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两个危机的故事

Investors could learn from the different responses to crises by central bankers in emerging markets and the U.S.

一个lthough the U.S. historically has lectured emerging-markets policymakers, it might be time for the U.S. to be the student. Comparing the policy responses of Asian governments to their financial crisis in the late 1990s with the U.S.’s response to its financial crisis generates a stark contrast.

亚洲危机的原因包括被高估和挂钩的汇率和不可持续的资本流入亚洲政府和企业债务。Crony资本主义加剧了这些误子。美国危机也是由资本的政策激励误报以及金融机构杠杆造成的。

亚洲政策响应阐述所谓的华盛顿共识。尽管经济衰竭,所需的央行需要徒步旅行率,以保留和吸引资本流入。最终需要货币贬值来保护保留,并改善外部余额(通过降低进口,增加的出口和增加的资本流入)。财政赤字急剧下降。允许或强制违约,允许破产金融和企业机构。甚至有政治反应 - 泰国总理和印度尼西亚的总统失去了职位。请记住,尽管基于美元的GDP和股票市场跌幅约为50%,但仍然提出了这些痛苦的政策选择。

政策工作。亚洲的金融制度(除中国可能的例外)是更健康的,国家资产负债表更强大,该地区的大部分经济体都是美国的债权人,而且增长是所谓的发达市场经济的倍数。事实上,创造的财政和货币“空间”允许这些经济在美国危机卷绕时执行财政和货币刺激。

Despite being the source of the Washington consensus, U.S. authorities implemented completely opposite policies when the 2008 crisis hit. The Federal Reserve reduced interest rates and embarked on experimental balance-sheet expansions, which are ongoing. Bank debt was guaranteed. Worse, off-balance-sheet derivative liabilities of banks were guaranteed in secret, with the Fed lending $16 trillion to prevent a run on derivatives. Fiscal deficits were expanded.

Though one could perhaps justify such behavior if it were conditioned on the fiscal authority getting its act together — “We’ll give you the liquidity, but you have to address your solvency by controlling your budget and the banks” — there was nothing of the sort. The central bank is, in fact, rewarding political authorities by lending at suppressed interest rates indefinitely and indirectly creating too-big-to-fail banks. Perhaps most worrisome, there has been virtually no political fallout (excepting the now seemingly coopted Tea Party and Occupy movements).

把自己放在一个新兴市场中央银行储备经理的鞋子里,他们必须决定哪些国家的债券市场应该弥补银行的储备金。这是据说黄金已成为一个明显的储备资产或加拿大,墨西哥,挪威,俄罗斯,韩国等国家都在看到他们的债券,弥补了全球中央银行储备的成长部分?

I should note that although I have only mentioned the Asian crisis, there were similar policy responses to crises in Eastern Europe, Northern Europe and Latin America. If one listens to authorities in “hard-money” countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, this divergence in crisis responses puts the U.S. in a potentially isolated position.

哪些国家的债券可能最终找到进入央行的储备资产,寻求政策混合更接近自己的混合物?墨西哥,俄罗斯和尼日利亚立即想到。墨西哥拥有世界上更具技术知识和独立的中央银行之一。利率实际上很高,通货膨胀是锚定的,政治当局正在通过实施持续的低财政赤字和揭示新的改革方案来响应。俄罗斯和尼日利亚的央行不是正统的,但他们也越来越富有通货膨胀。

底线是外国中央银行不仅仅是购买黄金。他们还在购买分享其政策框架的国家的债券。请注意,许多这些债券由基于商品出口的外部盈余国家发布。从某种意义上说,中央银行正在获得其国家将来所需的商品支持的收益率。Similarly, for U.S. investors, if the dollar is not as likely to have the same purchasing power as it does now to buy a barrel of oil in the future, shouldn’t some portion of their wealth be in bonds from countries with strong policy mixes, backed by commodities for which future demand seems fairly certain?

Eric Fine是一名常规董事,Van Eck Global在纽约和Van Eck不受约束的新兴市场债券基金的投资组合经理。

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