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Plastic meltdown
Providian mastered credit card marketing, then got hammered by the slowing economy - and by its own overconfidence.
Providian mastered credit card marketing, then got hammered by the slowing economy - and by its own overconfidence.
By Gregory J. Millman
2001年12月
亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者杂志
Executives of Providian Financial Corp. could at times act more like devil-may-care dot-commers than risk-savvy bankers. They swaggered through the halls of their San Francisco headquarters with an aura of invincibility worthy of the most self-assured Silicon Valley entrepreneurs.
And they made money, lots of it, feasting on loans to borrowers whom other banks regarded as marginal. Built and run by longtime CEO Shailesh Mehta, a fastidious engineer who prided himself on his ability to design extremely accurate and highly predictive mathematical models, Providian thumbed its nose at traditional notions of business cycles and credit quality, approving credit cards for people who otherwise couldn't get them.
即使经济蓬勃发展，该公司也遭遇了贷款损失大量贷款损失，但凭借似乎魔法组合的计算机化营销和建模技术，普华人的高管耸了耸肩，投资者也也是如此。毕竟，自20世纪90年代在20世纪90年代无处出现，盈利人士才能成为美国十大最大的信用卡贷款人之一 - 以及金融服务业的崛起之一。1997年至2000年期间每年净收入增长45％;卡片贷款未满188亿美元至322亿美元。2000年，Providen刊登了39.21％的普通股权回报，比花旗集团更好，比花旗集团更好，净收入为6.52亿美元，或每股2.23美元。
"People at the low end may be a higher risk, but not necessarily a bad risk," said a confident Mehta in an interview with Institutional Investor earlier this year. "You can design a product that meets the customer's needs and still compensates you for the risk."
它听起来很好。理论上。可能确实没有这样的信用风险，只设计了不良的产品和定价。但在现实世界中，提供的威廉可能不在身边证明公理。
Providanian于2001年在通常的卷上开始。尽管在第一季度的托管贷款9.34％的贷款率，但大量信用卡银行中的最高额度 - 普罗维斯省净收入增长32％，达到2.31亿美元。第二季度提高了24％的增长率，达到2.32亿美元，即使失去汇率达到10.29％（后来向上修改为10.63％）。但即使在9月11日恐怖袭击之后设定的经济寒意之前，Providan的光泽形象已经开始削减和裂缝。
9月4日与分析师的会议电话会议，Mehta向2002年警告了更高的抵押贷款，导致当天持续22％，达到30.36美元。他还预测，2001年的收益仍然比2000年高出17至19％，但市场并不令人印象深刻 - 较糟糕的反应即将到来。在下一个月，Mehta的相对乐观的预测蒸发。10月18日，在其第三季度盈利报表中，普罗维斯透露，其收费低于10.33％，其最接近的竞争对手，首都一金融公司和MBNA公司净收入从2000年第三季度暴跌71％，达到5720万美元，或每股20美分，因为公司被迫将贷款损失条款加倍，达到9.96亿美元。Providenian预计第四季度每股收入10至15美分，全年总额为1.87美元至1.92美元，下降约14％。
有一个其他的新闻。描述希姆斯elf as "frustrated" and conceding that "we have not delivered the earnings we promised," Mehta stepped aside as chairman of Providian's board and said he would stay on as CEO only until a replacement could be found. The share price, which hit a peak this year of $60.91 on May 22, shed 58 percent on October 19, falling to $5.15. It continued to decline steadily until more bad news hit on November 14, after the market closed: Providian withdrew its previous earnings guidance and announced a plan to sell or securitize $3.9 billion of loans. The stock dropped 22 percent the next day, to $2.87.
