The Future Face Of Hedge Funds

阿齐兹·纳哈斯是个失败的学生。

In 2006, following the collapse of hedge fund Amaranth Advisors, which lost an eye-popping $6 billion in less than two weeks late that summer betting on natural gas, Nahas, who was working at a rival firm, interviewed former Amaranth employees to find out what had gone wrong. Two years later, Nahas — by then managing his own fund, 1798 Fundamental Strategies — experienced investment adversity firsthand when markets went into free fall after the September 2008 bankruptcy filing by Lehman Brothers Holdings. To Nahas’s horror, his equity-focused multistrategy fund plunged in value as the global credit contagion worsened.

“我在2008年成为我职业生涯的最艰难和最具挑战性的年份，”摩洛哥的Nahas说，39岁的摩洛哥的Nahas说，他在前14年的交易中从未有过下降的一年。

纳哈斯担心他梦想着他自己的对冲基金，他一直经过一定年内的梦想，是在危险之中。但是，他最困扰着他的是，他觉得他让他失望了那些信任他保护资本能力的人。
瑞士私人银行Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch&Cie。2007年，他与纳哈斯（Nahas）联手推出对冲基金业务，现在是Lombard Odier投资管理公司的一部分。尽管Nahas的60人团队大部分都在纽约，但他大部分时间都在该行沉稳的日内瓦总部工作。在危机期间，他每天都会与LOIM首席执行官休伯特•凯勒（hubertkeller）交谈，后者的母公司避免了当时许多其他欧洲金融机构面临的问题。这家保守的瑞士银行支持Nahas和Keller，甚至将资本金用于支付员工工资和雇佣更多人才。

“If I had partnered with the usual European seeders, my fund would have ended in November 2008,” says a grateful Nahas, who as CIO of LOIM runs the 1798 Fundamental Strategies Fund.

The fund — named after the year the original partners of Lombard Odier established the bank — might not have lived up to its manager’s own high standards, but it came through 2008 remarkably well. The fund fell 15.9 percent, outperforming the typical hedge fund, which lost 19 percent that year, according to Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research, and trouncing the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, which plummeted 37 percent. In addition, because the fund uses only moderate leverage and has a small and stable investor base, strong agreements with counterparties and highly liquid positions, Nahas didn’t face the steep margin calls and redemption requests that led many of his competitors to anger investors by blocking redemptions or moving illiquid assets into so-called side pockets to be accounted for separately. Such foresight left him well positioned to bounce back in 2009, a year that saw his fund return 50.31 percent.

During the financial crisis, the hedge fund industry teetered on precarious ground — assets declined precipitously, funds seemed to be closing almost daily, and scandal stalked the business. Now, two years later, the industry isn’t just in good shape, it is positively booming. At the start of 2011, hedge funds were managing nearly $2 trillion in assets. Pension funds and other institutional investors — still feeling the effects of the market meltdown and desperate for the downside protection that hedge funds can offer — have been plowing money into many of the largest managers. But in their haste, these investors may not only be missing the opportunity of a lifetime, they might be taking on unnecessary risk and forfeiting returns.

Nahas是新一代基金经理之一，他们代表着未来对冲基金行业健康盈利的最大希望。他们不仅从经济崩溃中吸取了教训，也从之前的泡沫中吸取了教训。他们更年轻、更饥渴，而且在很大程度上，比许多更成熟的对冲基金同行都要小。这些新兴的明星谈论财务管理的重要性，实际上是认真的。他们敏锐地意识到自己对投资者的责任，以及建立强大、可持续的企业的义务。他们希望以正确的方式进行交易，关注交易对手关系和风险管理。他们对定义上一代管理者的那些财富的装饰——跑车、社交活动、迷人的朋友——没有那么感兴趣。他们新发现了一种严肃性，这种严肃性来自于他们看到成功是多么容易、多么迅速地被夺走。

