圣地亚哥的新学校

投资者在智利几乎不能否认:traditionally polite, slow-paced financial landscape of Santiago, the country’s capital, is these days displaying a rough-and-tumble competitive style reminiscent of Wall Street. Local observers point to an incident two years ago at the Bolsa de Comercio, the stock exchange in Santiago, as the harbinger of this change. That was when Anheuser-Busch Cos., the U.S. beer colossus, decided to sell its 20 percent stake in Chile’s largest brewer, Compañía de Cervecerías Unidas, or CCU, and agreed to have the shares auctioned off by global giant Deutsche Bank and Chile’s prestigious LarrainVial, a white-shoe investment bank with a seven-decade history.

但as it turned out, this wasn’t a done deal. A few days before the November 12, 2004, auction, in a startling break with Bolsa etiquette, a rival investment bank, Celfin Capital, secretly contacted Anheuser-Busch and offered to purchase the CCU shares for $300 million on behalf of a group of Chilean retail and institutional investors. According to an Anheuser-Busch spokesman and Celfin executives, the auction of the CCU shares went ahead as scheduled to maintain transparency and allow for a possible higher bid. The mandate for the auction was given to Celfin. When nobody matched the offer by the investment group it had put together, Celfin collected fees from both its clients and Anheuser-Busch.

Deutsche Bank和Larrainvial由美国酿酒商支付了承诺的费用，但他们并没有弥补。“你不要偷走另一家公司的任务，”洛杉矶经纪师首席执行官Manuel Bulnes说。当地市场观察员倾向于与他公司的指控联系在一起，以至于Celfin已打破了不成文规则。“承诺和传统有利于快速利润和荣耀，”在拍卖后一天的一天，他在La Tercera的广泛阅读专栏中写了CésarBarros。

Hogwash, was Celfin’s gleeful response. “We were just looking out for our clients,” says Jorge Errázuriz, 53, a founding partner at Celfin and head of its corporate finance division. “Our view is that if it’s legal, we’ll do it.”

这种美式的侵略性不是智利金融市场年龄到期的唯一标志。该国长期以来一直是拉丁美洲的明星经济表演者，在过去二十年中年平均年增长率为6％。但直到最近，当地资本市场都是由一个表现良好的大银行和甚至更大的私人养老基金，行政机构de Fondos de养老金或法官的主导。

“过去三年或四年的巨大故事是其他演员的出现，他们在智利瑞银瑞银的瑞士州瑞银的研究负责人表示。当地独立投资银行，如Celfin，Im Trust和越来越难以越来越渴望的Larrainvial，正在培养他们的途径进入股票交易，私募股权交易和兼并和收购。他们还在展示当地企业客户，有时候会更容易，更便宜地在智利发行股票而不是国外发行债务 - 并找到智利投资者，愿意支付国内公司股份的股份。

“CELFIN是当地投资银行最具侵略性的，”圣地亚哥评级机构惠莉的智利金融机构研究负责人EduardoSantibáñez说。BBVA Provida的首席投资官JoaquínCortéz是最大的AFP，超过230亿美元的资产，同意。“Celfin肯定是在街区的艰难新的孩子，”他说。

尽管争议Anheuser-CCU股票auction have forged Celfin’s reputation for feistiness, the firm has also drawn recognition for some of the most notable financial deals in Chile over the past couple of years. In 2004 it arranged a $332 million IPO for 20 percent of Cencosud, a supermarket and home improvement store chain at the time fully owned by Horst Paulmann, one of Chile’s wealthiest and most colorful entrepreneurs. A year later Celfin managed Cencosud’s purchase of a majority stake in Chile’s second-largest department store chain, Almacenes París — the first time a major local company was acquired in an all-share transaction. It was also one of the most bruising market deals in Chile, with Celfin and Cencosud outbidding the Luksic family, the wealthiest in the country. And Celfin was in the news again last year for successfully placing on the local market a 20-year, $200 million bullet bond — a bond that cannot be redeemed before maturity — with only 3.29 percent annual interest, for Codelco, Chile’s state-owned copper mining behemoth. “We showed it was possible for a Chilean company to issue bonds domestically on cheaper terms than abroad,” brags Errázuriz.

引人注目的企业融资交易好了。但for steady, growing income, Celfin relies on fees from $2 billion in assets under management and commissions from stock trading; in 2005 it led all brokerages by handling 17.8 percent of transactions for third parties on the Bolsa. Headquartered on the 19th floor of a mirrored-glass high-rise in Las Condes, the new business district in eastern Santiago, Celfin has 275 employees. The firm only discloses net income from its brokerage activities: $4.5 million last year. But according to Celfin executives, total profits are roughly equally divided among asset management, trading and corporate finance — meaning that 2005 net income was probably about $13 million, slightly behind the $14 million reported by LarrainVial, the largest independent investment bank.

