不可持续的利用是D如何riving Market Mayhem

Equity and credit markets were bludgeoned this month after中国’s currency devaluationconfirmed what the commodity bust had previously hinted: Global output is in trouble if its main demand engine is stalling.

问题看起来比产出问题更深刻，更广泛。多年来，多年来的普遍资本和资源误包在经济体中有乱扔垃圾金融碎屑，今天没有明显的出口，以便在足够大的规模上获得更多信贷来进行有意义的宏观经济影响。8月份市场混乱可能只是一个不可持续的全球经济杠杆的表现，这一结构问题不太可能轻松消失。第一次捍卫这个论点需要持续的金钱和信贷审查：

•人类欲望可能是无限的，但经济需求需要手段，即金钱或信贷。

• Credit is a direct claim on money, not a claim on assets or production. (One may not pay off a bank loan with a sofa bed.)

• The global stock of money and credit is technically unlimited in the current global monetary regime.

• The global value of money and credit is functionally limited over time by the ongoing value of global production and assets.

• The total value of money theoretically equals the value of everything not money. If the two values are not in the same ballpark, then they will eventually be brought closer together through either price deflation or by increasing the money stock.

• Lots of money relative to credit creates no future problems for asset values and production. However, lots of credit without lots of money (for example, leverage) demands that either credit be destroyed or more money be created.

Despite quantitative easing, there is an overabundance of systemic leverage presently, which implies that more money must be earmarked for future debt service and repayment and that global growth can no longer rely on an animal-spirit-driven business cycle. This structural headwind may practically explain economic and market dysfunction in China and beyond.

In the 25 years since the Iron Curtain fell and China opened its stock markets, global production migrated from mature economies to emerging ones with lower manufacturing costs. Cheaper goods and services exported from emerging markets generally displaced higher-cost producers in developed markets. EM economies effectively exported deflation (and imported inflation), whereas the opposite was true for DM economies. Deflationary pressures in DM economies encouraged their central banks to pursue inflationary policies to keep asset prices stable.

Domestic debt loads also expanded in places like China, despite lacking credible currency boards, deep and domestically sponsored capital markets, adequate regulatory controls and trustworthy court systems. Such economies relied on trade and foreign investment, prompting policymakers to use their currencies as blunt tools to promote mercantilist agendas. Credit and debt grew large but lacked stable financial infrastructures.

与此同时，DM经济体的经济政策制定者继续保持过于容易的货币条件，以抵消从EMS进口的抵消通货紧缩。财务和真实资产导致，为消费者提供财富效应，这些消费者可以有效地借用较高价格的资产抵押品来消费商品和服务。税收扣除兴趣也鼓励经济信用创造和债务假设。证券化创新进一步创造了债务从未被灭亡的看法。商品和服务生产成为资产收益的衍生品，这已停止成为资本资本形成的副产品。

The tipping point came in 2008, when U.S. markets implicitly acknowledged that financial leverage had raised asset prices to levels irreconcilable with sustainable production. Global DM policymakers dropped overnight lending rates to zero, ostensibly to recharge (that is, releverage) their economies. It was too late. The risks inherent in leverage were exposed to the masses. Policymakers, unwilling to let their economies naturally adjust prices to better reflect production, began to create new base money in the form of bank reserves. (Base money creation effectively covers “short money” positions that were created by banks when they originally lent M1 and M2 into existence.) This partially deleveraged bank balance sheets but did not deleverage households, corporations or governments. In fact, according to a study by McKinsey & Co., the global stock of debt outstanding has increased by $57 trillion since the financial crisis.

价格和生产价值的和解似乎是不可避免的，给予过度的全球杠杆，过度的全球产量和资本驱动信贷需求的下降。借助于资产价格的金钱创作被证明是一种无效的经济兴奋剂。这提出了一个非常不方便的真理：全球商品，服务和工资的价格的自然路径已下降，而服务的必要性不良债务继续上升。

监测情况，经济学家和政策制定者一直关注债务到国内生产率比。这就像在吃掉冲浪板时保持一只鲨鱼。依靠这种指标作为警告标志有三个明显的问题：1）GDP只告诉我们去季度发生了什么，并没有对推动未来产出增长的激励措施。2）产出是一种经济流量的衡量标准，而债务已成为需要维修的永久库存项目（以及我们敢于偿还）。3）GDP计算包括金融产出，金融造成比其参与者的商品和服务生产更多的债务。因此，债务到GDP比率并没有告诉我们经济相对于债务服务挖空生产的程度或程度。

Finance is critical to economies when there is a surplus of productive capacity in relation to available savings, and perhaps even more critical (cynically speaking) when it is politically advantageous to sustain the appearance of normalcy. But finance is not commerce. Today there is global overcapacity and negative net real savings (adjusted for debt), and, without a new outlet for credit that captures the world’s imagination, we should expect the frequency of asset de-leveraging and currency devaluations to rise.

具有讽刺意味的是，这种可怕的宏观经济状态并不一定意味着下降世俗资产价格。与美联储一样，强势中央银行拥有无限的资产负债表和暗示的授权，以保持银行抵押品（名义资产价格）稳定。

保罗布罗德斯基是创始人Macro Allocation，坦帕，佛罗里达州的宏观经济和市场研究和分析公司为顾问，投资者和信徒。