Craig Perry and Erez Kalir hired a sports psychologist when they started Sabretooth Capital Management in the spring of 2009 to keep them intellectually honest — making sure they would be willing to disagree, change their minds and admit mistakes. Boaz Weinstein, one of the pioneers of the credit derivatives market, founded Saba Capital Management at around the same time. As co-head of global credit at Deutsche Bank, he managed a proprietary trading fund that had made billions of dollars for the bank before losing $1.8 billion in the last quarter of 2008, when the credit markets seized up. Gregory Lippmann — who launched LibreMax Capital late last year — was previously head of the Deutsche’s nonagency residential mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities trading and became famous by shorting the subprime mortgage market.

然后有宽客,管理者使用网络atical and scientific techniques to build computer models to exploit price anomalies in liquid markets. Last November, Mark Carhart, a former co-head of Goldman Sachs Asset Management’s quantitative investments, began trading partners’ money for his new hedge fund, New York–based Kepos Capital. A few blocks north of Kepos’s Midtown headquarters, Peter Muller is working out of Morgan Stanley’s offices to start his own firm. Muller, the longtime head of Morgan Stanley’s Process Driven Trading quantitative group, and his 60-person team are part of the exodus of investment talent from Wall Street in the wake of regulatory reform.

以前美联储董事会主席Paul Volcker的Volcker规则禁止美国银行从事专有交易。因此，银行必须分解或解散内部交易单位，如PDT，这通常是一个令人难以置信的利润来源。外部投资者现在必须为这些前银行交易者提供资本，这是一个制作J. Tomilson Hill非常幸福的发展。

“Hedge funds have been significant beneficiaries of the Volcker rule,” says Hill, CEO of alternative-investment firm Blackstone Group’s $36 billion hedge fund business. “The brain drain from the banks has accelerated dramatically.” In 2007, Hill’s group launched the $1.1 billion Blackstone Strategic Alliance Fund to partner with new managers, injecting $100 million to $150 million for a minority stake in their businesses. The fund has seeded eight managers, including George (Beau) Taylor, former head of commodities trading at Credit Suisse Group, and Nick Taylor, who had been running an Asian event-driven fund for Citadel (see “Philosophical Difference,” page 60). Blackstone recently raised $2.4 billion for a second Strategic Alliance Fund.

这不是很久以前,市场专家作表语用ting the demise of hedge funds. Some of the industry’s biggest criticism came from within. In November 2008, George Soros, arguably one of the greatest managers of all time, testified before the House of Representatives as part of a hearing on financial markets and regulation. “It has to be recognized that hedge funds were also an integral part of the bubble,” the billionaire Holocaust refugee told Congress. “But the bubble has now burst, and hedge funds will be decimated. I would guess that the amount of money they manage will shrink by between 50 and 75 percent.”

Soros’ prediction turned out to be too dire. Although hedge fund assets fell by nearly a third from their second-quarter 2008 peak of $1.93 trillion, by the end of last year, they were back up to $1.917 trillion, according to HFR. Still, Alex Ehrlich, head of Morgan Stanley’s prime brokerage unit, which provides financing and other services for hedge funds, says that it is harder for small firms and start-ups to raise money in today’s market than before the crisis. The main sources of capital — larger pension funds, foundations, endowments and insurance companies in need of both diversification and better investment results — are plowing their cash into the biggest players.

“The largest funds are getting larger,” says Citi managing director Alan Pace, regional head of the bank’s prime finance business for the Americas. Institutional investors favor managers like New York–based Paulson & Co., whose founder, John Paulson, personally made an estimated $3.7 billion in 2007 shorting the subprime market. His firm’s assets have grown from $6.4 billion at the end of 2006 to $32 billion when this year began.

“[W]e are not concerned about our size,” Paulson told investors recently. “Scores of smaller funds have failed or delivered subpar performance.”

