9月11日恐怖袭击后，当证券市场停滞不前时，人们的注意力转向了纽约证券交易所和纳斯达克股票市场，它们是美国经济及其恢复能力的代表。但负责交易所技术和运营的高管们——纽交所的罗伯特·布里茨和纳斯达克的史蒂文·兰迪奇——仍然不在人们的视线之内。
NYSE chairman Richard Grasso and his Nasdaq counterpart Hardwick Simmons were their organizations' very public and confident faces, while Britz and Randich toiled tirelessly in the back rooms, restoring communications lines and priming computers to handle the pent-up rush of orders when markets reopened on September 17. They and their systems came through with flying colors; the Big Board broke a volume record that first day, and both exchanges easily handled trading activity that has remained at levels well above those before September 11.
对于英国人和兰迪希，那些疯狂的恢复周只提供了一个暗示的重建和再造挑战，以便跟随他们的世界可能会如何变化。填补首席技术官的角色，并且与他们的交往一样竞争，他们坚定地面对现在的运作可靠性和灾害计划的更大问题。
布里茨和兰迪奇还有一个共同点：晋升。明年1月生效，布里茨将成为纽约证交所的联席首席运营官，保留其目前的首席技术官职责。今年10月，兰迪奇出任纳斯达克首席信息官，将市场运营、信息安全和项目管理办公室纳入其技术开发和数据中心职责。
"What was previously unthinkable is now, unfortunately, thinkable, and you have to think about what you want to defend against in a much more robust way," says Britz, 50, a 29-year NYSE veteran who has been group executive vice president of market operations, technology and information products since 1995.
Adds Randich, 38, who joined Nasdaq in 2000 after four years at the Chicago Stock Exchange, where he was chief information officer, "If there is one lesson to learn from all this, it is that disaster-recovery plans need to be even better than was demonstrated on September 11."
这两位技术专家在接受机构投资者撰稿人玛丽安·沙利文（Marianne Sullivan）的采访时回顾并展望了那决定性的一天。他们分别回答了一组类似的问题。亚博赞助欧冠
亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者: How directly did your infrastructures get hit?
罗伯特布里茨：纽约证交所的一切都很正常。我们的交易设施和数据网站没有受到影响。我们的人民没有受到伤害。我们的重型基础设施——电力、水和蒸汽——很好。即使是我们的电信，因为我们有非常多样化的路由，是压倒性的未受影响。
Steven Randich：我们的系统是受伤的，因为它们不在下曼哈顿。[纳斯达克的主要数据中心是Trudbull，康涅狄格州。它的备份网站位于马里兰州洛克维尔。]幸运的是，我们在美国周围有20个WorldCom电信中心。我们的市场制造商订阅者连接到纳斯达克网络。其中两个枢纽位于纽约地铁区，在市中心和新泽西州。问题是，曼哈顿较低的一些公司失去了与外界的所有连接。这意味着我们的许多市场制造商丧失了主要的联系，并且必须在整个11日和后期工作，以重新建立连接，而不仅仅是纳斯达克，而是对每个人来说，从他们的主要或备份站点中。
布里茨：这是一个中心辐射行业；像纽约证交所这样的目的地市场是中心，经纪人和交易商是辐条。“9·11”事件后问题的实质是，在许多情况下，辐条连接到我们网络的能力受到了严重损害。
你是如何应对许多市场参与者的是什么完全连接的？
布里茨：他们和我们共同进行了一系列的通讯解决方案，其中许多仍在实施和稳定。我能否形容这些沟通渠道与911事件前一样强大？可能没有，但变通办法已经发挥了出色的作用。毫无疑问，每个需要到达纽交所销售点的人都完全有能力做到这一点。证据是，在恢复交易的第一天，成交量就创下了纪录。
Randich：我们做得很好，因为我们要求该国任何地方的任何市场制造商都有两种连接纳斯达克网络的方式。这与单独的本地电话运营商一起，每个电话载体都指向单独的WorldCom集线器，因此没有单点故障。下曼哈顿的所有市场制造商都将与新泽西州以及中城联系，他们将使用单独的运营商。这一切都很好。不幸的是，世界贸易中心的损失是如此糟糕，即两个载体连接都丢失，在实践中几乎从未发生过。
当你回来的时候，你有没有遇到容量问题？
布里茨：完全没有。我们的订单处理和交换系统的吞吐量过大，网络的带宽过大，这些系统几乎不出一身汗。我们平均约20%的系统利用率，即使在第一周的记录数字。
Randich：我们没有问题 - 自9月17日以来，我们已经有了一些大日子。我们每周都花费大量时间预测，每周都在星期天，我们的系统能够满足舒适范围的需求。我们对远现过去六个月经验丰富的历史峰的历史最佳记录。
鉴于公共电信运营商的电信业务超出了您的控制范围，您能做些什么来支撑市场的连通性？
Randich: The carrier connections have to be more dispersed, and then the firms need to have the ability to quickly move to another site and come back up operationally. A number of market makers have a hot disaster-recovery site backing up their primary operations as a part of normal business. If they lose one site, they don't have to reestablish operations at the other location. They just need to expand it to accommodate the lost functions at the disabled site. A number of firms have done that, and those are the ones that fared the best.
