贝姆和财富

在亚洲金融危机的高度，基金经理Tan Chong Koay削减了他的薪水，抛弃了他的二手雷克萨斯，并开始在其中一家翻新的“商店” - 两层楼建筑中乘坐公共汽车到他的狭窄的办公室 - 下面有一个商店以及上面的所有者的生活宿舍 - 在新加坡老城区的Tanjung Pagar。谭先生们在狭窄的会议室，谭先生，而不是邀请客户在临近的餐厅享用午餐，而不是他的四岁公司的一卧室。该地区的许多小型投资服都合并或折叠，但谭决心挂断。他想为他的员工设定一个例子 - 他的工资他没有削减，以免他们戒掉最好的。

“人们开玩笑说我生存多久，”谭朗克斯。“但我收紧了我的腰带并削减了我的成本。我知道我只需要几个月，事情最终会转向。”

当他晚上才骑着伐木队的房屋时，谭会仔细考虑第二天购买的被击败的股票。“危机对我们来说是一个很好的机会，”他现在笑着说。“幸运的是，我及时出去了，正如市场击中底部就坐在很多现金上。”

果树果实（发音为“FEEM”）被成为新加坡和马来西亚的最佳资产经理之一，1997年和1998年。在“97年”，当时新加坡海峡时报指数陷入了25％，谭的公司已经下降了只有7％，而在98年，当STI下降大约7％时，Pheim几乎是平的。在动荡爆发之前，谭已经兑现了，他继续减少他的股权，因为市场更深。在1998年中期，就在底部之前，他再次开始购买。今天他称之为他有史以来最好的一个 - 它让他很多钱。

标准普尔和潮流今日将Pheim资产管理评价为该地区最成功的投资管理房屋之一，三个，五年和十年回报。咨询公司Watson Wyatt Worldwide计算了普利马的马来西亚资金，自成立以来连续11年以来连续11年，并且其新加坡基金在连续十年中表现优于他们的基准。

"Anybody can outperform an index over six months or even one year," says Tan. "But outperforming the indexes and all your peers over five years or ten years is what gives you a track record."

55岁的棕褐色的棕褐色，多年来不得不骑公共汽车（他现在推动一个全新的雷克萨斯）。他的30人公司管理了26亿马来西亚林吉特（7亿美元） - 六次在'98年底积累的六次 - 使其成为东南亚最大的私营投资公司之一。仍然总部位于新加坡港口的旧商店，普利现在拥有五个基金：Pheim东盟新兴公司增长基金，普米维多利亚基金，达娜·麦尔普普基金，Pheim新兴公司平衡基金和普利普收入基金。资产去年增长了40％以上（帮助日本的Aizawa Securities Co.的8000万美元任务），并来自于亚洲各地。

Pheim's clients -- almost all of them institutions -- include some noteworthy names. One is Government of Singapore Investment Corp., which manages more than $100 billion for the city-state. "For a small boutique fund management house like ours," Tan brags, "we have been given a lot of money to manage by GIC." (He cannot disclose how much.) Another regional heavyweight that invests a sizable sum with Tan's firm is Malaysia's $65 billion-in-assets Employees Provident Fund. Tan says that most of Pheim's clients are European fund managers and European insurers but that it also caters to some Asian investment firms and a significant contingent of high-net-worth individuals.

谭现在也许是新加坡最着名的价值投资者，现在正在引领东南亚以及印度和中国的投资行动较大。同时，他认真地追加零售投资者之后的准备 - 只要，他们只占普利姆的5％。谭预测，在接下来的三到五年，他的公司将能够每年在25％至30％的管理层下的资产，或者大约两倍于东南亚资产管理行业的步伐。

Yet he doesn't intend to be any rasher about expanding than he is about choosing stocks. "We are ready to grow regionally, but one step at a time," Tan vows. "The key in China and India is finding the right partners or having a strategic tie-up with an existing financial services player. We are still looking around, talking to people, but these are emerging markets where the asset management industry is still in its infancy, so we believe there is no need to rush. If it takes us another six months, a year, to find the right partner, do all the homework, so be it."