但最近由纽约的投资管理公司春山首都是一个早期的保尔森投资者的研究表明，大小很重要。“规模对绩效产生了非常重大影响，”该公司的校长Jason Orchard说。“较小的资金历史上产生了更高的绝对返回和比较大资金更大的alpha。”与许多投资者认为，他补充说，“较大的资金实际上比较小的资金更安全。”当资本筹集停止时，当救赎开始时，投资组合的负面压力在较大的资金上甚至更大，产生更快速的向下螺旋。
纽约传奇对冲基金公司Tiger Management Corp.创始人朱利安•罗伯逊（Julian Robertson Jr.）认为：“作为投资者，从5000万美元到5亿美元要比从80亿美元到200亿美元容易得多。”。罗伯逊知道他在说什么。上世纪90年代末，泰格与索罗斯基金管理公司（SorosFundManagement）争夺最大对冲基金公司的头衔时，规模过大。在遭受重大损失后，罗伯逊决定将老虎公司与外部资本隔离，并归还投资者的资金。

“对于更好的想法，我会想到Madoff的事情就会立即挤压，”Robertson补充说，参考Longtime Wall Street Power Broker Bernard Madoff的650亿美元的650亿美元的Ponzi计划。虽然Bernard L. Madoff投资证券不是对冲基金，但许多对冲基金的资金都是投资者。

Madoff Scandal是一个悄悄进入对冲基金行业的症状，因为该业务于1990年的资产389亿美元增加到2008年的资产达到2万亿美元。随着金钱淹没，回报变得更加努力，创造诱惑达到产量 - 通过使用过度杠杆，与其他基金经理斗争，或者在最令人震惊的情况下，伪造回报或参与内幕交易。

The best of the new generation of hedge fund managers know the cost of placing personal gain above integrity. They want to get back to some of the old-fashioned values hedge funds used to have.

在更新世时代，Smilodon，rober-teamered Tiger，罗德欧洲和北美，大约10,000年前灭绝了。在消失的物种似乎像一个坏主意之后命名一个坚定的东西，但Erez Kalir和Craig Perry看不到它。They chose the name Sabretooth Capital Management because they wanted to emulate the “dinosaurs” of the hedge fund industry — people like Robertson, Soros and Michael Steinhardt, who built their reputations during the 1970s, ’80s and ’90s, delivering net annualized returns of 24 percent or more. (Incredibly, $1,000 invested in Soros’ flagship Quantum Fund in 1969 would have grown to $4 million by 2000.)

但吸引佩里和卡利的不仅仅是恐龙的数量。这也是他们的多才多艺。这些经理人在不同的证券和风格中寻找投资机会。在卡利尔和佩里看来，恐龙本身并不是灭绝了，而是过去十年机构资金涌入对冲基金，使得它们的行事方式过时了。Sabretooth的创始人认为，这是一件坏事。”31岁的佩里说：“我们希望回到对冲基金历史上较早的时代。”。

佩里最初并不打算进入金融业。2002年从普林斯顿大学经济学学士毕业后，他进入宾夕法尼亚大学医学院学习。一个学期后，他意识到自己不想成为一名医生，于是辍学，在总部位于纽约的对冲基金King Street Capital Management找到了一份不良债务分析师的工作。尽管他喜欢这份工作，但很快他就渴望获得更多的自主权和责任感。2005年，他加入瑞士信贷（creditsuisse），在瑞士信贷自营交易集团（Credit propertial trading group）工作时，他找到了自己想要的自由。

由于佩里开始了他的银行业的职业生涯，一代高级交易员正在离开银行开始对冲基金。在最高型材中是Eric Mindich，1994年，在27岁时，在Goldman，Sachs＆Co.的套利书中运行了套利书桌，并成为公司历史上最年轻的合作伙伴。当迈里迈彻留在十年后发射Eton Park Capital Management，他提出了一个纪录的30亿美元，他将用来聘请大型团队，并在大门中建立重要的基础设施，试图在高盛在高盛重新创造他的成功。

Kalir，39，是Eton Park的一个不寻常的租赁。他没有来自高盛或在华尔街上有背景。With a BA degree in literature from Stanford University, an MSc in biology from the University of Oxford and a law degree from Yale University, he was in Washington working for John Kerry’s presidential campaign when a partner at Eton Park decided to take a chance on him, hiring him as an analyst for the event-oriented special situations group.

