Is the Age of the Powerful Asset Owner Over? It Might Be.

In theHistory of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides — that guy you were forced to read in college history — wrote, “The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”

His adage finds expression today in the power asymmetry between asset managers (the strong) and asset owners (the weak). While asset owners, like the people of Melos, might like to believe that they hold a position of parity with asset managers, there’s little evidence to support that.

This power asymmetry is clearly manifested in misaligned fee schedules and liquidity terms, and in the often infuriating passivity with which asset owners consume the products offered up by asset managers.

In spite of these “minor” inequities — which asset owners tolerate and perhaps moderate through private negotiations (i.e., side letters) and “strategic partnerships” — the elemental compact between owners and managers has remained firmly in place, reliant on the belief that asset managers would place their clients’ interests ahead of their own and act as good fiduciaries.

It appears this compact has been compromised.

作为一位辉煌的年轻副CIO，最近告诉我 - 没有一丝讽刺或难以置信 - 一些“最大众所周知的蓝筹股基金经理”取消了对其投资管理协议的任何涉及信托义务的参考。

And, perhaps even more Trumpian than President Trump himself, they are telling prospective investors that they will engage in activities that will not be in their clients’ best interests.

Furthermore, the deputy made clear that these asset managers consider that proviso nonnegotiable: There is sufficient demand for their products that asset owners either accept the terms or step aside for the next in line.

Here is the fullest expression of the imbalance between asset owner and asset manager. In renouncing fiduciary duty, asset managers are explicitly recalibrating the power structure of the owner–manager relationship to a position of extreme asymmetry: “I owe you nothing. You have no leverage other than investment. You are powerless in this relationship.”

这是一个销售人员的梦想 - 以及一个cio的噩梦。

我的轶事研究支持这一资产管理人员拒绝信托税的费用，在Vanguard中有少数经理。它还揭示了这是一个相当近期的现象。资产所有者确认，最近五年前，他们可以在合同中得到任何他们想要的任何术语。也许来自公共资金的金钱墙到几个对冲基金和私募股权和风险投资公司的手中挫败了这一变化 - 但无论原因如何，这是动力动力的地震转变。

The seizing of this power by asset managers could be characterized as a rational commercial response to maximize the value of their businesses (such as, fiduciary duty is the ultimate portfolio constraint vis-à-vis the fundamental law of active management).

However, paraphrasing technology theorists Vasilis Kostakis and Michel Bauwens, this newly defined asymmetry creates and propagates an artificial scarcity of knowledge, subjecting innovation to contrived restrictions and allowing for profit maximization and capital accumulation. The result is both paradoxical and dramatic: While this power structure cannot produce the desired risk-adjusted returns net of fees, it simultaneously inhibits the development and deployment of new solutions that could meet the needs of asset owners. Put simply, the increase in these managers’ assets under management and their ability to act in their own best interests has completely failed to result in a corresponding uptick in innovation or in performance.

On the other side, asset owners’ acceptance of this extreme asymmetry is hardly rational because it provides, at best, access — a benefit that is incommensurate with the abdication of fiduciary duty (after all, it’s not like they are getting access to the Medallion Fund).

It’s important to recall two things: The asymmetry between asset owners and asset managers (even in its weakest form) is a relatively modern phenomenon, which can be traced to the late 1960s, when we saw the formation of the first independent institutional investment management firms and investment consulting firms (and the start of Institutional Investor).

其次，基本条款没有没有资产所有者的机构管理人员。

资产所有者的权力是他们能够说“不” - 拒绝现状与他们分配大笔患者资本的能力。我的副CIO每次走出不利的结构化交易时都表达了他的力量。但是这种离散的抗议行为将变得更改。

Actual change will require asset owners to be genuine, vocal advocates for their beneficiaries — individually, through acts of rejection of misalignment and transparent communication; and collectively, through active participation in asset owner–driven organizations seeking to reset the fulcrum in the balance of power (e.g., the Alignment of Interests Association and the Institutional Limited Partners Association).

In a word, asset owners need to act like the fiduciaries they are.