最近几个月的学术经济学家，市场评论员和投资者已经讨论了今年美国货币政策的适当道路，鉴于我们居住在经济周期的地方。虽然来自这场辩论的两个连贯的阵营 - 既是制定一些与我们有一定程度的同情学位的论点 - 每一方都犯了错误的错误，以免世俗势力的重要性，如technological innovation那that we have identified as holding a powerful disinflationary influence.
更具体地说，愿望营地非常关注经济承受适度的政策收紧的能力，这表明这种行动可能类似于联邦储备面临1937年的情况，在过早收紧时导致极端股权市场抛售和抑郁症恢复的挫折。这个营地争辩说，如果中央银行迁移到政策收紧，那么由于经济恶化，必须以短秩序逆转，其可信度比如果政策制定者仅仅延迟徒步旅行。这是今天尤其如此，否则参数出现，当前充气率低于目标时。最后，在通货膨胀上，由于美联储靠近实现其大部分劳动力市场目标，因此该营地辩称，中央银行不应开始紧缩，直到通货膨胀越来越靠到美联储的2％的目标目标。这一观点的支持者甚至唤起了在他们的论点中的堡垒山之战中唤起了武力，这表明美联储不会拧紧，直到它“看到通胀的白人的眼睛。”
与此观点相比，另一个 - Hawkish - 营地更关注非传统政策措施的意外后果，争论我们不应该驳回猖獗的未来通货膨胀风险。该集团倾向于建议，当判断增长与通货膨胀之间的风险平衡时，今日美联储做的谨慎措施将至少从零束的美联储基金率升降，这将是一个更加平衡的方法比保持过长的低政策率的极端位置。本集团提醒我们，美联储的信誉问题可以削减两种方式，因为中央银行可以太快收紧或尽可能太慢 - 在2000年代中期 - 冒着信誉和经济稳定。
基于我们对证据的阅读，我们分享了霍基里斯阵营对意外后果的担忧，但与该集团的许多人不同，我们并不担心通胀猖獗。相反，我们更关注货币政策如何产生一些可疑的资本分配决策和金融资产价格扭曲，最终可能会使美联储更广泛的目标造成风险。我们生活在一个非凡的技术创新和人口转移的时期，旨在创造一个消极的环境。这种结构融合对美国家庭来说主要是阳性的，因为它在缺乏标称收益时助攻了真正的一次性收入增益。虽然这种动态有助于所有消费者，但对于近年来最多遭受的低到中非收入家庭应该是一个特别的救济。
This has led to a situation in which the Fed appears to be afraid of its own shadow when it comes to normalizing rates. We at BlackRock think the Fed currently has a window of opportunity to move, with stable markets, payroll growth at extremely high levels and foreign central banks — notably, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan — taking the reins of policy accommodation. As a case in point, the U.S. labor market continues to power ahead, creating 2 million new jobs in the past seven months. The last time that 12-month job growth was as strong as it is today, the Fed’s policy rate stood at 6 percent, compared with the near-zero rate now. The labor market is also tighter now than it was in 2006, with stronger positive momentum and more job openings.
当然，Dovish Rejoinder可能会涉及缺乏可观的工资增长在这种经济循环中看到，以及随着通货膨胀运行低的争用，持续存在对当前的住宿水平很少的风险。尽管如此，我们仍然建议有很多证据意味着工资增长即将到来。两个，三分之二和四分之四的变化美国劳动力劳动部成本指数shows solid wage growth in recent quarters, which should gain momentum as labor markets tighten further (see chart).
As Stanley Fischer, vice chair of the Federal Reserve Board, has suggested in recent comments, although the Fed expects to raise rates sometime this year, the central bank would merely be moving from ultra-stimulative to extremely stimulative policy. Effectively, this is taking the first step toward neutral, then slightly positive, real rates. At this stage of the economic recovery, this is hardly a radical policy prescription. In fact, Fed policy today is penalizing储蓄者和现金持有人而借款人中受益。维护of that dynamic, however, could place the credibility of policy at risk, as well as financial stability. The proximate cause of the past two recessions in the U.S. was资产泡泡通货膨胀导致资本误子和最终的崩溃。这令我们担心我们。
We strongly suggest that Fed rate normalization not only will be borne well by the economy but also may actually have a positive impact. Conversely, keeping rates excessively accommodative almost certainly holds an increased risk for markets. Based on our interpretation of recent economic data, it is clear to us that a zero or negative real Fed funds rate is the wrong number relative to present growth levels. The great irony here is that whichever camp you ally yourself with — or if you agree with our view — the investment implication that follows is much the same: a fairly broad-based derisking of portfolios and elevated cash holdings related to your respective worry.
董事总经理Rick Rieder是基本固定收入和美国的主要投资官员固定收入黑石in New York.
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