Mehta于11月26日离开;Providan宣布Joseph Saunders，这是56岁的FleetboSton金融公司的信用卡子公司，会取代他。当天股价增加了16％，达到3.80美元，但公司的市场资本化仍然是贫血10亿美元，下降仅为140亿美元。
Why Mehta's business model went bad - and why it went bad so quickly - remains something of a mystery. Providian's closest competitor, Falls Church, Virginia-based Capital One, shrugged off the post-September 11 economic slump, reporting relatively low charge-off rates and a 35 percent jump in its third-quarter net income, to $165 million, or 75 cents a share (see box, page 109). The most likely scenario, accepted by most Wall Street analysts, is that an overconfident - or overly greedy - Providian erred by continuing to market heavily to risky customers even as the economy soured and other card companies were turning more cautious. Never doubting its proficiency at designing products for any risk profile, Providian grew its loan portfolio by 31 percent, or $7.7 billion, in the 12 months ended September 30. In November federal regulators ordered the company to halt the growth of its subprime lending.
“最令人震惊的统计数据是，他们在美国证券专业财务公司分析师Caren Mayer表示，他们在次级市场的平均平衡为1,500美元。
Says one insider, speaking on condition of anonymity, "The company basically shot for too much growth at the expense of some other things it should have been assigning more priority to."
Perhaps, in the end, Mehta was just another genius who pushed his insights a bit too far. He has avoided interviews since October 18, when he turned the chairmanship over to veteran Providian board member and Mayfair Capital and Glenview Trust Co. chairman J. David Grissom. Two weeks later Providian engaged Salomon Smith Barney and Goldman, Sachs & Co. to consider "a broad array of financial and strategic alternatives." As often as not, of course, that's synonymous with a sale, but when new CEO Saunders took the helm, he vowed to keep Providian independent.
Some research analysts continue to believe that Providian's competitive advantages in credit analysis and financial mass marketing were genuine. Most bankers were unwilling to take Providian's risks, but few could match the size of its consumer database or the sophistication of its analytical models. "I think Providian really did have a superior platform," says J.P. Morgan Securities credit industry analyst Michael Freudenstein. "I still think they do relative to most of the industry."
甚至以前普遍的看涨分析师越来越普遍，祝福后代的利益，是他们可能给予MEHTA的情绪太多了。“他们的资产回报是该行业中更好的球员的两倍，”Anbanted Abs Amro研究员罗伯特纳波利表示，他在1月份在最喜爱的股票清单上有典雅的股票。“你可以通过他们追求的细分来证明它，但一般来说，当有人比其他人都好得多，这是一个关键的风险指标。”
当然，讽刺是，风险正是Mehta和Providan声称所声称了比其行业中的任何人更好的信息。
彻底改变美国信用卡业务，Shailesh Mehta旅行得很远。
1949年出生于1949年，Mehta赢得了印度理工学院机械工程学士学位，然后在20世纪70年代初前往克利夫兰获得他的硕士和博士。在西部储备大学的运营研究与计算机科学。
In 1973, while still a student, Mehta took on a consulting assignment for a local bank, AmeriTrust Co., which was trying to find a way to save gasoline expenses during the Arab oil-producing countries' embargo on exports. The bank's management wanted to reduce the mileage on trucks that picked up checks from branches and delivered them to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Mehta crunched the numbers and came to the counterintuitive conclusion that economizing on transportation would be a mistake because of the money that would be lost by delayed check-clearing.
很高兴，银行提供了一个全职工作的Mehta。他住了13年，运行后台系统并向执行副总统升起。1986年，他留下了肯塔基州路易斯维尔的保险公司首都持有公司的首席运营官，该公司正在寻求多元化其金融服务产品。首都将重命名为荷兰的AEGON提供的威途金公司并将其保险销售在一起，拥有一家小银行，该银行将成为当今提供的金融金融的核心。
The credit card industry had been dominated by big commercial banks like Citibank and Bank of America that had controlled the business since it went mass-market in the 1960s. The banks mainly marketed their cards through advertising and direct mail aimed at their own customers and others living in regions served by their branch networks. Banks typically invited consumers to send in applications that were evaluated according to a standard scoring system that used age, income, homeownership or rental status and other factors to determine creditworthiness.