Putting more emphasis on retail customers by selling them mutual funds should foster Pheim's growth at home as well as in other Asian markets. As more and more Southeast Asians go gray and discover to their horror that they haven't saved enough for retirement, they will clamor to invest with top-performing firms like Pheim. Or so Tan reasons. Within 20 years South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand are projected to have a median age of about 40, compared with just under 30 now. For Hong Kong and Singapore, where the current median is also just shy of 30, the future figure looks closer to 50.

“我们需要成长我们的零售业，”谭强调，注意到普利定期从个人投资者查询。“直到现在，我的哲学一直是，为什么浪费时间和努力，当你建立你的机构企业时浪费时间和努力？”他补充说，“随着我们多元化和发展我们的业务，”零售和机构部分将同样重要。现在我在未来十年内看到零售业的增长潜力更多，我们希望挖掘该机会。“他的雄心勃勃的目标是在五年内建立零售资金到30％的行动。

Yet doing so could be harder than achieving double-digit returns. Investment industry insiders in Singapore say that Pheim has a great track record but is neither well known nor well marketed outside its home base. Tan himself wryly concedes, "My problem is I am not good at marketing myself or our business." Nonetheless, he has been, until recently, resistant to hiring marketing professionals. The trick, as he acknowledges, will be to find a pro who gels with the firm's culture and, though he doesn't say it, with Tan himself.

该公司的方法有怀疑论者，普遍认为，普利最终将被一个大型金融机构渴望在亚洲扩展的大型金融机构购买 - 并充分宣传国际营销。然而，谭说，他怀疑任何人都想为他买出来，他没有认真对待销售。“即使有人想买Pheim，”他用耸耸肩说：“他们希望通过为我提供股份和长期合同来让我保持周围。”

“简单”是Tan描述他的投资哲学。“我只投资低估的股票，”他说。"I don't believe in being fully invested at all times, because Asian markets are far more volatile than developed markets like the U.S.'s. I believe in trimming equity exposure when the market is near its peak, to preserve capital and increase exposure in equities when, in my view, the market is near its bottom."

AHA，购买低价并卖得高。当然，搭便车只是在做出这样的动作时才知道。谭一直在努力让他的时间接近三十年。

在马来西亚的西北部的禅宗小镇出生于大型海外中国贸易家庭，他在父亲的规定店后占放学后工作。他学会了很节俭，通过观看肥皂和米饭的父亲交易来保持简单的事情。谭仍然找到了在附近的槟城岛上的高中工作的时间，并在1974年以1974年毕业于西伊利诺伊州大学毕业，毕业于西伊利诺伊州大学。

他始于吉隆坡吉隆坡的职业生涯，位于马来西亚和新加坡的第一家本地拥有的单位信托经理和今天的马来西亚工业发展金融集团的一部分。他展示了一个用于识别小型，不受广动的股票的诀窍，并且很快被命名为投资组合经理，监督主要投入小帽子的增长基金。1981年，他加入了阿拉伯 - 马来西亚商人银行，然后是马来西亚最大的投资银行（现在是Ammerchant Bank），作为首席投资官。五年后，谭通过推动阿拉伯马来西亚吉尔斯，这是一个投资马来西亚政府和银行支持证券的共同基金，今天拥有超过10亿美元的资产。1987年，阿拉伯马来西亚协助摩根斯坦利＆Co.在推出纽约证券交易所博物馆的马来西亚基金 - 第一个马来西亚封闭终端基金。咨询公司William Mercer＆Co. 1988年命名为Tan Malaysia的顶级基金经理。

One year later Germany's DG Bank (now DZ Bank) recruited Tan to manage a Southeast Asia equity fund out of its Singapore office. He boosted performance, in large part by channeling much of the fund into small caps: Within two years assets had soared from $18 million to more than $120 million. His reputation grew along with the fund, and in 1990, John Govett (Asia), the Singapore arm of the U.K. investment firm, offered him the job of director of investments for all of Southeast Asia. Two years later Tan was managing $75 million for Govett Emerging Companies Fund and $30 million for Govett's Singapore Sesdaq Fund while developing a Southeast Asian warrants fund on the side.