Because of their similar size and contrasting public images, Celfin and LarrainVial inevitably draw comparison. Both rank among the top three brokerages and are among the market leaders in mutual funds dedicated to Chilean equities. Whenever LarrainVial manages the IPO of a leading Chilean company, Celfin is sure to follow with an IPO for a rival firm. In asset management and private banking, LarrainVial emphasizes its longevity and the blue-blooded credentials of its founding owners, the Larrain and Vial families. Last year the firm softened its reputation for stodginess by managing the IPO of Colo-Colo, Chile’s most popular soccer team. Lately, LarrainVial executives favor sports images to describe their rivalry with Celfin. “We want to win every game, but if we lose fairly, we just move on to the next match,” says brokerage chief Bulnes. Celfin’s Errázuriz retorts: “Forget about fair play — this isn’t sports.”

For all the attention the Celfin-LarrainVial rivalry gets, their financial figures don’t impress the big commercial banks, which are increasingly engaged in investment banking of their own. “These smaller firms need alliances with some big guns from abroad if they are going to leap to the next level,” says Gonzalo Menéndez, a senior bank manager who sits on the board of Banco de Chile, the country’s second-biggest bank after Banco Santander Santiago.

Celfin executives couldn’t agree more. That’s why in May they signed an accord with Merrill Lynch & Co. under which the global heavyweight will give Celfin clients more exposure abroad while Celfin does the same in Chile for Merrill’s clients. “Merrill has no presence locally besides its small private banking operations,” says Juan Andres Camus, 53, Celfin’s chief executive officer and founding partner. “So we’re a good fit.” According to Andrew Gray, Merrill’s first vice president for corporate strategy, his firm was impressed by Celfin’s “research capability and the great relationships it has built up as an investment bank.” The initial focus, say both sides, will be on equities and fixed-income assets, with the intention of moving on to more-sophisticated private banking and corporate finance deals.

Celfin was founded 18 years ago, but Camus and Errázuriz, who each hold a 32 percent stake in the firm, had been discussing the idea of starting an investment bank since their college days in the 1970s. Both are descendants of Basques who emigrated to Chile in the mid-1700s, during the Spanish colonial era. Over the next two centuries, their families filled the ranks of the lawyers, doctors, landholders, clergy and politicians who dominated Chilean society. That social order was shattered first by the 1970 election of a Marxist president, Salvador Allende, who brought much of the economy under state control, and then by the brutal 17-year rule of a right-wing dictator, Augusto Pinochet, whose violent coup in 1973 overturned the Marxist government and led to Allende’s death during the upheaval. Pinochet then instituted radically conservative economic reforms.

Camus and Errázuriz met in the early ’70s at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, where they studied under the University of Chicago–trained professors who headed Pinochet’s economic team. After graduating in 1975 they ended up four years later at Banco Bice, a Chilean bank where Camus became a commercial banking executive while Errázuriz joined Bice Chileconsult, a joint venture with N.M. Rothschild & Sons of London that became Chile’s first investment bank.

The contacts made during those early years provided a useful client base for Celfin when it was launched in 1988 by Errázuriz, Camus and a third partner, Mario Lobo, who is no longer with the firm. Back then, the pool of domestic investors was still small, and the only way an investment bank could prosper was by selling Chilean companies or their shares to foreigners. “Celfin decided at that point to create a research department that spoke English and met the more sophisticated requirements of a Wall Street firm,” says Alejandro Montero, 39, head of capital markets and a senior partner.

This led to an alliance with Salomon Brothers in 1989 under which the U.S. firm agreed to split trading fees generated by Celfin’s research on Chilean companies. At that time, regulations aimed at preventing rapid outflows of capital from Chile required foreigners who invested in Chilean companies to keep their money in the country for at least a year. (Restrictions on capital flows were fully rescinded only in 2002.) But Celfin and Salomon successfully lobbied the government for approval of their Chile Fund, the first Latin American country fund traded on the New York Stock Exchange.

The alliance lasted until 1998, when Salomon Smith Barney was acquired by Citigroup, which had a full range of financial operations in Chile. The break from Salomon coincided with the Asian financial crisis of 1997–’98 that led to a lull in global investment in emerging markets, including Chile. Celfin and the handful of other independent Chilean investment banks had to refocus and look for capital closer to home. Fortunately for Celfin, the pool of domestic investors was widening. Chilean entrepreneurs were flush with cash from selling parts or all of their companies to foreigners during the 1990s. “People were calling us up and asking what to do with their new fortunes,” says Camus. “So we started to develop our private banking business.” In 1996, Celfin bought brokerage Gardeweg y García Corredores de Bolsa, which at the time handled about 6 percent of the Bolsa’s total trading volume. A decade later Celfin Gardeweg has tripled its share of Bolsa trading.

Ever since shifting its focus toward the domestic market, Celfin’s biggest customers have been the AFPs, six private pension funds that manage assets totaling $80 billion in a country with a 2005 GDP of $105 billion. (Retail clients account for less than half of Celfin’s income.) Because of their size and clout, the AFPs are both bane and balm for Chilean investment banks. The pension funds account for 20 percent of Celfin’s trading activities and pay less than half the commissions that retail clients get charged. “But because of the volume of their transactions, they provide much of the daily flow and liquidity for our business,” says Celfin senior partner Montero. “And if you look at all our businesses with the AFPs, they amount to a reasonable, steady, growing income.”

