风险投资的“资助基金”在哪里？

在硅谷的风险资本家感觉非常好。返回开始趋势。高调出口很常见。普遍合作伙伴的筹款变得越来越容易。甚至希望推出首次资金的新VCS。而我通常很高兴看到新的进入者 - 新的资金往往是新的模特 - 我不开心。这些新的VC中的许多人都是“我的”球员;希望复制山谷中最好的vcs，而不是尝试从根本上的东西。

这实际上非常有问题。为什么？这个行业需求的最后一件事是同一件事的新作物。高调退出，我们都应该欢呼，尚未转化为LPS的更好的风险调整回报。截至2014年6月，VC行业已设法在Russell 2000 - 在过去十年中对罗素2000的“价值加入”的一个往返的基本要点！是那些18个BPS值得vc的费用，锁定和无效吗？不。事实上，大多数LPS想要在公共市场Comps的400到600个BPS，每年，以证明风险投资作为资产类别。因此，现在可以看到VCS吹嘘任何事情是显着的。

The traditional models of venture capital continue to fail the broad community of investors. To be fair, over the past decade new models have been launched to try to better align the interests of the VCs with the entrepreneurs; let’s call this VC 2.0 (see Founders Fund, A16Z, ffVC, and so on), but these models haven't yet addressed the needs and interests of the broader investment community (i.e. the funders or LPs). And this raises an important question: What should VC 3.0 look like? In my view, VC 3.0 is about connecting the funders with the founders in the most streamlined, cost-effective mechanism available. Only when we can do that will the promise of Silicon Valley riches be realized for the broad community of LPs in venture funds.

具有讽刺意味的是，VCS将告诉您，任何具有不满意客户和高盈利的现有的行业都是成熟的中断。现在是vcs照镜子的时候了。

But before I discuss ways in which LPs might catalyze real creative destruction in the VC ecosystem, let’s start by flagging up the key problems I see in this asset class today:

费用：每个人都有一种感觉，费用结构是顶级VCS的影响：2.5％的基础和30％的携带。我知道这是一个普遍的主题，但我相信，这种行业的许多问题都可以在这个结构创造的问题激励措施中找到。但而不是花太多时间专注于这些奇怪的激励（我触摸下面），让我改为为什么我相信这些费用没有合理：让我们在硅谷说“资本主义河流”以20英里/小时流动。这是这样做的，因为19世纪的遗产的遗产（詹姆斯舔，莱斯特佩尔顿等）;斯坦福和伯克利的影响，美国宇航局和洛克希尔的资金，威廉·施谢和“叛逆八”的作用;惠普等公司的成立者，IBM和Apple;风险的文亚慱体育app怎么下载化服用;欢迎移民政策;等等等等。 Venture capitalists, for their part, spotted a fast-moving river and, to their credit, jumped in, adding another 2–3 mph to the downward path of the flow. Relative to the ground, then, VCs here in the Valley can swim up to 23 mph! That's remarkably fast — faster than anywhere else in the world — which is why we see so many game-changing companies coming out of our "river." But the problem with VCs is that they want to get paid for swimming 23 mph, when really they are only swimming 3 mph.

路径依赖：Lucky investors look smart; smart investors develop brands. Top entrepreneurs want the top-brand VCs because it’s validation that their idea is sound. Many don’t need VC money, and they often don’t need much help either. But the brand-name VCs signal legitimacy to the broader marketplace. As such, these brands fall into a very favorable, path-dependent position: being lucky and appearing to be good allows you to be good for real. How can upstart VCs (which might offer more-aligned terms) hope to compete with this kind of competitive advantage? Moreover, how can anyone trust a track record developed while working for a brand VC? I personally wouldn’t have great faith in any mid-level partners looking to set up a new shop on the back of brand-name performance (not that you’ll actually get to see audited performance numbers, as these funds use secrecy to reinforce their privileged positions). Once ex-brand VCs are on their own, the top entrepreneurs may stop coming to them. And so the power of the brands is reinforced, which gives them even more pricing power over the marketplace (see above).

Alignment:有限合伙人希望GPs与他们的利益投资最小d. But because of the fee structures and path dependence, most GPs end up being permitted to maximize their own interests, and the interests of LPs is often a distant third (after the entrepreneurs they back and themselves). The size of funds is one illustration of this misalignment. Asset managers of all stripes have a big incentive to increase the assets under management, but in VC there is considerable evidence that fund size is negatively correlated to fund returns (see the Kauffman report). Put simply, big funds perform worse. And yet many VCs will push hard to get as much capital in the door as they can, even offering different funds with different mandates (seed, early, growth, green-growth, digital-growth, etc.). Layering these funds offers GPs big paychecks through fees even if the carry checks never materialize.

Distortion:If you’re running a $500 million fund with a 2.5 percent base fee and a premium carry, generating a good internal rate of return requires returning 2.5–3-times invested capital back to LPs. But even returning 1x (i.e., zero percent return) requires generating $625 million in profits (assuming a 10-year fund). In order to deliver a 3x, then, you’d need a handful of portfolio companies with enterprise values in the billions. In other words, instead of swinging your bat with a view to hitting singles and doubles — and cheering when the ball goes out of the park — VCs today are, in Babe Ruth fashion, calling their shots. They are pointing that finger out to center field and swinging with all they've got. But calling shots doesn’t necessarily work well; when you’re swinging for the fences you're using an approach that can often result in strikeouts.

