此内容来自：Portfolio
Goldman Sachs Strives To Stay On Top
After more than a century of investment banking success, Goldman Sachs grapples with an unyielding publicity crisis and a rapidly shifting regulatory environment.
The audience of about 350 portfolio managers, analysts and shareholders gathered in a ballroom at the Grand Hyatt in midtown Manhattan sat quietly. If Blankfein and his company, Goldman Sachs Group, were causing some kind of stir, it wasn’t evident here. But outside, in the media, the firm was caught in a public relations firestorm. CEO Blankfein’s joking comment to a London newspaper the previous weekend that Goldman was "doing God’s work" served as an accelerant and subjected the proud, 140-year-old Wall Street firm to growing public outrage for its methods and famously high compensation.
但那一天，普莱德·弗兰登冷静地放心了，“[高盛遗产]必须不断培养并传递给后代。”他补充说，客户服务和表现将胜过。高盛将保持优势。“我从来没有对那些结果更有信心。”
With the White House and bank regulators — including the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission and Treasury — as well as lawmakers in the Senate and the House seemingly set on reining in Goldman’s risk-taking and compensation, can Goldman really expect to continue generating outsize profits?
Many believe that they can and will.
"Regulation is not likely to contain Goldman," asserts Kenneth Grant, CEO of Risk Resources, a New York–based risk management consulting firm for hedge funds. "There is a monstrous trading edge that pervades everything they do."
Guy Moszkowski, a veteran Wall Street analyst, insists that Goldman, postcrisis, is "more dominant than ever."
A bet on Goldman’s being successful has been a lock for the past decade. Since going public in 1999, Goldman shares have generated a cumulative total return of 159 percent, compared with a slightly negative return for the Standard & Poor’s 500 index. Net revenue has roughly quadrupled during that period, to the approximately $40 billion anticipated for full-year 2009.
And despite being vilified as a greedy bank running high-stakes bets on the taxpayers’ tab, Goldman is nevertheless considered by many in the financial industry to have an unmatched and powerfully effective approach to risk-taking.
冒险不仅仅是高盛所做的核心is高盛在繁荣，萧条，特别是在市场脱位时代。
“这是一群人可以发现他们拥有优势的市场，然后在他们拥有的所有知识火力之后，”这是他们拥有的所有知识火力之后，“纳斯达克股市交易负责人罗伯特·斯里尔（Robert Stellato）说。“他们不采取捷径。”
But where can Goldman go next?
Blankfein谈到该公司的出价将服务扩展到中国和印度等新兴市场，利用其有利的销售武力，以便在这些市场的机构，公司和交易对手中联系，同时还在其全球私人财富管理业务上建立。但毫无否认：高盛是核心竞争力的银行 - 交易和风险。
考虑到2009年第二季度，投资世界仍然在蛋壳上行走，高盛在纳税人美元和私人（阅读：沃伦巴菲特）首都数十亿美元，并将其余的Archrival Morgan Stanley回到其高跟鞋上。高盛认为有机会在固定收入和信贷衍生品市场中收获低悬垂的水果。它升高了它的风险，至少在一个普通的公制，风险价值的价值 - 财务会计速记对于最多的金钱，理论上，高盛在任何一天都愿意失去。
称，高盛称，当前和前雇员是通过评估任何特定市场上的竞争领域的能力驱动，利用公司的巨大信息基础，清楚地在有效减轻风险的同时清楚地奖励。Because virtually every large institutional investor relies on Goldman every day for at least some transactions — and because Goldman’s specialty is catering to the largest of them — the firm can bring all of its strengths to bear on its conjoined, concurrent pursuits: making markets and money for counterparties, and proprietary trading, or trading purely for itself, in stocks, bonds, interest rate instruments, credit derivatives, commodities futures and currencies.
特许经营的公司深度并不一定局限d to trading. Assets under management are closing in on $900 billion, more than three times the amount Goldman had when it went public. The division that houses prime brokerage was good for nearly $1 billion in net revenue in each quarter of this year. Former trader Stellato describes the sheer scope and depth of Goldman’s many simultaneous global moneymaking pursuits as "awe striking." Since the beginning of 2007, Goldman has underwritten more than $1 trillion in corporate debt products and equity-related products in 1,800 offerings for 750 clients around the world. Across the gamut of its bond and stock trading desks, Goldman is involved in 2.5 million daily transactions on average and has 2,000 institutional clients.