Among the more prominent examples of Celfin deals that drew heavy AFP investments were the IPO for Cencosud in 2004, followed by its 2005 acquisition of department store chain Almacenes París. Until then the AFPs had no interest in Cencosud because its owner, Paulmann, now 71, managed his supermarkets, home improvement outlets and shopping malls as tightly as if they were a mom-and-pop shop.

在德国出生的Paulmann和第二次世界大战后与他的父母搬到阿根廷，然后智利搬到了智利，“从早期开始，他的手就是实践的管理风格，”埃拉苏里斯说。当他在2004年求追究企业家时，他讲述了一系列的剧集：坐在咖啡馆，在他拥有的购物中心，Paulmann将女服务员们选择了不要让他们和咖啡一起吃食物或甜点。“总是试图让客户花更多，”他告诉她。

Paulmann financed his business almost entirely from cash flow; with no Cencosud shares on the market, his real worth was anybody’s guess. But as he neared 70, Paulmann decided to transform his empire into a modern, publicly traded corporation with a constituency of shareholders who might invest with him in new projects. In 2004 he asked Celfin to arrange an IPO for 20 percent of Cencosud. “We held road shows in Chile, Europe and the U.S.,” recalls Errázuriz. “The real surprise was just how much capital was available in Chile.” Chilean investors — mostly AFPs and insurance companies, and the rest retail investors — took 70 percent of the $332 million IPO. They would have bought even more, but Paulmann had reserved 30 percent of the offering for foreign institutional investors.

Soon afterward, Paulmann again turned to Celfin, this time to arrange the $602 million purchase of 71 percent of the Almacenes París department store chain. Today Cencosud is one of the most traded shares on the Bolsa and a mainstay in AFP portfolios. Cencosud’s market cap, $1.66 billion at the time of the March 2004 IPO, stood at $5.08 billion in late September.

Although the Cencosud deals firmed up Celfin’s reputation as an equity firm, it is still considered weak in managing debt issues. “We are in the process of working closely with Celfin to grow our fixed-income presence in Chile,” says Merrill’s Gray. That is why, say Celfin executives, it was so important to land last year’s $200 million bond issue by Codelco, Chile’s largest company and the world’s biggest copper producer.

在许多方面，Codelco是一个异常。在一个关于从制造业到社会保障的一切局部私有化的国家，Codelco仍然是100％的国有。2005年以105亿美元的收入和17.8亿美元的净利润，占智利铜业的70％。由于公司与武装部队之间的Pinochet政权所产生的强大关系，Codelco可能会在可预见的未来留下政府控制。根据Pinochet时代的法规，军方的预算是由Codelco收入的10％提供资金 - 而不是利润。以铜价多倍多，从8月1日的$ 1.70英镑，一年后的每磅3.50美元，武装部队遭遇了富裕的尴尬。

With so much financial and political clout, Codelco has preferred to float its bonds with global institutions. “In all my years in investment banking, I was never able to get a foot in Codelco’s door,” says Errázuriz. What finally got Celfin over the threshold were the kind words of a well-placed friend: Juan Eduardo Herrera, Codelco’s senior vice president for strategy and business development. Errázuriz and Camus had met Herrera in 1990 when he was a director of Chile’s central bank. At that time, Celfin and Salomon negotiated often with Herrera to get the central bank to allow the pathbreaking issue of American depositary receipts on the New York Stock Exchange for Compañia de Teléfonos de Chile. (The Chilean telecommunications company is now a subsidiary of Spanish telecom giant Telefónica and has been renamed Telefónica CTC Chile.) Thereafter, Herrera maintained a friendship with the Celfin executives. When a new financial team arrived at Codelco last year, Herrera felt it was an appropriate moment to give Celfin a hearing. “We asked them why Codelco should only think of raising debt abroad when there was a strong enough local pool of capital willing to accept cheaper interest rates,” says Errázuriz.

Celfin’s solution — 20-year bullet bonds — came with a 3.29 percent annual interest rate, which was barely 20 basis points above the terms for a comparable bond from the central bank. Working with Credit Suisse, Celfin arranged a cross-currency swap for the duration of the bond, meant to offer protection against currency fluctuation losses. Most of the Codelco bond issue was bought by the AFPs.

作为CEFEIN的个人资料和盈利能力膨胀，猜测开始搭载它是否仍将是独立公司。毕竟，大多数较大的智利金融公司 - 包括大多数AFP和大型商业银行 - 将外国机构作为其控股股东。卡姆斯，埃拉尔兹和蒙特罗拥有80％的Celfin，其余20％的其他高管平均分裂。“我们不想要一个家庭生意，在这里没有亲戚在这里工作，”卡姆斯说，仍坚持认为他没有想到销售公司。

Errázuriz, on the other hand, has mulled over that possibility and suggests a strategy for Celfin similar to what the firm has offered to clients like Cencosud’s Paulmann. “In five or ten years, Celfin should become a publicly traded company,” he says. “Of course, if the price is right, something could happen sooner.”