英国人：这是一件事可以在其设施和网络和交换和订单处理系统方面充分硬化。但如果经纪人经销商无法发送我们的订单，这是一场空洞的胜利，因为它们已经失去了与我们的主要网站的连接。因此，我们正在研究一个行业应急计划，该计划承认这一行业的非凡相互依赖。我们只是最薄弱的联系。
What will be in the plan, and how does that compare with previous levels of contingency planning?
布里茨：我们成立了一个特别小组，以确定我们在哪些方面吸取了教训，可以做得更好。这是一种错误的安全感，当你真正进入电线和钳子的层次时，人们认为他们真正拥有的那种冗余并不存在。
兰迪奇：我们有一个非常明确的计划，我们每年至少做六次测试来重新证明这一点。每当一条信息进入康涅狄格州的纳斯达克——我们每秒有3000条——它就会在一个亚秒的时间范围内立即在马里兰州复制。从本质上说，我们有一个高带宽的网络与同步通信之间的位置。
Nasdaq focuses a lot of effort on disaster planning and is going to focus even more and conduct more frequent tests. In one type of test, we pump transactions through the backup site in an effort to see where its breaking point is. That's something we do every week in our primary site. We want to ensure that the backup site performs and functions at the same level as the primary site.
What is the likelihood of more redundancy - a second trading floor for the NYSE or a third data center for Nasdaq?
拉夫:我们当然是思考和debating it. One justification would be that we could bring an active second site up sooner than other backup alternatives. But there are other issues to consider. If you are trying to defend against the loss of people, having more than one trading site, at least in theory, gives you some level of protection against that. But if you carry this to an extreme, terrorists who really wanted to take out the NYSE would presumably make an attempt on both sites. And if there were six trading sites, they might make an attempt on all six.
So you cannot defend against all possibilities. But it used to be that you did not have to plan for, or defend against, the unthinkable. When you realize two planes have hit the World Trade Center and taken it down, you begin to realize that nothing is unthinkable anymore.
兰迪希：我们正在考虑第三个网站。但不要让我错了;这是概念性的。这不像我们已经预算了这件事。
这是在9月11日之后开始的吗？
Randich: No, it started quite a while ago. Another thing we are thinking about is to eventually have all of our international and domestic systems run on a common platform. Much like we saw happen at many banks on September 11, our European and Asian operations could take over in an emergency, creating a continentally diverse disaster-recovery capability.
After the attacks, could the NYSE have reopened faster by moving to a backup site?
Britz: No. We had made a decision that we were not going to open that day, so there was no need to go elsewhere. But lack of access to our trading space was never an issue. We had alternative venues at our disposal and had the capability of bringing them up. If anyone needs proof of that, look at how we brought the American Stock Exchange up [on NYSE communications lines] overnight. Given that we were untouched, there was no need to move the trading facility, and frankly, moving the trading facility would not have cured the connectivity problem.
这一经验是否加强了建立更为电子化的市场基础设施的论据——纳斯达克模式，而不是纽交所的集中交易大厅？
布里茨：纽约证交所有一个交易大厅，因为它给了客户他们想要的东西，而我们也不能免除这一基本业务。我们提供产品-订单执行-和任何时间段内的任何其他产品一样，它具有客户想要的特性，否则它不会成功。我们为他们提供了许多不同的选择，包括连接和交付系统、订单类型以及销售点的自动化与人工干预。例如，他们使用的是我们的自动订单传送系统Dot，我们90%的订单都是以这种方式来的，占我们订单量的52%。日复一日，他们也会选择把我们48%的交易量寄给经纪人，以代表他们在销售点的利益。
Randich：我们一直觉得我们的模型，在地理上多样化的数据中心和连接分散的市场制造商的容错网络，是最佳的网络。纽约是非常不同的，它有很多传统。我认为纽约证券交易所的重点将更多地备份交易楼，而不是改变其集中拍卖方法。这场辩论已经发生了十年并没有改变。我可以说，我们的模型吸引了很多流行的关注，特别是在袭击之后，因为地理分集非常引人注目。我们很高兴，并将继续进一步提高它。
NYSE chairman Richard Grasso and his Nasdaq counterpart Hardwick Simmons were their organizations' very public and confident faces, while Britz and Randich toiled tirelessly in the back rooms, restoring communications lines and priming computers to handle the pent-up rush of orders when markets reopened on September 17. They and their systems came through with flying colors; the Big Board broke a volume record that first day, and both exchanges easily handled trading activity that has remained at levels well above those before September 11.