“在进行这么多同步交易中，没有公司努力了解和管理的风险比高盛，”华盛顿省新泽西州的市场战略管理乡镇首席执行官Jim Delaney。
高国库秘书和高国议员亨利（汉克）保尔森JR的一个术语，高国权秘书和高国务局（汉克）为最大的投资银行支持，普遍雇用了“太大而无法失败”。尽管高盛的名声是华尔街上最聪明的商店，但该公司在2008年底差不多罚款。不是那戈德曼从未感受到失败。有文化破坏的先例：20世纪70年代初期的宾夕法尼亚州中央铁路惨败，或者20世纪90年代初期的债券损失。但高盛在过去的成功案例中，除J. Aron＆Co.，这是一家银行在20世纪80年代初买入1.2亿美元的小商品贸易公司。The purchase, which at the time seemed like a mismatch of genteel bankers and hardcore, raucous traders, is widely considered Goldman’s best acquisition (the firm has made very few) — if only for the cadre of talent and the dedication to stringent risk management it inherited, which eventually came to be embedded in the entire firm’s DNA. Run postacquisition by steely young Goldman partner Mark Winkelman, Goldman’s commodities arm produced a slew of skilled traders — among them Gary Cohn, now president and COO, and Blankfein — and plenty of profits. Winkelman had the right match of technical trading comprehension and cold-blooded hatchet man toughness to be a manager of traders (not the most common skill set on the Street). The J. Aron division became a powerhouse within the firm. Says a former Goldman trader: "Winkelman was the most feared person at Goldman, and he had the best understanding of how to manage risk. He passed this along to all of the guys running the firm today."
Goldman, incidentally, would in 1997 acquire another respected player: Commodities Corp., a Princeton, New Jersey–based manager of commodities fund managers. Leading up to Goldman’s 1999 IPO, trading in general became a larger component of the firm’s overall mission, although its ability to move securities merchandise — equity and debt issues — had long underpinned its M&A business. Additionally, under Gus Levy, Goldman had pretty much invented equity block trading.
但是有更多的来。在股票交易ding front, Goldman in 1999, the year it went public, snapped up Windy City market maker Hull Trading Co.; in 2000 it acquired another market maker, Spear Leeds Kellogg, forming SLK Hull. Along the way, Goldman took a majority stake in electronic-trading juggernaut Archipelago, an electronic communication network (ECN) that was single-handedly transforming the structural underpinnings of the equity trading world.
The New York Stock Exchange’s hire of Goldman banker John Thain as CEO and, under Thain, the exchange’s subsequent merger with Archipelago, as well as the political ascendancy of former Goldman execs Jon Corzine, a senator and governor from New Jersey, and Paulson at Treasury, seemed to confirm one of Wall Street’s most often repeated conspiracy theories: that Goldman has a high-paid bench of killer talent and one hell of a government feedback loop.
“高盛就像纽约洋基州，”塞恩冈诺，前纽约州的山顶贸易商和I-Bankers证券，一家精品投资银行。“如果你在那里工作，或者如果你为他们扎根，你就会爱他们，但如果你竞争他们，你讨厌他们。你可能会嘲笑他们，但你仍然讨厌他们，因为他们是如此美好。”
The Yankees of Wall Street, humbled in 2008, have enjoyed unrivaled dominance in a number of areas, including electronic equity trading. Consider this: One quarter of the volume at the NYSE is done via program trading — computer-generated multistock bundles that human hands never touch. Goldman has seized the largest share of that business. Among off-exchange dark pools, Goldman’s Sigma X is the third largest, with Credit Suisse and Knight controlling the two larger pools, according to Rosenblatt Securities. With a bigger slice of the equity market, and its sweet spot, commodities, entering a boom, Goldman expanded its purely proprietary trading arm, Goldman Sachs Principal Strategies, to complement and, some of its critics would say, feed off its institutional business.
In 2000, Goldman’s formidable trading and principal investments (TPI) segment generated $6.6 billion in net revenue, compared with $5.4 billion for investment banking and $4.5 billion for asset management and securities services, a fairly even spread. But beginning in 2003 the trading segment, powered by the fixed-income, currency and commodities (FICC) business — actually five separate businesses because fixed income is divided into three units: credit, rates and mortgages — began to generate record revenue. That year trading kicked in $10 billion; investment banking contributed $2.7 billion and asset management and securities services, $2.9 billion. Trading in 2003 represented a little more than half of Goldman’s net revenue. A year later, in 2004, it was nearly 60 percent of revenue. In 2006, trading, powered by a record year for FICC, recorded revenue of $25.6 billion, or almost three fourths of total net revenue.
高盛成功建立了专有的贸易集团，制作了一名才华横溢的人才嘲笑，转向对冲基金 - Dinakar Singh，Christian Siva-Jothy和Mark McGoldrick，以命名为数少。一些以前的高级高级纪念品（如Ranaan Agus）在该公司采取了不同的角色，但仍然涉及交易和风险，并被认为是其最高雇员之一。靠近该公司的许多人继续相信，高盛通过交易自己的资本来充分利用它的资金，利用更少的杠杆，而不是以前但仍然杠杆。高盛首席策略至少有十几个致力于专有交易的独立细分桌，这些售票没有客户互动 - “他们看起来，感受和行动，如对冲基金，”一位以前的员工 - 包括伦敦的团队，由皮埃尔 - 亨利领导弗拉蒙斯。
Just as Goldman is driven by trading, trading is driven by risk management. There are numerous forms of risk management — committees, analytics, entire teams of staffers — and the dean of risk at the firm is CFO David Viniar. A few details about him are common knowledge: The 53-year-old keeps a meticulous office on the 30th floor of Goldman’s 85 Broad Street headquarters, with nary a paper clip out of place. And he relies on an equally rigid approach to measuring, quantifying and mitigating risk. That Viniar called in December 2006 for a meeting of senior executives from Goldman’s mortgage desks and the firm’s risk management division — a sit-down that led to a prescient if not controversial mortgage market hedge — is well documented. Goldman, despite its housing hedge via credit default swaps, continued to underwrite controversial credit structuring as late as 2007 but had bailed on a particularly dicey market — asset-backed-securities collateralized debt obligations, or ABS CDOs.
