罗伯特Pozen.Grades the Government's Role in the Financial Industry

去年年底，波士顿的1950亿MFS投资管理董事长Robert Pozen和哈佛商学院的高级讲师，撰写拯救太大了？如何解决金融系统。[点击这里下载前言written by Robert J. Shiller, Yale University.] Pozen, who was also chairman of the SEC advisory committee on improving financial reporting during 2008, sat down with Julie Segal, staff writer at亚博赞助欧冠杂志，谈论他的书籍和关于政府在金融业的持续作用的思考。

到目前为止，这本书的接待是什么？

嗯，泰勒·考恩撰写了博客的“边缘革命”，写了这篇评论，我一直希望有人写：“这是你一直在等待的书。”对于那些想要真正了解金融危机发生的事情的人来说，这也是政府干预措施的努力，尚未提出且前进的建议。

您对危机期间发生的短暂销售提供了一些独特的分析。告诉我这一点。

我用一定量级的工作。我们真的跑了数字，以便在该期间看到卖空卖空股价的效果。当然，金融机构的每个首席执行官声称他们短暂销售为零。有些人对某事。根据我们的分析，John Mack致以正确的方式，是的，卖空者的卖家推动摩根士丹利的库存，但是用Merrill，它并没有成为正确的。短款卖家确实驾驶了雷曼兄弟，但是他们没有。我们从经验的角度看待这一点。

我有一个非常平衡的卖空观。我只是想减缓它可以在股票价格上的向下势头。在一个有效的市场中，您想要延长和短裤，但在短暂销售中有这么多的歇斯底里，那么您就禁止了该活动，并且没有稳压器想要的影响，而不是它具有其他负面影响。

即使有了政府干预，贷款量也很慢，衰退恶化。为什么？

每个人都质疑为什么银行不放贷。But there is a common misconception that banks are responsible for most lending. If you look at the statistics in the U.S. before the financial crisis, say in a normal year like 2006, then you realize that only 20 percent to 25 percent of credit that was extended by banks and the rest was by non-bank lenders who were heavily dependent on the securitization markets. In 2006 we were securitizing $1.2 trillion in loans and in 2009 we did about $50 billion. So the securitization process has broken down, despite some recent deals, and that’s why loan volume is down.

在这些结构中，基于实际风险假设以及来自赞助商支持安全的资本，市场不会回来。抵押债务等证券难以理解，难以理解。秒可能需要更多的披露，他们没有。最重要的是，大多数证券化交易都在33行动下注册，然后在第一年内注册，因为他们说不到300人拥有证券。但这是看起来似乎唯一涉及的投资者是持有信任证券的人。但我认为赞助银行有投资者也在乎。所以我们有可怕的披露。如果off资产负债表的信任中存在问题，我们没有良好的披露关于正在发生的事情。如果我们关心贷款，我们需要把它带回。

你说救助人员很差。为什么？

首先，他们在银行购买了首选认股权证。一旦康复持有，就会给予美国纳税人的所有缺点，而不是足够的。我也认为，国债向小银行，信用卡发行人和保险公司提供了救助部队。这些是在没有告诉人们的情况下进行的。

I think the bailout of CIT is ridiculous, for example. We have a theory of too big to fail, and we’ve somehow recapitalized 600 institutions. Are there 600 institutions that are too big to fail? It seems unlikely. I try to delineate in chapter 9 the two valid rationales for bailouts: One is you have to protect the payment system, but that probably involves a handful of money center banks. The second is if you have an institution like Fannie or Freddie where its failure would lead to massive failures throughout the system. Does CIT count as either of them? No. We bailed out American Express. It’s a credit card company. If American Express went bankrupt, would the whole financial system go? No, a new credit card company would emerge. We have no rationale and we’ve bailed out far too many firms. I point out in my book that there is now a trucking company that wants a bailout, and of course, we can’t do without trucking.

自信贷危机开始以来，对行政薪酬的抗议。应该做什么？

有些限制已经被回复了。纾困公司的高管执行奖金上限导致了大量保证工资。这打破了支付和性能之间的联系。监管机构应设定基于原则的补偿套件准则，董事会可以监督这些原则。我也是一个很大的信徒，私募股权模型具有丰富的经验，可以帮助屈服于“支付”选票，这在u.k.