当纽约I-Banking Goldman，Sachs＆Co.以某种方式设法在2008年逃避最严重的市场崩溃，然后在2009年袭击了另一个横幅赛季，超过了一些批评者坚持认为政府偏袒，而不是技能，使所有的差异。高盛的粉丝指向每平方英尺的智商和顽强的防守。
但运气或情况真的扮演的是什么部分？超过你可能怀疑，一些老将华尔街风险管理人员说。
从2003年开始，华尔街银行正在将钱交出拳头，他们可以在结构化 - 债务市场中预订的费用，特别是在抵押债务义务中。CDO市场广泛被视为崩溃的原因。但在它之内是一个亚基，一个风险渊博，更不透明，特别是有利可图的CDO与资产支持的证券。ABS CDOS在创造的更复杂的投资车中，金融Piñatas填充了杂项形式的ABS，包括抵押贷款起源狂热，对冲基金泡沫和五大投资之间的关键环节。银行，其近乎完全崩溃最终导致了救助。2007年和2008年，ABS CDOS将在所有形式的信贷衍生品中脱颖而出，作为金融业的最恐怖产品，时间炸弹包裹在专用公司车辆官员和聪明的合同规定。
但2004年，当CDO市场首次起飞时，高盛根据“结构性财务监测仪”通讯，在承销时排名第11。花旗集团和美林林奇占据了那一年的名单。事实上，高盛在2006年之前没有将CDOS积极进入CDO，而不是在市场上第一个裂缝开始展示之前。2007年高盛在全球CDO发行人中排名第六，市场份额为5％，而花旗的14％和Merrill为17％。
2007年第一季度，高盛仍在做一些ABS CDOS，尽管在2006年的情况下，这是在这个市场上的活动。但是发生了两件事，使公司撤退。
First, in early 2007 one of its big ABS CDO underwriting deals was scuttled after some assets Goldman was storing on its balance sheet cost the firm tens of millions in markdown losses, according to one CDO industry source. Goldman started dialing down ABS CDO initiatives thereafter, in part because of the serious losses but also for an even more fundamental reason: Demand was slowing amid the earliest signs of trouble in the Bear Stearns Asset Management hedge funds. Additionally, in early 2007, Peloton Partners, a London-based hedge fund started by two former Goldman Sachs traders that used Goldman as prime brokers, liquidated after lenders, including Goldman, saw the writing on the wall.
高盛的甜蜜的时间to the ABS CDO market, did an about-face. As late as 2007 it was still doing what today would be considered dicey debt structurings. But it was not doing ABS CDOs. That single decision would prove critically important.
When subprime cratered in 2007, what at first was thought to be a containable threat quickly spread to the banks by way of the ABS CDO market, the first domino to fall in a series that would inevitably threaten the entire system.
通过迟到ABS CDO派对并提前躲避，高盛避免了对ABS CDOS过度推荐的竞争对手银行（Bear Stearns，Lehman Brothers，Merrill Lynch）遭受的致命伤口。
“它可能是由设计的运气，但在艰难的融化中，高盛正在躲避严重的子弹，”风险资源首席执行官肯尼斯·格兰特的核武器经理肯尼斯经理。“所以错过了第一个鞋子，让我们面对它，很幸运。他们没有暴露在第一个炸弹上。”
If the dominos hadn’t fallen exactly the way they did, Grant explains, with Bear first in the early part of the year, then Lehman and Merrill as the sacrificial lambs, "there would not have been this collective realization that Goldman and Morgan Stanley could be next — and the government’s decision that they could not be allowed to be next."
这么卓越的风险管理或运气也是如此？
“这是顶级的审慎治理，”格兰特航空公司“，不要对任何一个盈利机会投注公司，这是运气。”