"Goldman distinguished itself by not going into the riskiest forms of structured-credit markets as aggressively as some of its competitors and doing an apparently superior job of managing any retained risk," says securities attorney J. Paul Forrester, a partner at Mayer Brown in Chicago and head of the firm’s derivatives and structured-products practice.
高盛拥有华尔街最严格的方法来处理最坏情况情况。风险管制首先编译最差可能的标准偏差跨多个市场移动，然后假设这些移动在同一天发生。Tanya Beder是Citigroup的Tribeca全球化管理对冲基金单位，他目前经营着自己的风险管理公司，在纽约的SBCC集团同意，“没有其他公司越来越难于管理风险。”
Goldman is known not only for having best-in-class risk management and trading, but also for its sales effort. Without deploying any capital, salespeople — relentless and motivated — intervene between clients and the firm’s position traders, tying all of the transaction activities together.
"Goldman was constantly pushing things on clients when I was there," recalls Nomi Prins, a Goldman managing director in the FICC division from 2000 to 2002 and author ofIt Takes a Pillage: Behind the Bailouts, Bonuses and Backroom Deals from Washington to Wall Street。她解释说，激进的销售团队说服客户需要解决他们不知道存在的问题，例如外汇风险。
At most banks there are at least three distinct kinds of trading desks: those that only execute trades for clients; those that make markets, which requires the firm to invest its capital alongside that of clients (and take prop bets); and those that simply make proprietary bets using the firm’s money. Prins says there were inevitable conflicts: "Of course, info gets shared — that base of knowledge is what makes Goldman Goldman. The prop trading and the client trading are intermingled; in some cases, the same person is doing it or the groups are next to each other."
Goldman says it ensures that the proprietary trading it does purely for the bank is both physically and technologically separate from the prop trading it does for clients, and that information does not cross these barriers. Moreover, Blankfein insists that 90 percent of all prop trading done by the firm is tied to activity on behalf of clients. Goldman’s critics beg to differ.
“这概念认为，高盛主要代表客户投资校长，只有少量的额外收入率是完全不诚实的，”普林斯抗争下。“除了，无论是为自己还是为客户而言，它仍然存在风险。”
Blankfein通常计数器断言，他的公司必须利用其信息基础。但纯粹的PARP，Blankfein说，只有一小部分的战利品贡献，不应该与伴随市场制作和客户订单实施的支柱交易。采取这一假设：一位高盛股票市场制造商任务是在30天内为大型买方股权共同基金执行大规模卖出订单。当贸易商知道该基金完成销售 - 缓解股票的下行压力 - 在这个例子中，在这个例子中，可能会购买最后一个基金的股票，希望在未来几天作出体面的利润。嵌入在市场制作中的支柱交易是迄今为止高级德曼的面包和黄油业务。
高盛在近期泡泡年度达到了30％的人，近期季度的30％。股权退货被去年完成的股票发行稀释，以搁置资产负债表。“对于金融，Roe就是一切，”分析师Moszkowski指出。“重要的是，它如何服用多年来一直建立的所有资本并部署它？是举起的回报，还是恶化？当ROE开始倾向时，就是你担心的时候。”
Despite Goldman’s skills the clock on risk may be running out. Roy Smith, an economics professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business, warns that "banks are not out of the woods yet" as far as what business activities they will be permitted to pursue. "The Congress and the regulators are surely going to have something to say about these issues," he says. "Proprietary trading activities may end up being too expensive for bank holding companies, causing some banks to rethink where their trading businesses ought to be. Some may want to spin them off to shareholders to free them up."
实际上，几个月前雕刻了金人成交量是在马萨诸塞州理工学院经济学教授Simon Johnson的Capitol Hill。高盛是一个大的对冲基金，没有更多的东西，他说，纳税人不应该对风险负责。并且有赔偿问题。高盛的员工是业务中获得最高的。又称，争论高盛，它可以保留其顶级球员的名单吗？Moving to defuse public outrage, the firm announced before Christmas that its top 30 executives would receive all-stock bonuses for 2009, which can’t be sold for five years, and investors would be given a nonbinding advisory vote on compensation principles at the shareholder meeting.
Goldman could find itself caught up in any number of small scandals that could escalate quickly. Under way are regulatory examinations into industry practices such as trading huddles and practices associated with dark pools in which high-frequency traders get millisecond peeks into electronic equity order books. (Goldman notes that its "huddles" are perfectly legitimate analyst discussions of such issues as earnings, sales numbers and economic data, and furthermore that it does not offer "peeks" at orders to any traders, high frequency or not.)
"It still won’t matter," asserts former Goldman managing director Prins. "Even if they are hit by a big scandal, Goldman exists to do one thing: figure out ways to make money."