Book Review: Warren Buffett and His Investing Ground Rules

Warren Buffett中国的选股奇才催生了自己的文学流派。有关奥马哈神谕的书籍数量堪比一些美国总统的书籍。

这个图书馆的最新条目，沃伦·巴菲特的基本原则：世界最伟大投资者合伙信中的智慧之言,回到巴菲特的新领域first partnership letters, written a half-century ago. Author Jeremy Miller, a research analyst at摩根资产管理, delves into Buffett’s correspondence from the 1950s and 1960s and finds that Buffett hasn’t budged from his underlying principles of value-driven, commonsense investing.

The letters “provide timeless principles of conservatism and discipline that have been the cornerstone of Buffett’s success,” Miller explains. They also illuminate a significant development in Buffett’s investment approach, as he moved from his so-called cigar butt strategy to one concentrating on high-quality companies.

In 1956, at age 25, Buffett launched an investment fund with $105,000 he had raised from family and friends. In his early days as a money manager, Buffett was the most value-oriented of value investors. He might have been born after the Crash of 1929, but memories of the Great Depression loomed large for him.

Seeking to avoid risk, the eager young stock picker scoured the markets for bargains he referred to as “soggy cigar butts.” These seemingly undesirable companies had been cast aside; their sullied financial statements drove most investors away. Buffett saw a “free puff” he could wring out of them, extracting some profits with almost no chance of a loss. A mapmaker and a farm equipment manufacturer were among the unloved stocks he bought during this period.

He proved a shrewd judge of companies, and in just a few years the assets in Buffett Associates rocketed from $105,000 to more than $7 million. The soggy cigar butt strategy, alas, proved a victim of its own success. As Buffett’s portfolio ballooned, tiny companies no longer produced the returns he needed.

In the 1960s, Buffett’s focus shifted from cheap stocks with unsightly business models to quality brands facing temporary troubles, Miller recounts. Buffett began to load up on blue-chip stocks such as American Express Co. in New York and Burbank, California–based Walt Disney Co.

尽管如此，巴菲特还是忠于自己作为一个常识投资者的本源——一个会对华尔街的过度行为感到不满的人。就像他会坐视90年代末的互联网繁荣一样，巴菲特对60年代泡沫重重的市场投下了怀疑的目光。在他早期的信中，他抓住机会将著名的成长型投资者如蔡国伟（Gerald Tsai）列为注脚，蔡国伟在建立富达投资（Fidelity Investments）的第一只成长型基金富达资本基金（Fidelity Capital fund）过程中发挥了不可或缺的作用。

巴菲特给伯克希尔哈撒韦公司股东的那封著名的年度信预示着他与早期合伙人的通信是平易近人和富有洞察力的。

He often touched on the miracle of compound interest. In one vintage missive, Buffett mused that the Mona Lisa, which in 1540 fetched $20,000, might have been worth more than $1 quadrillion by the 1960s.

In another piece of pithy analysis, Buffett warned his partners against persuading themselves that they knew how to time the market. After stocks swooned in 1966, Buffett noted that several investors had called him with forecasts of further declines.

“This always raises two questions in my mind,” Buffett wrote. “One, if they knew in February that the Dow was going to 865 in May, why didn’t they let me in on it then; and, two, if they didn’t know what was going to happen during the ensuing three months back in February, how do they know in May?”

巴菲特还抨击过多交易的诱惑，认为大多数投资者在有生之年只买入10次的政策将使他们受益。在20世纪60年代接近尾声时，他在一次卓有成效的竞选之后结束了合作关系。米勒指出，1969年，巴菲特身价2600万美元。当然，他的卓越回报还在继续：截至2016年9月中旬，巴菲特持有的伯克希尔哈撒韦308261股A股价值约670亿美元。

Miller makes the case that there’s nothing flashy or especially complicated about Buffett’s investing strategy. His real genius has been his ability to make sound decisions with great consistency. “It’s an attitude-over-IQ approach,” Miller concludes. “Staying true to one’s process without getting drawn in by the trends is one of the hardest things for even the most seasoned investors.”