香港从香港到印度尼西亚的股票市场在1993年翻了一番。谭的Sesdaq基金投资于新加坡的二级公司 - 主要是一分钱股票 - 248％飙升，而其基准飙升110％的升级，塞斯达克指数。虽然他的基金的表现感到高兴，但谭感到不安。“到1993年11月，当我的基金已经超过200％时，我正在考虑自己突击并开始自己的基金，”他说。在年底，棕褐色清除了他的办公室，并开始在吉隆坡寻找自己的便宜空间。为了他的惊喜和喜悦，通常会缓慢移动马来西亚官僚，并立即给予他投资管理许可。

“政府非常热衷于发展马来西亚作为金融中心，他们正在推出他们鼓励像我这样的当地专业人士设置商店，”谭解释道。“我一直想为自己工作而不是在伦敦或那些真正不懂亚洲市场的波士顿回答一些老板。”

In January 1994, Tan launched Pheim Asset Management with a secretary and one other employee, a senior fund manager who has since retired. The firm operated out of a tiny two-room office in Kuala Lumpur's UBN Tower, which adjoins the Shangri-La Hotel. (Tan confides that he got the space cheap because although it was a corner office, it was wedge-shaped, so nobody else wanted it.) Most of his friends gave the firm two years, he says. Some reassuringly told him that failing on his own would be a good learning experience because it would toughen him up for the jostling on the fast track as a mutual fund executive.

谭先生的总部首选是新加坡，但城市 - 州的货币权威使他倒闭，因为它只授予公司300个顶级投资经理的公司排名。在一定之处，他在1995年初再次申请了新加坡许可证，并在基础上获得了一个 - 否定了他的基金的整体表现。在任何情况下，新加坡在此期间都自由化了规则。谭现在从新加坡运行菲利姆，但每周至少花两天的时间在吉隆坡的马来西亚联盟公司每周花费两天。

从开始时，他加载到他觉得最舒服的股票中：低估的小帽子和中央插座。它被证明是一种精明的策略。Pheim的马来西亚新兴公司成长基金于1996年增长45％，而吉隆坡综合指数为24％。

A reporter for the Asian Wall Street Journal, who had heard that Pheim was making a killing in small caps came to call just a few weeks, as it happened, before the Thai baht collapsed in early July 1997, triggering the Asian financial crisis. Tan told the journalist that he was bailing out of stocks and taking refuge in cash. A story headlined "Wary Investor Set to Sell Pricey Shares" appeared on the paper's front page, adding to Tan's reputation for foresight once the crisis erupted. His strategy, of course, was more than just good public relations for the firm: By sitting on a pile of cash when interest rates were on the rise and stocks were in free fall, Pheim beat the indexes hands down in 1997 and '98.

1999年末，Tan将他的技能展示了他作为市场预测者的技能。由于技术股票达到了历史新高，他警告说，任何关心的人都要倾听，是时候削减股票的时间 - 最重要的是，倾倒任何股票任何与技术有关的事情。谭在当地的功能旁边把业务记者拉出来，他的耳朵弯曲了他的故事即将到来爆发。1999年底，故事在亚洲华尔街日记中担任，加入（足够很快）到Tan的避难所的市场。

The Pheim founder was by no means technophobic. In July 1998 he had accumulated 2 million shares of a small Malaysian semiconductor-assembly company, Unisem, at the IPO price of RM5.10. The stock fell to RM3.50 but then shot up to more than RM44. Tan sold at an average of about RM30 in March 2000 for a sixfold gain.

"Sure, Unisem went up another 20 to 25 percent after I sold, but the trick is getting out in time," he says. "You should take a profit if you're sitting on a six-bagger by selling it at a very high valuation instead of hoping it will become a seven-bagger." Eight months after he sold the stock, Unisem plunged to little more than its IPO price.