在20世纪70年代后期，CITI通过购买邮件列表并用索取洪水淹没国家来破坏旧的营销模式。虽然花旗银行落后了 - 其一些优惠是着名的儿童和宠物 - 该战略使花旗成为世界上最大的卡片发行人;至今，贺卡是其最大的收入发电机之一，在第三季度推出了花旗集团的200亿美元超过30亿美元。
几乎每个主要的商业银行都在加强其直接邮件，以应对花旗银行的成功，但他们的产品几乎没有差异。除了高利法律有限利率的国家外，银行信用卡的利息通常在18到20％之间。当1979年 - '80的记录利率删除他们的利润时，银行在任何地方筹集了高于20％的信用卡率，并开始施加年度费用。
By the mid-1980s the rigidity of bank pricing attracted new competitors. Sears, Roebuck and Co. introduced its Discover card - now part of Morgan Stanley - with an annual rebate, something no bank had ever tried. And American Express Co., then a marketer of travel and entertainment cards without a revolving credit line, rolled out the Optima card, undercutting most banks with a 15 percent interest rate.
即便如此，大银行之间的竞争仍然相对抑制。“当我们于1987年开始查看信用卡业务时，我们对此一无所知，”首都主席兼首席执行官Richard Fairbank说。“但我们确实知道，前十名球员中的每一个都在收取相同的利率 - 19.8％。这是有问题的。我们出发了降低价格和民主信贷。”
Capital One, Providian, MBNA and First USA emerged as a new breed of companies - called monolines - that focused only on the credit card business. (Some of these companies were in fact spin-offs of established banks.) The monolines sold most of their cards by direct mail, but they took a more aggressive, targeted approach than the banks. Rather than wait for customers to come to them, the monolines relied heavily on demographics and credit scoring systems to seek out and fashion pitches to every potentially profitable applicant. These new companies pioneered the use of low interest rates as teasers to attract customers and their balances away from established competitors. And they scrutinized account activity, watching for credit problems and identifying opportunities to pile more credit on good customers.
创新的Mehta和他的Providan的团队迅速开始发现信用卡业务的盈利细微差别。“大多数人在今年早些时候回忆起基于人口统计学的信用证。“我们发现两个具有相同人口统计数据的两个人的信用行为可能是非常不同的。挑战是发现变量和构建模型。”
Mehta提出了17个风险类别中的每一个消费者的模型。如果旧的毯子对大规模邮件的方法相当于地毯轰炸，那么提供的卫生们从事手术罢工，量身定制信用卡为不同类型的客户提供，并以最大限度地提高自己的利润。定制的能力在2001年产生估计的40亿邮件招揽的行业中尤为宝贵，从1990年的11亿增加，而响应率从1.5％下降到0.5％。
单根模型工作。1990年，十大最大的卡片发行人占万事达卡和签证账户债务的1180亿美元的51％，而且其中一个是单麦片：MBNA，其中位于Citicorp和Chase Manhattan Corp.的第三次落后于2000年，前十名控股据“尼尔逊举报”，82％的471亿美元市场，是加利福尼亚州奥纳德的行业时事通讯。花旗集团领导着名单，J.P. Morgan Chase＆Co.排名第四，但其余的前六个是单麦藤：MBNA，第一美国，普遍的美国和资本第一。（第一个美国被银行一家公司收购，1997年，刚刚从1999年的信贷亏损中恢复，强迫长期银行一级首席执行官约翰麦科伊纳退休。）
Capital One and Providian epitomized the aggressive and intelligent use of technology and computerized modeling. UBS Warburg card industry analyst John McDonald says that the two set themselves apart "by using information about customers to be more creative on the marketing end or smarter on the pricing end than everyone else."
Providian自己设定在另一种方式——它ggressively courted riskier customers. After a couple of years in the 1980s when Providian primarily went after the higher end of the credit spectrum, the company decided to move downscale, focusing on people it labeled "unbanked" or "underserved." Today about 70 percent of Providian's card loans and losses are concentrated in the riskier subprime segments.
