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NFL草案可以教我们关于投资的信息

NFL general managers and investors tend to make the same mistakes, paying too much for glamour and neglecting solid, albeit duller, performers.

Institutional investors spend tremendous time, money and effort drafting their portfolio of investments and investment managers. Similarly, National Football League teams spend millions of dollars on scouting and analysis, trying to select the best players in the rookie draft. Can investors learn anything about selecting investments by studying how NFL teams select players — including the most recent NFL draft?

答案是肯定的。我们之一(Thaler)共同写了一篇关于NFL选秀中的错误的论文with Wharton professor Cade Massey. The main finding: In spite of spending so much time and money — and the huge stakes involved — NFL teams still make big behavioral errors that let smarter teams draft better and win more games. The primary mistake: NFL teams pay too much for the right to pick early in the draft. Understanding the sources of these NFL draft miscues can provide useful lessons for investing in stocks.

对于投资者来说,有两份大课程。首先,最好的球员不一定是最好的选秀权 - 就像最好的公司一样不一定是最好的股票购买。平均地与第一轮选秀者采取的球员不提供尽可能多的团队value- 与他们的成本相比表现 - 随着以后的回合所采取的成本。价值问题。其次,NFL总经理 - 就像投资者 - 为魅力付出太多,忽视较近的,坚实的表演者。具体而言,NFL总经理经常超过早期回合选秀权,因此他们可以起草一个诱人的星星 - 就像许多投资者一样,为迷人,快速增长的公司提供多付,忽视雄厚但不太令人兴奋的。

第1课:最好的球员(或公司)不一定会使最好的选择。

显然,团队不随意挑选球员,并在草案早期服用的球员平均比以后所采纳的球员更好。但足球运动员不免费工作:早些时候的选秀权必须支付更高的工资。因为足球队有团队薪水帽,但薪水不仅仅是一种财务成本;这也是机会成本。团队为一名球员支付的越多,在其他球员上花费的钱越少。即使是Peyton Manning也需要Linemen阻止和接收者抓住他的通过。因此,选秀草案的投资回报不仅仅是玩家的原因是多么好,但玩家与他的成本有多好。

通过草案招聘玩家的独特方面是,玩家的谈判能力非常有限 - 他们的薪水主要由选秀草案时确定。虽然NFL新秀薪水很高,但它们并不像同一个口径的老将球员的薪金那么高。换句话说,起草球员的大福利是管理者可以以较低的成本获得伟大的球员。粉丝可以无休止地争论佩顿曼宁还是汤姆布拉迪(2014年超级碗获奖者)一直是更好的四分卫,但是没有辩论,这是一个更好的选择选秀权。曼宁被选中,第一次挑选并从第一天支付了大笔工资。布拉迪是199,5选择,所以在他的合同的早期,爱国者们在旁边没有得到他的服务(足球条款)。

The paper studied all the players selected in the NFL draft from 1983 to 2008, and for each player computed his “surplus value” — that is, the performance he provides to the team minus his compensation. Figure 1 is a graph of the results. The top line shows that performance does decline as the draft proceeds — teams do know something! But while performance declines with later draft picks, compensation also declines. So for any player, surplus value is performance (the top line) minus compensation (the second line). And here’s a result that is shocking to most football fans: Surplus value increases throughout the first round of 32 teams. And even later rounds provide almost as much surplus value as the first picks.

挑选玩家时的价值很重要 - 以及选择股票时。伟大的公司经常赚得昂贵的股票。有一条长长的研究表明价值库存有更高的回报。例如,an early paper by Werner De Bondt and ThalerDoes the Stock Market Overreact,展示了价值股票(过去三到五年的回报最低的人) - 就像后来的选秀权一样,平均值提供了更好的投资回报。随后的研究发现,这种简单的价值衡量标准在货币中表现,政府债券and商品。On average, value works.

今天,我们担心投资者遗忘,因为他们堆积在更昂贵的政府和蓝筹公司债券中时,请注意高价投资。我们怀疑投资者 - 像NFL总经理一样 - 忘记了价值的重要性。

Lesson 2: NFL general managers (and investment managers) overpay for glamour.

在NFL团队被分配七轮选秀权(以前一年的榜样相反)后,NFL GMS通常会进行挑选。而NFL总经理将疯狂的价格提前挑选。考虑2014年草案,当布法罗放弃未来的先决赛选秀权(和更多) - 只是从第九到第四个草案。基于多年来的几十条交易,图2绘制了任何选秀草案的任何选秀草案的平均贸易价格。

虽然二轮挑选的剩余价值(即第33次挑选,给出32支球队)略高于第一个选择,但商品价值约为0.2,只有五分之一。换句话说,您通常可以交易第一次选择五个第二轮挑选 - 尽管第二轮选择提供比第一个剩余更多的剩余。谈谈机会。

这为什么会发生?一个行为的原因是爱rconfidence. Many teams are just certain that if they had one of those early picks they could select a player who will be a star. But predicting the future is really hard. If you compare two players at the same position taken consecutively — for example, the third and fourth running backs picked in the draft — what do you think is the chance that the earlier one will turn out to be the better player? If teams were perfect forecasters the chance would be 100 percent; if they are flipping coins it would be 50 percent. How do teams do? Just barely better than chance. The player taken earlier has just a 52 percent chance to be the superior player.