对于英国人和兰迪希，那些疯狂的恢复周只提供了一个暗示的重建和再造挑战，以便跟随他们的世界可能会如何变化。填补首席技术官的角色，并且与他们的交往一样竞争，他们坚定地面对现在的运作可靠性和灾害计划的更大问题。
布里茨和兰迪奇还有一个共同点：晋升。明年1月生效，布里茨将成为纽约证交所的联席首席运营官，保留其目前的首席技术官职责。今年10月，兰迪奇出任纳斯达克首席信息官，将市场运营、信息安全和项目管理办公室纳入其技术开发和数据中心职责。
"What was previously unthinkable is now, unfortunately, thinkable, and you have to think about what you want to defend against in a much more robust way," says Britz, 50, a 29-year NYSE veteran who has been group executive vice president of market operations, technology and information products since 1995.
Adds Randich, 38, who joined Nasdaq in 2000 after four years at the Chicago Stock Exchange, where he was chief information officer, "If there is one lesson to learn from all this, it is that disaster-recovery plans need to be even better than was demonstrated on September 11."
这两位技术专家在接受机构投资者撰稿人玛丽安·沙利文（Marianne Sullivan）的采访时回顾并展望了那决定性的一天。他们分别回答了一组类似的问题。亚博赞助欧冠
亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者: How directly did your infrastructures get hit?
罗伯特布里茨：纽约证交所的一切都很正常。我们的交易设施和数据网站没有受到影响。我们的人民没有受到伤害。我们的重型基础设施——电力、水和蒸汽——很好。即使是我们的电信，因为我们有非常多样化的路由，是压倒性的未受影响。
Steven Randich：我们的系统是受伤的，因为它们不在下曼哈顿。[纳斯达克的主要数据中心是Trudbull，康涅狄格州。它的备份网站位于马里兰州洛克维尔。]幸运的是，我们在美国周围有20个WorldCom电信中心。我们的市场制造商订阅者连接到纳斯达克网络。其中两个枢纽位于纽约地铁区，在市中心和新泽西州。问题是，曼哈顿较低的一些公司失去了与外界的所有连接。这意味着我们的许多市场制造商丧失了主要的联系，并且必须在整个11日和后期工作，以重新建立连接，而不仅仅是纳斯达克，而是对每个人来说，从他们的主要或备份站点中。
布里茨：这是一个中心辐射行业；像纽约证交所这样的目的地市场是中心，经纪人和交易商是辐条。“9·11”事件后问题的实质是，在许多情况下，辐条连接到我们网络的能力受到了严重损害。
你是如何应对许多市场参与者的是什么完全连接的？
布里茨：他们和我们共同进行了一系列的通讯解决方案，其中许多仍在实施和稳定。我能否形容这些沟通渠道与911事件前一样强大？可能没有，但变通办法已经发挥了出色的作用。毫无疑问，每个需要到达纽交所销售点的人都完全有能力做到这一点。证据是，在恢复交易的第一天，成交量就创下了纪录。
Randich：我们做得很好，因为我们要求该国任何地方的任何市场制造商都有两种连接纳斯达克网络的方式。这与单独的本地电话运营商一起，每个电话载体都指向单独的WorldCom集线器，因此没有单点故障。下曼哈顿的所有市场制造商都将与新泽西州以及中城联系，他们将使用单独的运营商。这一切都很好。不幸的是，世界贸易中心的损失是如此糟糕，即两个载体连接都丢失，在实践中几乎从未发生过。
当你回来的时候，你有没有遇到容量问题？
布里茨：完全没有。我们的订单处理和交换系统的吞吐量过大，网络的带宽过大，这些系统几乎不出一身汗。我们平均约20%的系统利用率，即使在第一周的记录数字。
Randich：我们没有问题 - 自9月17日以来，我们已经有了一些大日子。我们每周都花费大量时间预测，每周都在星期天，我们的系统能够满足舒适范围的需求。我们对远现过去六个月经验丰富的历史峰的历史最佳记录。
鉴于公共电信运营商的电信业务超出了您的控制范围，您能做些什么来支撑市场的连通性？
Randich: The carrier connections have to be more dispersed, and then the firms need to have the ability to quickly move to another site and come back up operationally. A number of market makers have a hot disaster-recovery site backing up their primary operations as a part of normal business. If they lose one site, they don't have to reestablish operations at the other location. They just need to expand it to accommodate the lost functions at the disabled site. A number of firms have done that, and those are the ones that fared the best.