In March 2008, Kalir left Eton Park to join a long-short equity fund seeded by Tiger’s Robertson. The economy was a few months into what would be the worst recession since the 1930s. That same month, JPMorgan Chase & Co. bought troubled investment bank Bear Stearns Cos. in a government-brokered shotgun marriage.

大约在这个时候，卡利尔通过一个共同的朋友介绍给佩里，佩里在2007年夏天离开瑞士信贷，共同为再保险公司瑞士再保险（Swiss Re）推出了一项自营不良债务交易业务。两人发现他们对投资和商业有相似的看法。他们认为，对冲基金行业的演变造成了错误的二分法——债务与股票、基本面与宏观经济。相反，他们认为经理应该全面考虑投资选择。

Perry’s decision to join Swiss Re proved ill timed. The reinsurer was neck deep in subprime mortgages — precisely the type of securities that Perry and other traders wanted to short — and as the mortgage market continued to weaken, its available balance sheet for distressed-debt trading shrank. Throughout the 2008 summer the markets worsened, and Perry found himself out of a job.
与此同时，卡莱尔对他的新公司不满意。对他来说似乎没有准备好经济环境。9月初，他向基金的管理伙伴解雇了一封慷慨线的电子邮件，概述了他认为全球经济被走向的地方 - 以及投资组合应该如何定位。只有在雷曼兄弟崩溃前的几天，卡莱尔的经典电子邮件发现了罗伯逊的手中，而老虎创始人喜欢他读的东西。到这时，卡莱尔和佩里正在谈论建立一家公司。他们遇到了罗伯逊，看看他是否会支持他们。

Since Robertson closed Tiger Management to outside investors, he has operated as a seeder firm, using his own money to stake an army of new managers. The vast majority of Tiger seeds are fundamentally focused long-short equity managers. Blending strategies and styles, with an eye to the credit markets as well as equities, Kalir and Perry were something new. Robertson was impressed by the duo and staked Sabretooth with $65 million in March 2009.

“我喜欢他们与我们所拥有的其他人完全不同，”他说。“每个组织都需要思考的人。”

One of the first things that Kalir and Perry did was put together a business plan that included a statement of principles — pledging to do things differently and avoid the common errors that hedge funds often make. Their goal: to create a culture based on intellectual integrity and respect for investors. “To keep us honest,” as Kalir puts it, and true to its principles, Sabretooth hired a coach, sports psychologist Graham Jones.

Jones, a Brit, was helping to coach the 1996 U.K. Olympic swimming team when he met 1988 gold medalist Adrian Moorhouse. The two decided to start a firm, Lane4, to apply the techniques used in training successful swimmers to other sports and areas, including business. The Sabretooth founders read an article Jones had written in the Harvard Business Review on how winners keep succeeding, and Perry, who had been an All-Ivy League rower at Princeton, contacted him.

琼斯以前从未与对冲基金经理一起工作，他说他对一个行业中的任何人都持怀疑态度，并为大Egos和可疑的行为而享有盛誉。但它并没有长时间为卡莱尔和佩里的热情，承诺和欲望迎接自己的道路赢得他。“他们相信自己的错位，”琼斯说，琼斯曾开始进行新公司，最重要的绩效咨询。“他们想要做的最后一件事就是自满。”

All three men speak on a regular conference call once a month. By asking Kalir and Perry tough questions, Jones says, “I help keep them on the straight and narrow.”