在早期选择的另一个原因是超支的,它们反应过度限制数据并进行极端预测。团队不仅仅是预测球员将成为一个NFL起动器;他们预测他会成为一个超级巨星。在2012年草案中,华盛顿红斯金斯非常有信心罗伯特格里芬三世(或RG3,因为他被称为他所谓的)将是一个伟大的四分卫,他们给予了三年来的第一轮选秀权来获得他。虽然RG3有一个好的新秀一年,但他受伤了很快就会失去他的起始工作。与此同时,罗素威尔逊,第75次在同一草案中采取的四分卫,到目前为止,他的团队队到了两个超级碗。超过RG3的过度减少是一个糟糕的投资。

团队越来越聪明吗?并不真地。在最近的草案中,费城老鹰似乎据称尝试向前或第二次向前移动,也提供至少两个先进的选秀权和多名球员。我们采取:Tampa Bay和田纳西州(前两所选择的业主)犯了一个错误,不接受老鹰的侵略性报价。

我们发现最有问题的决定是坦帕湾利用它的第一个选秀权到Jameis Winston草案,这是一个曾经与入店行窃的法律重复过刷的Heisman Trophy Winner草案。即使坦帕湾在现场活动中不关心潜在的声誉伤害,在今天的NFL中,它也很容易想象温斯顿被暂停,又是另一个违规行为 - 和暂停的球员不会赢得比赛。最重要的是,没有人能知道Winston的大学成功将转化为NFL成功 - 记住平均只有52%的机会,他比第二次起草的四分卫更好。简而言之,坦帕湾在一个风险的篮子里放了很多鸡蛋。相反,该团队本可以达成一项贸易商达成一项贸易队以获得多个先进的选择和优质球员,从而获得更多样化的投资组合。

虽然今年的老鹰报价很高,但显然它不够高,坦帕湾或田纳西州贸易不够。我们怀疑球队正在学习,不要像对2012年的RG3所做的那个一样疯狂,但拥有高级选择的团队仍然要求疯狂的价格愿意放弃他们的高挑选。这有点像在下降中发生的事情房地产市场。There are lots of For Sale signs but not many sales because sellers are reluctant to accept less than their neighbors received before prices fell.

但是,在2015年的草案中,团队之间有20个交易,其中一支球队得到更多选择,寻求魅力的团队们早先挑选。我们会幸福地打赌任何人在超过一半的交易中,那些有更多选择的团队将最终得到更好的交易。

Another anomaly found by Massey and Thaler is that teams use a simple rule of thumb to trade picks from this year’s draft for picks in next year’s draft: If you give up a pick in a given round this year, you get a pick one round earlier next year. While this might not seem unreasonable, it translates to an interest rate of 137 percent per year. Presumably, most of the billionaire owners of NFL teams did not acquire that kind of wealth by borrowing at such high rates.

通过结合今年的多个后方选秀权的交易策略,为明年进行高级选择,智慧汇票 - 交易团队(如新英格兰爱国者)平均赢得1.5场比赛每季更多 - 巨额一个16场比赛。

Similarly, smart investors can win in the stock market by trading against biased investors. Research has found that fast-growing, sought-after stocks earn low returns on average, while conservative, neglected stocks earn high returns on average. Whether “fast-growing” is measured by past three-to-five-year returns or asset growth and whether “sought-after” is measured with trading volume or Google searches, the results are the same: Neglected stocks perform better. Similarly, a study of plan sponsors found that sponsors hire managers with glamorous past returns and fire managers with poor past returns — but in the future the fired outperform the hired. Why? Investors overreact to past performance. Smart investors should avoid overreacting.

Biased investors see high-flying stocks (or funds) and imagine they will go up forever. Smart investors sell glamorous stocks and buy neglected stocks instead.

作为投资者 - 像NFL总经理一样 - 我们都有行为偏见。我们过于自信。我们过度反应。克服这些偏差的诀窍是使用纪律文件的清单和识别我们自己偏见的指导方针。廉价被忽视的股票不一定是最好的公司,而是像后方循环选秀权 - 往往是最好的投资。

raife giovinazzo是加利福尼亚州圣马特索的富勒斯和泰勒资产管理研究总监。Richard Thaler是富豪&thaler资产管理的主要原因,芝加哥大学行为科学和经济学教授,芝加哥大学展位业务学院和最近发表的作者行为经济学的行为经济学