英国人：这是一件事可以在其设施和网络和交换和订单处理系统方面充分硬化。但如果经纪人经销商无法发送我们的订单，这是一场空洞的胜利，因为它们已经失去了与我们的主要网站的连接。因此，我们正在研究一个行业应急计划，该计划承认这一行业的非凡相互依赖。我们只是最薄弱的联系。
What will be in the plan, and how does that compare with previous levels of contingency planning?
布里茨：我们成立了一个特别小组，以确定我们在哪些方面吸取了教训，可以做得更好。这是一种错误的安全感，当你真正进入电线和钳子的层次时，人们认为他们真正拥有的那种冗余并不存在。
兰迪奇：我们有一个非常明确的计划，我们每年至少做六次测试来重新证明这一点。每当一条信息进入康涅狄格州的纳斯达克——我们每秒有3000条——它就会在一个亚秒的时间范围内立即在马里兰州复制。从本质上说，我们有一个高带宽的网络与同步通信之间的位置。
Nasdaq focuses a lot of effort on disaster planning and is going to focus even more and conduct more frequent tests. In one type of test, we pump transactions through the backup site in an effort to see where its breaking point is. That's something we do every week in our primary site. We want to ensure that the backup site performs and functions at the same level as the primary site.
What is the likelihood of more redundancy - a second trading floor for the NYSE or a third data center for Nasdaq?
拉夫:我们当然是思考和debating it. One justification would be that we could bring an active second site up sooner than other backup alternatives. But there are other issues to consider. If you are trying to defend against the loss of people, having more than one trading site, at least in theory, gives you some level of protection against that. But if you carry this to an extreme, terrorists who really wanted to take out the NYSE would presumably make an attempt on both sites. And if there were six trading sites, they might make an attempt on all six.
So you cannot defend against all possibilities. But it used to be that you did not have to plan for, or defend against, the unthinkable. When you realize two planes have hit the World Trade Center and taken it down, you begin to realize that nothing is unthinkable anymore.
兰迪希：我们正在考虑第三个网站。但不要让我错了;这是概念性的。这不像我们已经预算了这件事。
这是在9月11日之后开始的吗？
Randich: No, it started quite a while ago. Another thing we are thinking about is to eventually have all of our international and domestic systems run on a common platform. Much like we saw happen at many banks on September 11, our European and Asian operations could take over in an emergency, creating a continentally diverse disaster-recovery capability.
After the attacks, could the NYSE have reopened faster by moving to a backup site?
Britz: No. We had made a decision that we were not going to open that day, so there was no need to go elsewhere. But lack of access to our trading space was never an issue. We had alternative venues at our disposal and had the capability of bringing them up. If anyone needs proof of that, look at how we brought the American Stock Exchange up [on NYSE communications lines] overnight. Given that we were untouched, there was no need to move the trading facility, and frankly, moving the trading facility would not have cured the connectivity problem.
这一经验是否加强了建立更为电子化的市场基础设施的论据——纳斯达克模式，而不是纽交所的集中交易大厅？
布里茨：纽约证交所有一个交易大厅，因为它给了客户他们想要的东西，而我们也不能免除这一基本业务。我们提供产品-订单执行-和任何时间段内的任何其他产品一样，它具有客户想要的特性，否则它不会成功。我们为他们提供了许多不同的选择，包括连接和交付系统、订单类型以及销售点的自动化与人工干预。例如，他们使用的是我们的自动订单传送系统Dot，我们90%的订单都是以这种方式来的，占我们订单量的52%。日复一日，他们也会选择把我们48%的交易量寄给经纪人，以代表他们在销售点的利益。
Randich：我们一直觉得我们的模型，在地理上多样化的数据中心和连接分散的市场制造商的容错网络，是最佳的网络。纽约是非常不同的，它有很多传统。我认为纽约证券交易所的重点将更多地备份交易楼，而不是改变其集中拍卖方法。这场辩论已经发生了十年并没有改变。我可以说，我们的模型吸引了很多流行的关注，特别是在袭击之后，因为地理分集非常引人注目。我们很高兴，并将继续进一步提高它。