“What is great about these two is they are not satisfied with the tangibles, the financial rewards,” he continues. “They are more interested in the process, in running an organization to be proud of. It is about sustainability.”

Now with $600 million in assets, Sabretooth’s founders are humble in their attitude toward the markets. Perry sees every day as a battle to make money. “We don’t try to predict the future,” adds Kalir. “Anyone who tells you they can predict the future is selling you a unicorn, something that doesn’t exist. We attempt to construct a portfolio that has a quality of resilience. We look for asymmetries.”
通过不对称,Kalir指的是交易have identifiable limited potential downside with a larger potential upside.

Sabretooth’s six-person investment team starts by identifying macro trends, which they distill down to investable themes, such as going long U.S. regulated utilities or shorting the Australian housing market. They then employ bottom-up fundamental security analysis to capitalize on those themes, searching out opportunities across asset classes, geographies and industries. Unlike most multistrategy firms, Sabretooth doesn’t assign its traders and analysts to specific asset classes. Kalir and Perry want them to remain flexible. In addition, Sabretooth uses little to no leverage; to its founders’ minds, making returns from borrowed money is cheating.
Unlike most Tiger seeds, which operate out of Tiger Management’s longtime Park Avenue offices, Kalir and Perry have chosen to maintain their independence and work a few blocks away, on the 50th floor of the Chrysler Building. “They prefer to live apart from us,” Robertson says. “I think it is a mistake on their part; but I admire their willingness to differ.”

他们的公式似乎正在工作。为期十个月的Sabretooth在2009年上运行，该基金返回26.5％;2010年上涨了14.1％。

博阿斯·温斯坦是一位数学天才，也是曼哈顿著名的斯图伊弗桑特高中的产物，他15岁开始了自己的华尔街生涯，在美林公司（Merrill Lynch&Co.）的母女咨询团队实习。1995年，他从密歇根大学（University of Michigan）哲学学士学位毕业后，进入了美林的一个培训项目，他最后在公司债券部工作。几个月后，他跳槽到投资银行Donaldson，Lufkin&Jenrette，在那里他很快成为了一名交易员，但当美林转投德意志银行时，他重新加入了与他共事的团队。1998年1月，他来到信用衍生品部门，从事一种相对较新的产品——信用违约掉期交易。

Credit default swaps, or CDSs, are bilateral contracts that act like insurance. The buyer of the CDS pays the seller a quarterly fee for protection on a bond, typically issued by a company or a country. If the bond defaults, the buyer receives full value.

The then–$300 billion CDS market was a backwater when Weinstein joined Deutsche. But that started to change following Russia’s decision in August 1998 to default on its debt, which had investors running for cover as the contagion quickly spread. Over the next few years, demand for CDSs grew as volatility became the norm thanks to events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the bankruptcies of companies like Enron Corp. and WorldCom. By 2002 the market had grown to $2 trillion, as more and more investors were using CDSs to place bets rather than to hedge bonds.

Weinstein was instrumental in educating many of the top hedge fund firms on how they could best use the new instrument, in part because that’s what he was doing for Deutsche. Starting in 1999, Weinstein began running Deutsche’s in-house relative value credit proprietary trading fund. In 2001 the bank let him trade equities as well as credit — enabling him to exploit the relationships between the two markets. Deutsche also promoted Weinstein, then 27, making him the bank’s youngest-ever managing director.

In 2006, Weinstein struck an agreement with Anshu Jain, Deutsche’s head of investment banking, that would enable him to lift out his proprietary trading operation in 2009. In preparation, Weinstein named the group Saba, the Hebrew word for “grandfather,” so he could start branding it outside the bank. “I named it in honor of my saba, who saved my mother’s life and several other people during the Holocaust,” Weinstein says. “He was very wise.”

