不管你是否同情他们的困境，金融业领袖们都有可以理解的理由对他们拿到的监管牌感到不满。他们知道自己业务的复杂性，也很清楚哪些方面需要改进，如何改进。对他们来说，像美国《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案》(Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act)这样的立法太笨重，摇摆太大，无法准确无误地击中正确的目标。规定的国际监管协调的20国集团首脑在2008年崩盘仍然是cat-herding锻炼,玩的银行家们抱怨他们不能优化完成他们的工作,在足量生产贷款来刺激经济,挥之不去的云下的不确定性。在协调进展最明显的地方，即银行资本标准方面，银行家的声音变得非常尖锐。国际金融协会9月初警告称，巴塞尔协议III收紧的资本要求将抑制经济产出，并阻止创造750万个就业岗位。几天之内，摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase & Co.)首席执行官杰米•戴蒙(Jamie Dimon)就把他在改革议程上早已熟悉的直言不讳又提升了一个级别，称巴塞尔协议是“反美”的，并建议美国考虑取消其认购。戴蒙和其他志同道合的高管完全有权利发怒或批评。但他们不会冒抗议过度的风险吗?在这个非常晚的阶段，随着新法律的出台和巴塞尔协议III的势头几乎不可阻挡，它们难道不会引发这样一个问题:最终会有什么好结果? Legal tactics and objectives aside, the industry is not repairing its battered public image. Bankers come across as “wanting to do business as usual,” observes Barbara Ridpath, chief executive of the International Centre for Financial Regulation, a London-based research and education organization. “But voters are still angry.” Even if bankers don’t want to go so far as to think they are working for the voters, they might at least want to reconsider their relationship with the public interest and whether there might be more-productive channels for their argumentative energies. The backlash against reform has turned into an unbecoming spectacle of supercharged lobbying, no longer confined to the legislative arena, where the practice is traditionally centered. The financial industry was not content with its treatment by Congress in the U.S. Nor could it banish the phrase “ring fencing” from deliberations in the U.K., where officials were determined to adapt the so-called Volcker rule to separate core banking from riskier trading activities. So the lobbying continued, aimed at influencing the rule writers and implementers. “You have to give banks some credit,” derivatives expert Satyajit Das said in Litman Gregory Asset Management’s September No-Load Fund Analyst newsletter. They strong-armed regulators “in the garb of educating them.” The result, said Das, was to “impede sensible regulations.” The industry, if not able to claim outright victory, got off far easier than it might otherwise have. The Volcker rule was diluted in Dodd-Frank, and U.S. firms have generally come to terms with it. The U.K.’s Independent Commission on Banking, led by John Vickers, granted banks considerable flexibility in determining how to ring fence. Bob Diamond, CEO of Barclays, called the Vickers report “a welcome step towards the greater clarity” that banks had been seeking. But in the U.S. post hoc lobbying continues fast and furious in hopes of influencing the derivatives policies of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission. Leading that charge is the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, which has been pleading with the agencies — quite reasonably — to incorporate cost-benefit analyses into their Dodd-Frank rulemaking. At a recent ISDA conference in New York, the group’s CEO, Conrad Voldstad, conceded that “the infrastructure for the reforms is well under way, and it may well be impossible to adopt alternatives.” Nonetheless, he added, “we believe participants in markets should understand that alternatives are available.” Also reasonable enough. But one of the people ISDA wants to convince, CFTC commissioner Bart Chilton, has a different take.
迪德·弗兰克提供了一个“巨大的机会，以满足法律的任务和促进金融创新”，“奇尔顿说。虽然一些人致力于攻击或改变衍生品的能量，但他认为其他人在做金融创新者所做的事情：“预期，制作赌注，寻求优势。”
Jeffrey Kuller是全球风险专业团结出版的风险专业杂志的主编。