银行家现在几乎是辞职，遭受了巨大崩溃的惩罚后果。资本，流动性和杠杆要求将收紧，一些交易活动将受到限制，审慎监管将棘手。但对于一些高管，Postcrisis的审查 - 以及潜在的限制 - 他们如何得到补偿仍然存在。
While they may be ready to accept and comply with, for example, the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act’s shareholder “say on pay” provisions, and with even further-reaching U.K. and European rules and guidelines that are to take effect soon, high-ranking financial industry executives bristle at government intervention in an aspect of their jobs that they have always regarded as a free-market prerogative.
最近泡沫的扭曲和过度是不可否认的。“利益冲突和首席执行官的方式进行补偿是在已经消灭了工作岗位的资产数万亿美元，数百万这场金融灾难的心脏，”赫希·弗里德曼，在布鲁克林学院的商业和营销学教授和琳达·弗里德曼教授of statistics and computer information systems at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, wrote in the summer 2010 issue of the Capco Institute’s Journal of Financial Transformation. The prevailing ethic was “as long as there was money to be made, virtually no one said anything” about downside risks in the housing market, the collapse of which reverberated disastrously around the world.
John Taft, CEO of Royal Bank of Canada’s U.S. wealth management business and chairman of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, concedes as much: “I think most people would acknowledge that poorly designed compensation was a contributor to the excesses that got us into trouble.” At Sifma’s annual meeting in November, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Mary Schapiro said, “Compensation based on short-term numbers has to change.”
但是，什么是适当的和不适当如雷贯耳的薪酬有效的政策应对？将总CEO薪酬和公司全体员工的中位数，或对银行奖金英国税收之间的关系的多德 - 弗兰克授权披露，消除不良行为并更好地调整高管的激励与他们的市场和股东的利益？
这些措施没有保证，因为制裁与所需结果没有明确的联系。缺乏直接政府控制工资 - 几乎世界过度赔偿是一个难以捉摸的目标。它与其他有形和无形的因素，政治和行为相关，这是人性的难以调节的方面。
“在某些时候，你必须依傍参与运行的金融机构和这些组织的文化的人的性格，”塔夫脱说。亚慱体育app怎么下载“你必须依靠他们不要奖励行为是风险过高。这并不是说，补偿无法得到更好的设计“。
弗里德曼教授在他们的研究中断言，“如果高管真正道德，全球金融危机就不会发生全球金融危机。”如果赔偿不容易立法，那么道德肯定是不可能的。
也有迹象表，政策制定者错过了一些关键的微妙之处。勒内斯图尔兹，谁拥有俄亥俄州立大学的银行和货币经济学的埃弗里特D.里斯主席和吕迪格Fahlenbrach，在洛桑联邦理工学院瑞士金融学院助理教授，2009年7月发表的一篇论文探讨了“穷人的激励措施的解释危机。“他们“没有证据表明，支持首席执行官和股东之间的激励措施将导致更好的银行履行的观点。”John Core and Wayne Guay, accounting professors at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and avowed skeptics of proposed compensation regulations’ ability to achieve their objectives, wrote in January 2010 that “current regulations are based on arguments that U.S. CEO pay is too high and performance incentives too low” — assertions that “do not appear well-supported by evidence.”
明尼苏达大学法学院教授理查德·画家的大学不低于相信片面激励制度在管理质量和决策不佳牵连，但他主张一个基于行为的纠正。在法学院的同事克莱尔·希尔研究合作，画家提议使得高薪员工在破产案件负有个人责任，并推迟工资在计税股票的形式将被暴露在公司的破产。
“我刚刚联邦要求它，”画家说。缺乏，客户或公司治理倡导者可以推动它。无论哪种方式，这种令人瞄准的想法都有一种优雅，即反应性调节反应缺乏。•
Jeffrey Kuller是全球风险专业团结出版的风险专业杂志的主编。