干涉：The need to generate massive, billion-dollar exits (as above) has driven VCs to become unhelpful partners for some entrepreneurs, pushing them to "go big or go home." As such, many entrepreneurs have come to view VCs as more destructive than helpful. Here’s anall-too-frequent viewI hear about VCs today: “Every smart CEO and CTO I’ve known has viewed VC money as a deal with the devil: In exchange for the money, you commit to constant interference and endless pressure to deliver the goods earlier rather than better.” In addition, this focus on billion-dollar exits — instead of being happy with hundred million-dollar exits — means that VC money isn’tflowing它应该的地方。

In sum, despite the positive vibe you see around the VC industry today, I’d argue that the VC industry is not yet ready for a renaissance — it’s ripe for disruption. The big question, then, is how do we shift the VC industry into something that is more aligned with the LPs; how do we create a generation of “Funders Funds” that truly deliver on the promise of Silicon Valley for pensions, endowments, foundations and other capital providers?

To start, LPs need to act like investors and stop being allocators. If you’re job is to fill buckets full of VC, you’ve already lost. This isn’t the type of asset class in which you can spread money thinly across many managers; you’ll pay alpha fees for beta returns to an underperforming asset class. Rather, LPs should think about innovative and thoughtful ways to deploy capital. Much of this will require mounting challenges to the existing business models, but it will also call on some VCs to break rank and partner with innovative LPs in new ways.

Aside from new and innovative LP/GP partnerships, I also believe that LPs are going to have to begin doing things on their own. They need to spin out teams — from VCs, but also from other types of investment vehicles, such as family offices or corporate ventures — and they are going to have to dabble in direct investments. Crazy? Nah. With the Giants I work with, we’ve already been doing these things. In fact, I can think of three institutional investors that are in the process of seeding or spinning out new venture firms right now; all three are here in North America. Anyway, I could rattle off many other funds trying to do creative things: The Municipal Employees’ Retirement System of Michigan is直接investmentsin local companies. Singapore’s Temaseklauncheda new group, the Enterprise Development Group, to seed managers. The Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System, The Wellcome Trust, and AIMCo have been做有趣的事情也是。列表继续，它很快就会变得更长。

Most GPs I talk to genuinely believe that LPs are not capable of doing creative things in this space. For them, it’s a self-evident truth that what they do could never be done by the likes of a public pension. I personally disagree, but let's accept that as a given. The reality is that they actually don’t have to do the same job. All they need to do is find other people to do the same job, on better terms. That, my friends, is not as hard as GPs would have you believe.

无论如何，鉴于LPS越来越有兴趣播种新GPS，这是我认为他们应该专注于确保成功的地区列表：

治理：These vehicles should have governance arrangements (i.e., independence) that set them up for commercial success. It’s fine to impose certain constraints on strategy — it is very common for venture funds to raise capital based on specific industries or geographies — but the GPs need the flexibility to generate high returns. This is basic but as you’ll see below, I’m all for governments, universities and companies to use their own inherent advantages to drive high returns. But that only works if the governance is right.

Talent:This is an extension of governance; you have to be able to recruit the teams to ensure the success of these vehicles. By no means am I saying that you need to hire mainstream VCs — I’d personally go the other way — I am however saying that you need people that have been around the block as an entrepreneur or investor and know how to keep the train on the rails. This means paying fair compensation. If you pay bananas, you get monkeys. But you also shouldn’t believe VCs when they tell you that you have to pay them premium carry; the convention today demands it but the future won’t support it. As I said, VCs want to get paid for swimming 23 mph, when really they are only swimming 3 mph.

Lower Fees:If you bring the fees down, you change the entire incentive structure for the GPs, which is a good thing. We may ask the new VCs to look for doubles and triples rather than grand slams. And this focus may, in some cases, lead to gross returns that are somewhat lower. But the net returns we hope will still be higher. And the return per unit of risk should also be higher. Who’s going to take all the crazy risks, then, ask all the VCs reading this? The same people that are taking it today: angels, super angels, universities, companies, and so on.

不公平的优势：LPS播种GPS应该寻找不公平的优势 - 就像现有的GPS享受的那种归因于道路依赖 - 并利用它们。这可能是与知识产权开发或专有研究产出相关的排他性权利（例如，政府企业，大学企业或公司企业）。我认为一些主权发展基金甚至大学正在努力催化和捕获通过新的风险车辆在自己的生态系统内创造的一些价值。你为什么不呢？再次，如果您有治理和团队，这似乎是一个不公平的优势。用它！

Smart Beta:I’d suggest that there are a lot of VC strategies that can be automated and run based on a series of heuristics and triggers. Don’t kid yourself: most of the top VCs today operate in this manner. Here’s what they want to know: Who are the other VCs in the syndicate? How big is the target market? Has the management team had a successful exit? Are the off-list references stellar? You could almost put brand-name VCs on autopilot sometimes.

专注：LPs should think thoughtfully about informational advantages and focus on specific verticals (education, health care, finance). As the world becomes complex, generalist platforms will struggle to adapt to new industrial opportunities — see the experience of VCs with green energy companies. It pays to have domain expertise.

Commitment:LPS不应该让GPS从未来费用收入获取贷款，以便为GP提供个人承诺。我想看看GPS将大个人赌注放入基金中。这希望驾驶管理团队维持“高强度工作”为12-24个月。

Ethics:Obvious and critical. Never overlook ethical transgressions; it’s a heuristic for long-term success.

无论如何,让我总结的后退一步:Perhaps the best thing that VCs can be doing today is asking themselves who their customers really are. Seriously. Remember the saying, “The customer is always right”? I’d wager most VCs would say that their primary customers are the entrepreneurs they work with to build businesses. I understand the logic, but that’s not really true. The customers are the LPs that fund the partnerships and the underlying businesses. But today the LPs aren’t happy. And so something's going to have to change.