As Deutsche Bank’s co-head of credit, Weinstein had a front-row seat going into the financial crisis. The weekend before Lehman filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, Weinstein was among a group of bankers who met with then–Federal Reserve Bank of New York head Timothy Geithner to discuss how to deal with counterparty risk in the event of a default. “That was an incredible weekend,” says Weinstein, now 37, who was widely recognized as one of the leading experts on the then–$57.4 trillion CDS market. “I got to represent Deutsche at the Fed.”

Following Lehman’s bankruptcy filing, counterparty relationships throughout the capital markets became fraught as the stability of more and more financial services companies came into question. In particular, investors began doubting the ability of the bank underwriters of CDS insurance to make good on those contracts. CDS values went up when the associated bonds and loans were plummeting in value, but they didn’t rise enough to offset the massive losses. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that many of the traders had built their positions with borrowed money; as they got margin calls, they had to unwind trades, creating more downward pressure.

Although Saba, which by then had grown to about $10 billion, didn’t use leverage, it had a large portfolio of synthetic CDSs it was using to hedge equity and credit positions in companies like carmakers General Motors Co. and Ford Motor Co. Between its CDS, equity and credit positions, Saba lost $1.8 billion in the last four months of 2008, ending the year down 18 percent. That, combined with a further $3.2 billion in losses Deutsche sustained in other areas, was enough to create unflattering headlines for the bank — and for Weinstein.

In that climate of crisis, with Deutsche dialing back on risk, Weinstein decided to go ahead with the previously agreed-upon liftout of Saba. He took the majority of his team, including the most-senior members — Paul Andiorio, Jeremy Benkiewicz and George Pan, who became portfolio managers and partners at the new firm, Saba Capital Management. Weinstein was also able to take all of the intellectual property, including trading systems and analytics, that he and his team had created at Deutsche.

“Having the ability to take the trading infrastructure with us was a huge advantage,” says Pan, who has worked with Weinstein since 2002 and is regarded as the quantitative brains at Saba. “We didn’t have to build it from scratch.”

魏因斯坦和他的合作伙伴于2009年4月开始管理自己的钱，但他们已经在想大。“人们在早期建立业务时，人们给我们很多信誉，”Andiorio说。除了其广泛的贸易和结算系统外，SABA还有一名首席财务官，首席运营官和一项首席会计官。

韦恩斯坦认为，萨巴如今的运营方式与它在德意志银行（Deutsche）的运营方式几乎没有什么不同。萨巴银行于2009年8月以1.4亿美元发行了其旗舰基本建设总基金。其主要策略有多空信用、资本结构套利和信用相对价值。

SABA的办公室位于克莱斯勒大厦，八楼以上的肉体资本。两家公司之间的差异和相似之处是引人注目的。鉴于Weinstein的背景，他对对冲基金的愿景非常令人惊讶的是，他的对冲基金的愿景 - 在银行之外的成功专有业务，具有大量的机构投资者的资本基础 - 看起来更像是Mindich的Eton Park，而不是像肉衫一样。亚博赞助欧冠SABA比SABRetooth更加信誉和定量。但两家公司都依靠基本面，看待股权和信贷市场，练习资本结构套利并使用相对价值的方法。事实上，当他描述了他的投资方法时，魏因斯坦听起来很像Sabretooth的卡莱尔：“我寻找不对称。”

Weinstein拥有推销员的口才，使复杂的交易思想分解成简单，逻辑的策略 - 以及交易者为杀手交易的本能。“竞争力拥抱拥有他的结构行业的能力，真是一种非常独特和宝贵的商品，”米斯基罗先进战略总裁托马斯·梅纳说，芝加哥基于金融服务公司的136亿美元的对冲基金业务136亿美元Mesirow财务。“我们早期有萨巴的投资者，非常高兴。”

One worry for prospective investors is that Saba, following its experience in 2008, might be too cautious. Weinstein and his team insist that is not the case. “Strategically, we want to focus on producing uncorrelated returns with low volatility,” says Benkiewicz. “If we just do our job well, the rest should follow.”