“1989年左右，我们发现我们正在下降的前景并没有糟糕的积分 - 我们在我们的档案中没有足够的信息来进行知情的决定，”David Petrini，Providean的副主席监督金融，技术和行政管理，告诉亚博赞助欧冠今年早些时候的机构投资者。“这是一个大型市场，包括人们新的信誉，生活中的人们像离婚一样，他没有对自己的信誉和信贷历史不到恒星的人。”
Providan的热心追求次级市场成为其标志。1999年，公司的策略促进了旧金山市和康涅狄格州的调查，进入了一些涉嫌可疑的销售和收集实践。相关的客户和股东类行动诉讼是提交的;Providan公司同意尽可能高达3亿美元的定居点和重述。
分析师和投资者因这些事件而被解雇，因为他们没有伤害Providanian的底线，因为公司对其有害地反应，增加了其慈善捐款和任命前银行监管机构Konrad Alt担任首席公共政策官。但法律问题表明UBS Warburg的麦当劳麦当劳称之为“过度营销实践”，这将归功于亨特维护人。“他们将自己过度曝光到次级市场的风险领域，”麦当劳说。
普罗维迪亚的拖欠和损失数字反映了这一点。今年第一和第二季度，美国银行家协会（American Bankers Association）的一项调查显示，4.13%的信用卡贷款至少逾期30天，MBNA和Capital One都在4%到5%之间徘徊。但Providian在第二季度达到了8.04%，高于第一季度的7.64%，预示着将有更高的冲销。只要公司继续盈利，高拖欠率是可以的。Providian的竞争分析似乎证实了它的战略。就在5月份，该公司的投资者关系人士还在挥舞着图表，显示每个账户56美元的利润远远超过了MBNA（33美元）、花旗（32美元）和Capital One（16美元）。
The attitude that produced those profits was that "losses are never too high," as chief risk management officer James Redmond explained in an interview earlier this year. "There is no such thing as a level beyond which you won't lend. The point isn't how high losses are but are they predictable and can you price for them."
But by September of this year, with the stock market bubble long since collapsed and the U.S. economy flirting with recession, Providian's prices weren't covering losses like they used to. Mehta could no longer seem to get his earnings and charge-off projections straight, and investors took out their frustrations on the stock. The price-earnings multiple, in the high 20s earlier this year, fell well below 2 in November, while MBNA's was at 18 and Capital One's at 19.
关于在Providan的出现问题的后期应该持续一段时间，但是该公司披露了关于第三季度贷款绩效的一些细节中有诅咒线索。该公司将其卡贷款分为三大类：铂金，最信誉和最高余额账户;和两个主要是次级段，称为中间和标准。
第三季度，白金类平均余额为4,331美元，总贷款为9.6亿美元，亏损率为7.8％。在中间投资组合中，平均余额为1,950美元，总贷款为127亿美元，亏损率为9.9％。
平均标准账户余额为1,496美元 - 竞争对手的次级卡投资组合中的500美元至1,000美元。在Providenian的94亿美元的标准贷款中，第三季度亏损率为13.9％ - 远远差，而不是公司的10.33％的混合率，本身已经提高了分析师的报警。
J.P. Morgan Securities分析师弗洛伊森斯坦，他认为标准卡损失可能会攀升至24.5％的人，说收费太大了。他说，随着经济疲软，普华永道并没有及时从次级市场退回。最终秸秆可能在铂金账户中损失差，弗洛伊森斯坦归因于破产申请中的飙升。他说，拟议的联邦立法旨在使这些申请更加困难，激励许多债务持有的持卡人在仍然是一个简单的选择时寻求破产保护。
Providan不仅为您的客户提供比其他地方更有信用的风险，而且还以较低的价格提供。“他们将他们的APR [年度百分比]缩短了最高风险的客户，以23.9％。如果您从其他发行人查看次次次次次次次数，您将看到收费率接近30％，”UBS Warburg的麦当劳说。
Higher-than-expected losses. Pricing that was a little too low. Shailesh Mehta now has plenty of time on his hands to do the math.
Capital's ideas
Not so long ago Providian Financial Corp. and Capital One Financial Corp. were twin stars of technology-intensive credit card marketing. As Providian's then-CEO, Shailesh Mehta, said in an interview in the spring, "If anyone comes close to our skill set, it is Capital One."
