda, a southern suburb of the capital.

“I shouldn’t complain because there are many who are much worse off than I am,” says Mazzoli. “But I wouldn’t want to see people’s livelihoods crushed again for no good reason.”

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