I spend my life trying to convince large beneficiary investment organizations – such as pensions, sovereign funds and endowments – to act in innovative ways, to adopt new models of investing, and to cultivate more aligned access points to assets and risk factors needed to achieve long-term objectives. I do this because of two deeply held beliefs:
1）创新支付：最好的投资者是接受金融市场不断变化生态系统的投资者，因此他们自己不断探索创新。良好的投资思想不会永远持续，这意味着有很大的奖励，以便尽早发现新的机会，并迅速以创业方式行事。当然，因为大多数机构投资者群体，有返回的投资归还亚博赞助欧冠广义。实际上，一些最好的机会在资产类孤岛上没有整洁。
2）创新拯救：金融服务业正在服用太多的“馅饼”的份额。这是一个放置的行业100个人在Forbes 400上，占A的企业利润的三分之一，对于一个实际上没有做任何事情（Zing）的行业也很好。在我看来，太多的机构投资者在阿尔法的祭坛上亚博赞助欧冠失去了他们的大理石。正如我所看到的那样，节省费用和费用是投资业务的唯一无风险回报。但为了抓住它，是必要的创新。
总之,我热爱创新and unconventional thinking to these beneficiary organizations. However, my passion often runs into structural problems that limit funds’ ability to act creatively. And one of the single biggest culprits in this regard is the Prudent Person Rule.
在世界的金融市场周围，看到了谨慎的人统治时间和时间再次作为受益投资组织的受托人，董事和信因的指导灯。例如，在美国，审慎的人统治说，信托人必须仅仅符合受益人的利益“with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character with like aims.”
This sounds sensible, sure, but it has some foul consequences. Specifically, the big problem with prudent-person rules are the perverse incentives they create for pensions to avoid innovation and hold onto convention.
研究实际上表明了这些规则推动投资组织拥抱基准并避免做任何让他们从人群中脱颖而出的事情。根据Russell Galer of the OECD:“要找出普通的审慎人员正在做什么，一个人可以，非常自然地看一下作为基准的同行平均水平或相关指数。Indeed, trustees are likely to find themselves in breach of their fiduciary obligations – and potentially legally liable – if their plan’s investment performance (or the performance of any investment manager that they have engaged on behalf of the plan or fund) is consistently below average and they have taken no steps to address the situation.”
Also, asGordon Clark of Oxford University has noted:“而不是期待并成为社区规范和公约适应不断变化的环境的过程的一部分，而受托人可能会在过去的情况下寻求避难所，尽管是加强公约的成本。”
Consider the example that the Prudent Person Rule makes an explicit case for diversification “so as to minimize the risk of large losses.” What about the possibility of big gains? Investors are nothing more than risk managers, so shouldn’t they be allowed — and sometimes encouraged — to manage risk in concentrated pools or in new ways? Let’s not get into the fact that a broadly diversified portfolio of assets you barely understand is more risky than a concentrated portfolio of assets you know well and have a high conviction in... let's just focus on doing things differently from the crowd.
Anyway, as I see it, one of the key governing principles of our beneficiary institutions — the very principle meant to protect them — is partly to blame for their inability to innovate and professionalize, which renders them vulnerable to the powerful interest of the finance industry — and facilitates these intermediaries in extracting rents that far exceed value created by the finance ecosystem.
但是，这不是所有坏消息，实际上都有一个工作，允许真正的创新投资者超越谨慎的审慎概念和信托责任（看起来左，然后右）：它是对等协作的。
我确信这一专栏的读者已经注意到我这样做很多工作关于受益机构如何以新的和创造性的方式聚集在一起，以促进创新。我的个人观点是，对等协作可以显着增加组织的资源基础。它还可以为创新和创业主义提供独特的“动作空间”，因为同龄人可以分享成本，池资本和多样化的暴露。除了那些因素之外，如果养老金可以说服同龄人 - 这也是信徒 - 与他们合作，他们几乎根据定义履行审慎人统治下的义务（差不多）。
总而言之，投资者社区需要认识到“谨慎的人”不会长期成为一个非常成功的投资者。过度多样化和基准拥抱并不是这项业务成功的谱系。对不起。我对这些基金的建议是试图共同选择同行基准的概念，并沿着与您的创新之路带来同行。在我谦虚的意见中，将是谨慎的。