At about the same time, Capital One's investor relations director, Paul Paquin, complimented his rival but presciently pointed to a difference: "Providian is a good, information-based strategy player. They approach the process from a technology point of view much the way we do. But we are much more risk-averse."
风险厌恶有助于推动弗吉尼亚州弗吉尼亚瀑布教会的盈利增长35％，第三季度为1.653亿美元，今年前九个月的36％，达到4.643亿美元。1. 2001年首都，3380万消费贷款账户;到9月30日，该数字跃升了19％，达到4010万。贷款余额攀升90亿美元，或31％，达到385亿美元，但收费率持续下跌3.92％，“任何主要信用卡机构的最佳信用表现”，“资本一董事长兼首席执行官理查德费尔伯克”。
当Fairbank是20世纪80年代的基于纽约战略规划伙伴的顾问时，首都一开始。他和该公司的另一个顾问 - Nigel Morris，他现在是首都总统和Coo的Coo - 写了一个经营计划，其中包含了关于计算机化信用卡营销的想法。他们从最大的20大银行遇到了高管，希望筹集资金来支持他们的愿景，但只有一个，弗吉尼亚州里士满的标志银行同意支持他们。他们于1987年推出了首都，七年后，该公司公开了。（Signet成为现在Wachovia Corp.的一部分）
首都人通过大规模的审判和错误构建业务。它设计和测试定制卡的报价 - 去年它测试了45,000，从1999年的36,000增加到1999年的36,000，而1992年的策略在其初期阶段。如果消费者对考试作出积极响应，首都人会将营销活动指向更多的人认为可能会这样做。
费尔班克说：“我们建立了一个以信息为基础的公司，可以创造出无限数量的产品，并通过大规模的科学测试，从而进入一个单一的市场，或大规模定制。”
该公司偶尔会旨在将其营销娴熟应用于其他部门。1997年，它取得了遗址进入蜂窝电话业务，推理其识别卡客户的方法将携带。但是，在三月首都，一张用Sprint PCS集团将插头拉开了一个联合无线服务企业，因为这一业务的激烈竞争侵蚀了利润率，“明显低于我们的障碍，”帕奎恩说。
1998年，资本一体化，进入汽车贷款业务。它在9月份突出了其严重性，当时它同意以1.48亿美元的股票获得在线汽车贷方人士财务。“基于简单的交易的金融产品的速度比信用卡更快。该模型非常可扩展，”Fairbank断言。
That may be, but the economy is worsening, Capital One is growing at rates reminiscent of Providian before its crash, and a stock market that tends to value specialized financial companies more highly than diversified ones might frown on Capital One's expansion. Still, the company is not backing away from its 20 percent earnings-growth projection for 2002, and Fairbank and Morris are optimistic enough to be taking all their compensation in options, a majority of them performance-based, for the next two years.
说Ubs Warburg卡业分析师John McDonald：“100,000美元的问题是提供了多大的Providan的问题，具体的弱化和弱化经济的反映，提供了首先感受到效果。该问题将在下一个问题得到回答六到12个月。“麦当劳在首都买入推荐的首都，他并不孤单。
By Gregory J. Millman
2001年12月
亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者杂志
Executives of Providian Financial Corp. could at times act more like devil-may-care dot-commers than risk-savvy bankers. They swaggered through the halls of their San Francisco headquarters with an aura of invincibility worthy of the most self-assured Silicon Valley entrepreneurs.
And they made money, lots of it, feasting on loans to borrowers whom other banks regarded as marginal. Built and run by longtime CEO Shailesh Mehta, a fastidious engineer who prided himself on his ability to design extremely accurate and highly predictive mathematical models, Providian thumbed its nose at traditional notions of business cycles and credit quality, approving credit cards for people who otherwise couldn't get them.