Saba returned 10.84 percent in 2010, its first full year of trading, and as of February had yet to have a down month. Today, Saba has close to $2.65 billion in assets under management and is in the process of launching a so-called fat-tail strategy, designed to profit in times of extreme market dislocation.

Quantitative hedge fund firms lived through the ultimate fat-tail event in August 2007. That month many of the leading quant shops, including AQR Capital Management, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Renaissance Technologies Corp. and D.E. Shaw Group, experienced huge losses after a large multistrategy fund liquidated its portfolio.

“这是一个非常创伤的经历，”前GSAM Quant Group Co-Head Carhart，45岁在推出Kepos Capital之前告诉机构投资者。亚博赞助欧冠2007年，GSAM的甘瑞时期为120亿美元的全球alpha基金下降超过8月7日和本月28.5％的14％以上。“这是出乎意料的是，在市场之前发生的事情和我们有限的知识，在那一点上，这是多少钱真的是多少钱，”他补充道。

The August 2007 quant meltdown was purely an equity event. Carhart thinks that many of the problems were caused by too many managers having similar trades. At his new firm, investors say that Carhart has gone out of his way to make sure the research Kepos uses to generate ideas and the systems it uses to put on positions are unique. He also wants his new firm to be small and nimble enough to quickly and dramatically adjust risk.

Kepos began trading partners’ money in November as a way to build a track record to attract investor capital.“Not only did we learn a lot from 2007, but we have really tried to apply those lessons,” Carhart told II.

As for Muller, 47, who is in the process of launching his firm, likely to be called PDT Advisors, he thinks that the big issue in August 2007 had more to do with leverage and capital flows than it had to do with the quants being in the same crowded trades.

SUCCESS BRINGS ITS OWN UNIQUE set of challenges. Just ask Greg Lippmann. At Deutsche Bank, Lippmann was early to spot the subprime crisis. Starting in early 2006, he pitched the bank and its clients, including a list that would grow to more than 50 hedge funds, on the merits of shorting the subprime mortgage market. When the subprime market started to crumble in 2007, Lippmann’s star shone — he features prominently in at least two books on the financial crisis — resulting in billions of dollars in gains for the bank as well as some very grateful clients.

Lippmann于2010年5月离开德意志，以启动对冲基金，Liblemax Capital，以其四个创始伙伴命名。（Libre来自Lippmann的“Li”和Fred Brettschneider的“BRE”;“Max”是指代表乔丹·米尔曼和尤金徐。）像Weinstein一样，Lippmann带着他的大乐队和他一起拿走了大乐队。Birlimax总裁Brettschneider是德意志的美洲全球市场前负责人。首席风险官员徐是德国银行Lippmann团队的投资技术负责人。米尔曼，在Librimax，RAN次级次级交易中交易交易。

For his part, Lippmann has to prove he isn’t a one-hit wonder, showing that not only is he capable of investing but that he can do so without the resources and advantages of a big bank. To that end, LibreMax hired back-office and operational staff — including a CFO, COO and CAO — with extensive hedge fund experience.

“我们知道我们知道什么,我们知道我们不know,” says Lippmann, who talks about the need to create a strong, stable, partner-oriented firm. “We are trying to build a business that will be successful out of the gate, but one that also has longevity.”
Liblemax于10月开始交易时有15人，并且在资产中迅速发展到5亿美元。该基金投资于Lippmann和他的团队在德意志的时候制造市场的许多相同的资产支持和其他证券化产品。在那里，他们看到许多投资者通过对抵押证券过度押注的赌注进行了过度过度的投注。“我不只是看到一个对冲基金 - 我看了15到20个对冲基金处理保证金电话，”莱普曼说。因此，与今日许多其他新资金一样，Birlimax在二月以来，自成立以来大约为8％，只使用中等的杠杆，并花费大量的风险管理时间。

LOIM’s Aziz Nahas is also interested in building a fund with staying power. The son of an airline pilot and a graduate of France’s prestigious ESCP business school, Nahas throughout his career has sought out opportunities that would help him reach that goal. Nahas began in 1994 trading convertible bonds and asset swaps with Banque Paribas, first in Paris and then in London. Two years later he jumped to Credit Suisse First Boston in London, where he eventually became head of equity derivatives in Europe.

