欢迎来到奥术世界多发主义者定义的福利养老金计划。“Multis”经常被称为Taft-Hartley计划，在俄亥俄州罗伯特·塔夫特（Robert Taft）的俄亥俄州和弗雷德哈特利的新泽西州，1947年的劳动管理关系法案的共同提案国。只是不要称之为联盟计划，或冒险劳动力管理人员，他们很快就可以解释这些集体讨价还价的计划由员工委员会的董事会，以上有同数量的工会和雇主代表。但请记住，典型的十个成员Taft-Hartley养老基金会由五名董事组成，该托管人员是同一联盟的成员和可能代表同行业中竞争雇主的五名受托人。
A cluster of confounding pension rules and regulations began seriously gumming up the multiemployer pension works when financial markets took a nosedive in 2008. Increased employer bankruptcies and unemployment were heaped onto already stagnating union membership rolls. But even before the market meltdown, pension law and multiemployer plans had a troubled relationship.
“The complex web of rules that govern multiemployer pensions are part of the problem,” asserts Michael Sullivan, general president of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association in Washington and chairman of the board of the Sheet Metal Workers’ National Pension Fund. “Over the years I’ve seen the goalposts keep moving because we have too many regulatory groups involved — the Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service and the [Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.]” Adds Kenneth Hoffman, an employee benefits specialist attorney at Washington-based law firm Venable, “Multis are so different from single employer, it’s difficult to understand the rules.”
First came the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, better known as ERISA, passed in 1974 to regulate private pension funds, including Taft-Hartleys. A weakness in the law soon became evident when employers who paid into the multi plans on behalf of an often part-time, mobile union workforce ceased contributing to the plans, leaving employees in the lurch.
1980年的多发房养老金计划修正法案通过这些计划迫使雇主保留养老金承诺。它确保如果一家公司失业，该计划的剩余雇主将不得不为失业工人或“孤儿”夺取养老金捐款。它还要求退出雇主在退出计划前涵盖其负债。当所有雇主都有破产者或者已经被破产或从一个多发性资金买出来的方式，最后雇主是在Taft-Hartley Parlance中，“最后一个人站在”中。
“The price of success is to pick up all the liabilities of your competitors,” observes Thomas Nyhan, executive director of the Teamsters’ Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund in Rosemount, Illinois.
Erisa创建了PBGC来通过保险计划保护养老金。但是对于塔夫哈特利计划并不是很多用。PBGC对多重计划的帮助始终以贷款的形式而不是直接计划收购，而多发电算委会仍然管理资金。Taft-Hartley计划赞助商始终减少PBGC保险计划：目前，每位参与者每年9美元，与单一雇主计划的每位参与人数为35美元。福利相对结构化，工会退休人员每年为拥有30年服务的员工收到约12,870美元，而单人退休人员最多可获得54,000美元。
The MPPA required departing employers to pay up their liabilities rather than ship them off to the PBGC. The more underfunded a plan was, the greater the withdrawal liability would be; but historically, very few multiemployer plans have relied on the PBGC for succor. In fact, since 1980 only 59 multi plans have called on the PBGC, for total relief of $417 million, versus roughly 3,850 single-employer plans and $39.4 billion. “Multiemployer pension plans have performed the role of the PBGC for many, many years,” says Judith Mazo, director of research in consulting firm Segal Co.’s Washington office.
今天的Taft-Hartley养老金危机的主要原因之一是2006年8月签署了法律的养恤金保护法.PPA改变了养老金资金规则：现今的快照不再足以确定资金水平;计划必须项目未来的负债并采取补救行动，以涵盖未来的资金要求。根据资产负债差距的严重程度，养老金受托人必须每年报告基金的地位，这一想法是确定问题越早，可能会越早解决。难以部分：任何预计的资产责任缺口将不得不超越往往可能的额外收费。
Inspired by the security color code created in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a multi fund was considered to be in the “green zone” if it was at least 80 percent funded and “endangered” in the “yellow zone” if it was between 65 and 80 percent funded. Plans with less than 65 percent of the assets required to fund their liabilities were termed “critical” and placed in the “red zone,” necessitating a ten-to-15-year rehabilitation plan. Red-zone plans must also inform participants of possible reduction in noncore accrued benefits or adjustable benefits like disability payments or early retirement subsidies.
The PPA brought at least one positive change. It released employers from having to pay an excise tax when a fund passed the 100 percent funding mark. That old ERISA requirement kept plan sponsors from creating rainy-day funds during heady markets. Instead, they tended to pay out all the “extra” earnings in enriched benefits that, locked in through collective bargaining agreements, couldn’t easily be reduced when the markets tanked. The new trigger became 140 percent (150 percent for single-employer plans), but when the markets sank in 2008 and early 2009, the previously thin coffers were quickly emptied.