几乎每一个巨头我谈到的是，为了提供必要的，实际上，向他们的计划提案国提供必要的，并且实际上承诺的投资表现，他们必须为私募股权进行重大分配（PE）。如果没有PE分配，我经常被这些人提醒，满足7.5％，8％甚至8.5％的回报目标不太可能。因此，他们最终将资金倒入资产类别中，追逐两位数的返回大多数普通合作伙伴承诺他们的有限合作伙伴。我承认，当它做得很好时，PE可能会非常引人注目和奖励。然而，问题是，大多数有限的合作伙伴都不会这样做......根本不这样做。
This problem is exacerbated by the excess demand for what GPs are selling, as it creates an environment in which GPs have almost absolute power to do what they want. As such, the PE industry’s relationship with its own LPs has become downright dysfunctional. Consider this: The SEC recently discovered that more than half of the GPs they were investigating (as part of their阳光project) had “numerous problems“随着他们向LPS收取费用的方式。超过一半？这么低的行业沉没了现在一些GPS必须允许monitorsin their shops just to ensure that nothing shady is going on.
在私人equity investing, as in drinking, the road to recovery begins by admitting that you have a problem. So let me help the Giants with this: You. Have. A. Problem.
这里的银色衬里是PE行业如此倾斜，有利于GPS，即它可以去的唯一真正的方向是朝向LPS。而且，鼓励，有些事情开始移动。越来越多的巨人终于意识到他们需要do things dramatically differently。甚至卡波斯，官僚机构的堡垒宣布它将“把斧头” to its private equity portfolio (which, I must admit, sounds rather un-bureaucratic). Granted, CalPERS currently has 390 PE managers, so the portfolio likely needs a nuclear device to go along with that axe, but this is at least a start. In short, some Giants are realizing that harvesting PE alpha in the decade to come will require breaking the existing model and doing things differently.
要肯定的是，这种破坏不会是为了胆小的核心。顾问，不幸的是，通过将其努力集中在选择现有的GPS上，而不是试图帮助推出新的顾问。有些LPS害怕自己的阴影，更倾向于通过建立的球员挑选他们的口袋，而不是考虑选择更多的GPS的政治和职业风险，这些GPS提供更多的对齐。（虽然这将不可避免地改变，但一旦世界认为LPS的董事会和管理团队在PE中的同意“Feyphezement.“许多无疑是）。这里有一个先例的暴政，增强了一次性获奖者一生。更糟糕的是，LPS对抗GPS之间的协调非常非常努力。LPS休息时间频率往往是为了保护他们试图压力的管理人员的访问。对于许多这些LP来说，这一切太多了，这部分是我们在这种情况下发现自己的原因。
So, can anything be done to right this ship? Is there a path to a more aligned version of private equity? My answers are simple: Yes!
I’ve had the good fortune over the past few years to spend a great deal of time with certain LPs who I believe are doing private equity extremely well. In particular, there’s a $100 billion fund up in Montreal, Canada, and another Giant in Juneau, Alaska, that I’d describe as downright inspirational. Anyway, what I’ve learned from these LPs (in particularly a rather “forthright” individual named德里克墨菲）可以在以下六个见解中概括了井的其他人：
1) Prune:谈到pe关系时，更少的是。LPS需要建立一个集中的GPS组合，与他们有意义的双向关系。巨头需要认识到，PE中的多样化最好在投资组合水平上完成，而不是通过彼此叠加相似的管理者。后一种方法是用于支付alpha费用以换取β返回的配方，这似乎特别是不明智的。这是一个可能对巨人有用的拇指规则：您可以合理地拥有每十亿个PE分配的三个管理者。对PE的分配越大，我越多推向每十亿（其中，清楚）的单一经理，我保留50％的共同投资，并将50％放入基金中）。为了实现这一目标，LP可能需要追求二级销售，以清洁他们的投资组合。今天有很多专家可以帮助这个。如果你不想卖，你总是可以让遗留资金下降。
2) Cultivate:Now that our smart LPs have a more concentrated set of relationships, they can begin to cultivate and harvest these relationships in more creative ways. The obvious way is through co-investments. By committing in size, LPs can drive preferred economics and alignment, but they can also secure favorable co-investment rights to the best deals. This, again, offers a great way to reduce the cost of the overall PE strategy.
3）一个人的资金：As relationships of trust build with the small and aligned group of GPs, savvy LPs will take the time to understand how they can be useful to GPs. This is especially the case in launching so-called funds of one, where the GP creates a fund with a bespoke investment strategy based on investing style, geography or sectors, with relatively few investments per fund. The idea in setting up funds of one is to focus on what the GPs are truly good at, and then allow them to create a vehicle that can target those sweet spots in creative ways. These single LP funds are far more common than perhaps you realize.
4) Seeding:在体育行业中具有更深层次的关系 - 与GPS中交易团队合作的经验 - 完全新的PE公司的可能性变得真实。如果上面的执行良好（特别是共同投资），并且您被视为可信的播放器，那么GPS将开始来到并寻求你。这为LPS提供了一个很好的机会，与GPS，建设和起草共同投资指南更加合作。许多LPS告诉我，他们在这些早期对话中唯一一次对基金会有意义的影响。然而，制定这项工作的秘密调味酱是确保GPS在游戏中将真实的皮肤（不仅有助于延迟费用）。
5) Han Solo:Eventually, with the experience of running the above program well for a period of time, the LP will have a network of folks that can bring proprietary deal flow. This is direct investing in private equity, and it’s a bit of a unicorn among LPs. While many people talk about doing it, very few can do it well. And that’s because it’s not something you can start doing right away. It comes after building a successful and respected PE program. With such a program in place, the LPs will start to see good deals, as their long-term horizon and deep pockets tends to attract the best kinds of corporate CEOs and CFOs to their doorstep.
6）Onramp V. Evergreen?我的生命中有一点是我是常青汽车，永久资本车辆的大支持者。我仍然是这个模式的粉丝，主要是因为潜在的兴趣对准，但我越来越意识到对齐远远超过了车辆的时间。事实上，如果关于基金的一切是错误的，常绿车辆可以通过锁定非常不利的经济学来加剧问题。所以我正在改变我的曲调，并一直鼓励投资者更加深思地了解如何结构和术语（而不是仅仅是福音格林酿造）。为什么不为机构投资者创造一种方式，即支持GPS，在亚博赞助欧冠某些投资中踏入GP的鞋子？换句话说，我猜我提出的是“宣传资金”而不是常绿的资金。
这六个见解为巨人提供了一种合理的方法，以随着时间的推移建立PE投资组合。然而，这不是一种可以快速进行的方法。事实上，我以上所规定的可能需要5 - 10年来实施。这可能会很长一段时间让你感到震惊，但这就是我一直在看的资金需要多长时间。然而，重申，上述方法至少是开始考虑如何实施我想调用的“私募股权2.0”的方式。它提供，我希望，LPS社区的方式开始推动GPS的恶劣行为，并从管理器中获得更多对齐。
Most Giants haven’t yet realized the need to rewrite the rules of engagement in private equity; nor have they been shown a path to doing so. In fact, most LPs are their own worst enemies. Instead of choosing managers in objective ways, they behave like the Marx Brothers (any GP that will have me isn’t a GP that I want in my portfolio). We need to break this viscous cycle. So, here’s to hoping, spurred on by the SEC investigation, that such a path is now visible ...