纳哈斯于2005年从销售额转移到买边，加入了纽约锦标赛作为其专有交易和主要投资业务的全球权益负责人。他的期望是，银行将把单位衍生作为对冲基金，但最终它对于摩根委员会想要分享来说太有利可图。因此，纽约的MultSrategy对冲基金公司于2006年将Nahas于2006年被视为达龙读资本管理的全球股票和敞篷队，以35亿美元从瑞士银行UBS获得。

Late that summer, of course, Greenwich, Connecticut–based Amaranth announced it was shutting down after sustaining the largest loss in hedge fund history. Nahas, who happened to be hiring at the time, took the opportunity to interview as many soon-to-be-ex-Amaranth employees as he could to figure out exactly what went wrong with the fund and learn from those mistakes. His conclusion: Amaranth was taking on too much risk and trading in markets its CIO did not know well.

“As a CIO, I decided I would only oversee businesses that I had intimate knowledge about,” Nahas says. “Don’t oversee something where you don’t understand what the portfolio manager is doing.”

Nahas never got a chance to apply those lessons at Dillon Read. In May 2007, UBS decided to pull its capital, effectively shutting down the firm, which had raised little additional money. To Nahas, that experience underlined the importance of choosing the right partners and striking the right deals — hence his decision to team up with a conservative Swiss private bank when he started his own hedge fund.

-纳哈斯视图的构成他的基金的投资者基础as a critical part of risk management. “I don’t understand investors who give people a lot of money on day one,” he says. Nahas sees a correlation between the amount of due diligence an investor does and the speed with which money leaves a fund. Not surprisingly, he wants his investors to conduct substantial due diligence.

He launched the 1798 Fundamental Strategies Fund in November 2007 with $300 million, restricting the first round of fundraising to friends, family and a handful of high-quality investors that had relationships with Lombard Odier. He waited until 2009 to hire a marketer and then began to cautiously target larger asset allocators.

“We have a very deep sense of our fiduciary responsibility,” Nahas says. “Our clients are extremely important to us.”

During the difficult months of October and November 2008, when 1798 was losing money, Nahas personally called every one of the fund’s major clients and offered to return their money. Despite the challenging environment, most investors stood by him. LOIM has about $2 billion in hedge fund assets today. In addition to its flagship multistrategy fund, the firm launched a European loan fund in June 2009, an energy multistrategy fund in January 2010 and a special situations fund in May 2010.

LOIM’s growth is just one example of the resurgence of the hedge fund industry. Blackstone’s Hill sees good times ahead. “There is this runway, and the trajectory is very strong for the next five to ten years,” he says. “Not just in terms of the talent we see, but also the professionalism with which hedge funds are managing money.”

Tiger Management的Robertson对此感觉。他认为钟摆正在朝着行业常常的方式摆动，现在为他的种子业务提供了很大的时光，这是第一次从外部投资者筹集资金。

Nahas, who does math puzzles to unwind, intends to take complete advantage of the opportunity that he has been afforded at Lombard Odier. “There is no room in my life right now for any time-consuming hobbies,” he says. “I work, I spend time with my family, and I exercise. That’s it.”

He continues: “This is an immensely competitive business. You compete every day, and every day you need to earn the right to play. I’m not looking at this as a way of making my lifestyle so that I can sit in a boat in Monaco. Maybe one day that is what I will do, but I am going to be 40 this year. I have almost 20 years to make clients happy.”

For Nahas, like many of the new generation of hedge fund managers, now is the time to be serious.

For the complete II Magazine article, please clickhere.