多德-弗兰克法案的意外后果

银行一般可以预期耐或负的规定作出反应。多德 - 弗兰克华尔街改革和个人消费者保护法案 - - 当使用2300页新的法律和面临的数千页的监管规则，由国际司法机构平行行动加剧的前景，业内高管预见的勃然大怒。多德 - 弗兰克法案颁布两年后，搓手继续。的委托法规的数十名尚未完成，而政策制定者的事件，如全球曼氏金融控股公司的崩溃和摩根大通公司的交易惨败斗争。当华盛顿后者促使呼吁更多紧急通过沃尔克规则 - 多德 - 弗兰克规定，禁止自营交易的某些形式 - 反驳说，没有肯定，完全实现的规则就可以防止摩根大通的烦恼行业的维护者。如果仍然有争论到一个特定的感知问题如此高调的监管措施的有效性，这是什么暗示对改革工作的整体质量？从某些方面多德 - 弗兰克的批评更是包罗万象。富国银行公司的退休董事长兼首席执行官Richard Kovacevich，在最近一次讲话中称，如果法律是为了减少机构资产的集中被认为太大而不能倒闭，它严重错过了标记。更严格监管的行业 - 认为航空，制药，电信 - 越有可能是由几个大的玩家，可以更容易地承受比可以更小，更-财大气粗的实体规负担为主。“你怎么能在政府决策的信心，” Kovacevich要求在斯坦福大学经济政策研究6月12日，“当他们决定使经常有来自他们正在努力实现这一目标完全相反的影响？” Kovacevich is among those who say increased bank capital, intended to protect balance sheets in future downturns, is slowing credit expansion and hence the economic recovery. U.S. over-the-counter derivatives dealers warn that too many Dodd-Frank restrictions — which they contend are more appropriate to protect individual investors than to apply to their wholesale businesses — will drive transactions onto overseas markets. No matter how big or well intentioned, any reform package will have flaws. What was lacking in Dodd-Frank was more fundamental: an understanding of limitations and history. The act was a product of politics and rushes to judgment, attacking symptoms with little regard to root causes. In his 2007 book, A Demon of Our Own Design, Richard Bookstaber, a former hedge fund risk manager who is now an adviser to the U.S. Treasury Department, described the financial system as “interactively complex” and tightly coupled; if one component fails, there is little margin for error or time to adjust. Financial markets have these characteristics in common with jet airplanes, nuclear power plants and other systems prone to “normal accidents.” “The natural reaction to market breakdown is to add layers of protection and regulation,” Bookstaber wrote. “But trying to regulate a market entangled by complexity can lead to unintended consequences, compounding crises rather than extinguishing them because the safeguards add even more complexity, which in turn feeds more failure.” The post-2008 crisis response was a layering of complexity upon complexity unprecedented only in degree. Kovacevich pointed out at Stanford that in the late 1970s and early ’90s, “we piled on more and more extensive and burdensome regulation without addressing the actual causes of the crisis or the ineffective regulatory system that allowed it to happen.” Construction of a workable, modernized regulatory framework would begin with an acceptance of the realities of the complex, tightly coupled system that the financial industry is. Prudential regulatory models designed for small or regional banks may not work. Fresh thinking is called for, and, paradoxically, it may start with simplicity: back-to-basics statements of principles and objectives, as well as an understanding of the value of risk-taking and of markets’ role in disciplining it. The regulatory mind-set needs to be agile and expansive, not rigid and prescriptive.

欧洲保险和职业养老金管理局(European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority)主席加布里埃尔•贝纳迪诺(Gabriel Bernardino)今年4月在都柏林的一次演讲中表示:“没有任何监管要求可以涵盖所有这些复杂性。”“这只是意味着我们需要务实，接受监管中一定程度的缺陷，并多样化用于应对日益增加的复杂性的工具。“••

Jeffrey Kutler是全球风险专业人士协会出版的《风险专业》杂志的主编。