谭坚持认为，他不是“小型股票之王”，因为他被东南亚洲媒体被称为“亚洲新闻界”，特别是财政每周的优势，该周边在新加坡和马来西亚出版 - 指出此类股票现在占Pheim投资的30％以上。其余部分通常由增长或价值库存组成，其中许多中型。尽管如此，他被识别出小帽，有充分的理由。正如他所说的普利姆的早期，“如果我们只关注大型股票，我们就不会表现出索引，我们不会有轨道记录来获得新的投资授权。”

从一开始的阿拉伯马来西亚商人银行和少数民族投资者和少数民族投资者（5％）的Malek Merican从一开始就是他的职业雇员说，“他是一个喜欢他所做的事情的工作狂 - 寻找有趣的小公司，投资他们并看到他们成长并繁荣。“

The term "workaholic" is especially apt for Tan. "The best value is in small and midcap stocks," he declares. "But it's a lot of hard work. Big asset management firms that pay their managers huge salaries just don't have the time to talk with hundreds of little companies in the hope that they'll get lucky with one or two. For us, this is bread and butter. We keep knocking on doors, keep looking until we find the gems."

谭维护，彻底的公司知识对挥发性东南亚市场至关重要。他的Modus Operandi是通过要求他们在午餐或晚餐中向CEO或CFO建立融洽关系，并用礼貌地铺平，但有关商业条件的问题。他和Pheim的十个其他投资专业人员 - 新加坡五星和马来西亚五个 - 还制作了套管工厂和纽扣 - 钻孔总监。他们也检查了客户和竞争对手。他们的目标是通过远远超出其公布的财务来实现公司的真实衡量标准。“你需要仔细了解公司并了解其业务，以判断它将在哪里，”谭指出。“如果我不太了解经理，我不会投资股票，对他们的管理风格不满意。”

作为一位企业家，他可以同情小帽公司的首席执行官，谭维持，大概是因为他感觉类似的压力和诱惑。“这是你注意到的小事，”他说的是他的公司访问：一个自命不凡的办公室装饰，也许或者在首席执行官的停车槽或者是一个快乐的跑车的习惯太快或表演当他问一个问题时，不耐烦。“一个好的小型经理需要成为人们的好法官，”他说。

谭助给他有时误读了首席执行官，因为一个愤怒的浩老板而传递了一家公司，他们将他击败他作为鲁莽的侵略性和傲慢的傲慢，但在某种程度上成功地推动了股票价。“我不介意在一两个或两个中错过，”谭说，“如果我能避免进入一些坏人。”

How does he zero in on stocks? For a start, he doesn't count heavily on sell-side research, which is scant or nonexistent on most small- and midcap Southeast Asian stocks. "Brokerage reports and sell-side research is important for ideas or as a secondary source," Tan says. "But we have a strong in-house team of analysts who are our primary source." His firm employs four analysts, who are always subject to being approached, if not poached, by larger firms because of Pheim's reputation. Some have succumbed to the blandishments over the years, but most have stuck around for long periods.

谭顺斯公司拥有高杠杆和现金流动疲软。他奖出了良好的增长势头和定价能力。“我不仅仅是为了低价收益比率，而且还有低的价格到账簿比率和更高的利润率，”他说。他认为操作透明度非常重要。他还更喜欢经理拥有具有重要股权的业主的公司。他说，与传统的智慧相反，家庭经营的公司没有那么糟糕，因为该家庭拥有足够大的股份，以确保公司支付良好的股息。

尽管如此,他始终坚信Pheim不会被运行like a family firm, even though one of his two daughters, Tan Wai Szi, is a business development executive in the firm's Singapore office. "Pheim is no family business," Tan says. "I have tried to create an institution, and I'd rather not have any involvement of family or friends."

Tan can be just as strict in defining an undervalued stock. "I ask myself, 'Is this a stock others would eventually want to buy?'" he says. "You might think a stock selling at a P/E ratio of 6 is cheap, but it could go to a P/E of 3. Undervalued stocks can sometimes become even more undervalued. There are a lot of other factors to look at. Sometimes investors don't understand a company or its business model."

Worse, he adds, they're prone to behaving irrationally. "When we see an undervalued stock go from $5 to $15, instead of asking whether it has become overvalued, we start to rationalize that still has more upside," Tan says. "Somebody tells you it might actually go to $40, and you think you can safely get out at $35. When it crashes to $20, you're still wondering if that was just a minor correction before a rebound." By contrast, he says, a proper value investor "will do his homework and might get out at $15."

