在某些方面，国际金融出版社已在东京的相机和医疗器械制造商奥林巴斯展开展开丑闻，作为一种特殊的日本道德故事，植根于日本的20世纪90年代经济崩溃，并受到根深蒂固的偏见对管理的文化。亚慱体育app怎么下载然而，奥林巴斯故事不仅仅是跨太平洋Schadenfreude的机会：公司的公司治理中的结构性弱点，这种危机可能对美国股东股东的美国投资者来说是一个问题。
奥林巴斯的危机于10月开始，当时公司迈克尔·伍德福德的首席执行官迈克尔·伍德福德（Michael Woodford）令人遗憾的是一系列过高的价格，并面对该公司的主席和执行管理。伍德福德总结于周末的公司，但他的质疑促使了一个调查，最终发现了一个非常长的长期会计欺诈，涉及涉及超过10亿美元的合并支付的计划，以弥补超过二十年的投资损失。
Many details of the scam at Olympus were revealed in a scathing 200-page report issued by a company-commissioned panel on December 6, 2011. Ironically, the fraud was born when Olympus undertook extraordinary measures to avoid the disclosure of losses in the face of Japanese accounting reforms for mark-to-market accounting in 2000 and consolidation with subsidiaries in 2007.
虽然这些方案的结构复杂，但本质上奥林巴斯为子公司提供资金，以便在全书价值上购买几乎无价值的证券。它后来支付了收购和相关咨询费，弥补了隐藏损失的价格。
The December 6 report, compiled after interviews with Olympus executives and outside auditors, included a detailed account of who was responsible for the schemes. The panel concluded that a group of top executives had systematically violated the law, concluding, “The core part of the management was rotten, and that contaminated other parts around it.”
奥林巴斯丑闻强调了许多对美国投资者熟悉的日本公司治理的改革领域。这些包括在于在“安顿氏菌属中，诸如外部审计师之类的守门员的失败以及那些了解他们所促进计划的财务顾问被用于非法目的。其他改革可能包括更开放和透明的系统，以选择公司的最高管理层和股东诉讼更强大的系统。
然而，奥林巴斯案件中最大的问题是其董事会的虚拟瘫痪，该委员会应该作为反对管理渎职的第一行辩护。奥林巴斯董事会在12月6日的起诉报告提出了一个惊喜，因为奥林巴斯在其15名成员董事会上有三名外部董事。实际上，奥林巴斯被认为有一个相对良好的公司治理结构，因为大约一半的日本上市公司仍然没有境外董事。
The problem, as the report pointed out, was that those outside directors were essentially powerless. One key reason why outside and independent directors in both Japan and the U.S. lack the ability to meaningfully oversee management is their limited access to information much more readily available to corporate insiders. As a result, outside and independent directors often find it difficult to voice concerns or ask questions in the presence of insider directors and executives with far more knowledge about the company’s business.
这个问题对日本几乎没有流行。如ENROR和其他最近的美国公司丑闻所示，美国的独立董事一再未能为已深深从事非法或不道德实践的企业高管提供有效的监督。但是，这里或海外没有在这里完成，以确保管理层提供的信息的质量和完整性。
The adequate flow of information from corporate executives and inside directors to independent directors is the key to a functional board. Independent directors should have access to timely, complete and accurate information provided by management and by inside directors.
与此同时，独立董事欠股东义务义务，主动收集有权拥有所需信息的官员，经理和雇员的信息。他们的信息来源不应仅限于最高管理层，因为CEO对信息渠道的控制可能会破坏董事会获得完整和准确信息的能力，从而使CEO成为主导董事会的权力。相反，董事应该能够在公司内外的所有层级，在公司内外访问不同来源的相关信息。
Until boards and investors in both Japan and the U.S. take the issue of access to information seriously, independent and outside directors will be hamstrung in their core responsibility to police corporate management on behalf of shareholders. It remains to be seen whether the scandal at Olympus will provide the wake-up call that has long been needed.
Michael W. Stockeris a partner with the law firm Labaton Sucharow. He represents institutional investors in securities, regulatory, and corporate governance matters.
Bruce Aronson是克莱顿大学的法律教授,那ol of Law. He specializes in comparative corporate governance and is currently a Senior Fulbright Research Scholar at Waseda University in Japan.
yoko goto.是Labaton Sucharow的关联，促成了这篇文章。