9月，挪威财政部长SigbjørnJohnsen关于其国家4430亿美元的主权财富基金分配金钱的时间陈述了一个有趣的陈述。他说，在关于政府养老金基金全球投资的采访中，他说，“人们可以说我们正在投资无限。”无限？要是！具有真正无限时间地平线的投资者，由SWF的规模支持，在长期的非智能资产类别中会对无与伦比的。如果长期投资者可以超越零点至24个月的专业资金管理中绝大多数智力马力，从而避免了竞争水平不成比例的资产课程 - 它可以在理论上发展长期非资源资产课程中的市场殴打技巧。然而，挪威的基金尚未真正利用其无限地平线，因为它的暴露于基础设施和Timberland等非水资源资产，仍然有所限制。（上面引用的主权债务没有资格，因为胜利，挪威几乎没有人。主权资金的总体敞口对非流动资产课程仍然相对较小。 Compared with family offices, endowments and foundations, which have similar liability profiles, SWFs significantly underweight illiquid assets. According to a recent report by the World Economic Forum, family offices invest 35 percent of their assets in illiquids; endowments and foundations invest 20 percent; and sovereign funds invest just 10 percent. It seems that sovereign funds are focusing more on short-term returns than their time horizons would suggest. As China Investment Corp. vice chairman Gao Xiqing recently put it: “Theoretically, we are a long-term investor. . . . but you can’t really function on a ten-year horizon.” But why not, Mr. Gao? If SWFs really do have infinite time horizons, shouldn’t a ten-year time frame be easy? And more to the point, why would sovereign funds give up the risk premiums that can be reaped from long-term illiquidity? Multiple factors are shrinking the time horizons of sovereign funds. To begin, public officials can be just as demanding of short-term performance as their private counterparts. So rather than take the chance that a single bad year could prompt politicians to shut their funds down, SWF managers focus on short-term returns that bolster their legitimacy. In addition, sovereign funds face serious principal-agent problems with external managers in long-term asset classes, as managers’ incentives are understandably based on a much shorter time horizon. To circumvent managers, some sovereign funds have decided to launch internal investment programs for long-term assets. As one SWF executive told me earlier this year, “Why should I pay all of these fees if I plan to hold the investment for the life of the asset?” Sovereign funds must do several things to fulfill their potential as the true kings of long-term investments. First, they must communicate with and engage their domestic constituencies. If the public understands and supports the operations of a sovereign fund, then it will not — in theory, at least — question its legitimacy during market downturns. Next, sovereign funds will have to be creative in structuring their manager agreements. For example, a fund might cap the amount of leverage an infrastructure manager can use, or it might choose to drop the typical 2-and-20 compensation structure — a 2 percent management fee and a 20 percent performance fee — and instead establish a model that rewards managers for keeping volatility low and cash flows steady. Last, those funds intent on setting up direct investment programs should plan on allocating considerable resources to organizational design, institutional governance, management and talent. Interestingly, the allure of certain asset classes — namely infrastructure — has already driven a handful of funds to develop sophisticated internal capabilities for sourcing, structuring and managing multibillion-dollar infrastructure assets. Whatever the path chosen — internal or external — sovereign funds should be investing for the long haul. In line with Norway’s Finance minister, I think sovereign funds could have infinite time horizons. With the right design and governance principles, a time horizon stretching out for decades is within their grasp. As it currently stands, however, only a select few SWFs have managed to achieve this.
所以，我对各地的主权基金说:“走吧。”这是非常值得的。
阿什比·蒙克，牛津大学研究员，牛津主权财富基金项目联合主任，斯坦福大学访问学者。