谭的出售理念听起来很简单：“我卖掉了我相信的股票很快就会被别人出售。”他争辩说，大多数货币管理人员在它在被踩踏事件中碾过之前，大多数金钱管理者都非常高估了他们从小帽子股票的能力。平均Pheim持有九至15个月的股票。“我的投资组合中有一些宝石，我曾举行过超过七年，”谭说，虽然有目的地说，他有“失去的数量”，他在仅仅几周甚至几天被抛弃了。“坚持糟糕的股票只延长痛苦，”他说。他的投资组合中最古老的持股是马来西亚建筑材料和建筑公司WCT工程，他开始在近九年前购买。它今天交易三次他首先支付的东西（在调整分裂和奖金股份后）。棕褐色沿途采取了利润，但持有几股。

七年前，在他在他的彭博终端注意到，在他的彭博码头一天晚上那天遭遇了一场繁重的销售，谭在马来西亚石油和天然气服务公司略高于RM3的份额。作为亚洲金融危机的一部分，已发送对话卷合是一个更广泛的市场抛售。然而，谭先生窥探公司，并确信它是一种声音价值。“有时我会得到一个非常好的交易，因为我看到股票中很多销售，”他说。“投资者可能只是卖，因为他们认为其他股票将更快地上升。”

多年来，Pheim在对话上进行了数百万美元，仍然是其较大的股东之一。TAN认为公司现在有希望，因为它迎合了蓬勃发展的石油和天然气服务部门。对话框股票贸易超过RM0.50;Pheim的成本（考虑到奖金股份后，十次股票分裂）小于RM0.10份额。

“请谭是一个非常困难的人,但他做到了been a very supportive shareholder," says Ngau Boon Teik, Dialog's CEO and controlling shareholder. Ngau reports that Tan constantly grills him and his managers and that just when they think they've answered every conceivable query about the business, he comes back with another one. "He really cares about our company, and he tells us that he wants to grow with us," says the CEO. "I don't think he is in it just to make a quick buck on our stock."

The most controversial -- but seemingly successful -- aspect of Tan's investment style is his unrepentant market timing. "In Asia's volatile markets," he argues, "if you get your asset allocation and timing wrong, you can be in a lot of trouble. And, sure, you can never buy at the very bottom or sell at very top, but as long as you buy undervalued stocks and sell them when they are looking overvalued, you will get the timing pretty much right." A value strategy, suggests Tan, has the serendipitous benefit of forcing a portfolio manager's hand in timing decisions: "You have lots of money to buy at the bottom of the market and not much money to burn at the top."

如果谭将被他过去骑行的那辆公共汽车碾过，那将成为普利姆资产管理是什么？批评者描述为典型的单人商店。谭承认，他一直是普利海背后的动力 - 他仍然拥有新加坡臂的65％和45％的马来西亚人 - “我以某种方式交上动手”。然而，他发誓这个“并不意味着我不委派或者没有我在这里没有任何事情发生。”Pheim的十一半的十大投资专业人士是特许金融分析师。

“我们是一个非常精瘦和卑鄙的组织，”谭说。"I try to outsource anything that's better done by others [chiefly, back-office chores]. Although we don't pay as well as some of the large U.S. or European houses, we have a dedicated team of people who like the freedom that I give them." In any event, the former marathoner and squash player, who still looks fit, says, "I intend to go on for ten years, maybe longer." Still, Tan says: "I need to single out a No. 2, a successor. I have been so busy building up the company that I guess I have ignored an important element -- identifying a successor." Within a year or two, he pledges, he will have a second-in-command in place.

Tan likes to rattle off statistics indicating how important small and medium-size enterprises are to Southeast Asian economies. "Small, innovative companies play a very important role, and without them no economy [in the region] would have real growth," he says. "Small-cap entrepreneurs, if they are honest, hardworking, dedicated and run companies with a good business model, must be supported by investors, especially if their stock is selling at ridiculously low valuations. If fund managers don't encourage them by investing in them, who will?"

Plenty of imitators of Pheim, that's who.