即使经济蓬勃发展，该公司也遭遇了贷款损失大量贷款损失，但凭借似乎魔法组合的计算机化营销和建模技术，普华人的高管耸了耸肩，投资者也也是如此。毕竟，自20世纪90年代在20世纪90年代无处出现，盈利人士才能成为美国十大最大的信用卡贷款人之一 - 以及金融服务业的崛起之一。1997年至2000年期间每年净收入增长45％;卡片贷款未满188亿美元至322亿美元。2000年，Providen刊登了39.21％的普通股权回报，比花旗集团更好，比花旗集团更好，净收入为6.52亿美元，或每股2.23美元。
"People at the low end may be a higher risk, but not necessarily a bad risk," said a confident Mehta in an interview with Institutional Investor earlier this year. "You can design a product that meets the customer's needs and still compensates you for the risk."
它听起来很好。理论上。可能确实没有这样的信用风险，只设计了不良的产品和定价。但在现实世界中，提供的威廉可能不在身边证明公理。
Providanian于2001年在通常的卷上开始。尽管在第一季度的托管贷款9.34％的贷款率，但大量信用卡银行中的最高额度 - 普罗维斯省净收入增长32％，达到2.31亿美元。第二季度提高了24％的增长率，达到2.32亿美元，即使失去汇率达到10.29％（后来向上修改为10.63％）。但即使在9月11日恐怖袭击之后设定的经济寒意之前，Providan的光泽形象已经开始削减和裂缝。
9月4日与分析师的会议电话会议，Mehta向2002年警告了更高的抵押贷款，导致当天持续22％，达到30.36美元。他还预测，2001年的收益仍然比2000年高出17至19％，但市场并不令人印象深刻 - 较糟糕的反应即将到来。在下一个月，Mehta的相对乐观的预测蒸发。10月18日，在其第三季度盈利报表中，普罗维斯透露，其收费低于10.33％，其最接近的竞争对手，首都一金融公司和MBNA公司净收入从2000年第三季度暴跌71％，达到5720万美元，或每股20美分，因为公司被迫将贷款损失条款加倍，达到9.96亿美元。Providenian预计第四季度每股收入10至15美分，全年总额为1.87美元至1.92美元，下降约14％。
有一个其他的新闻。描述希姆斯elf as "frustrated" and conceding that "we have not delivered the earnings we promised," Mehta stepped aside as chairman of Providian's board and said he would stay on as CEO only until a replacement could be found. The share price, which hit a peak this year of $60.91 on May 22, shed 58 percent on October 19, falling to $5.15. It continued to decline steadily until more bad news hit on November 14, after the market closed: Providian withdrew its previous earnings guidance and announced a plan to sell or securitize $3.9 billion of loans. The stock dropped 22 percent the next day, to $2.87.
Mehta于11月26日离开;Providan宣布Joseph Saunders，这是56岁的FleetboSton金融公司的信用卡子公司，会取代他。当天股价增加了16％，达到3.80美元，但公司的市场资本化仍然是贫血10亿美元，下降仅为140亿美元。
Why Mehta's business model went bad - and why it went bad so quickly - remains something of a mystery. Providian's closest competitor, Falls Church, Virginia-based Capital One, shrugged off the post-September 11 economic slump, reporting relatively low charge-off rates and a 35 percent jump in its third-quarter net income, to $165 million, or 75 cents a share (see box, page 109). The most likely scenario, accepted by most Wall Street analysts, is that an overconfident - or overly greedy - Providian erred by continuing to market heavily to risky customers even as the economy soured and other card companies were turning more cautious. Never doubting its proficiency at designing products for any risk profile, Providian grew its loan portfolio by 31 percent, or $7.7 billion, in the 12 months ended September 30. In November federal regulators ordered the company to halt the growth of its subprime lending.
“最令人震惊的统计数据是，他们在美国证券专业财务公司分析师Caren Mayer表示，他们在次级市场的平均平衡为1,500美元。
Says one insider, speaking on condition of anonymity, "The company basically shot for too much growth at the expense of some other things it should have been assigning more priority to."
Perhaps, in the end, Mehta was just another genius who pushed his insights a bit too far. He has avoided interviews since October 18, when he turned the chairmanship over to veteran Providian board member and Mayfair Capital and Glenview Trust Co. chairman J. David Grissom. Two weeks later Providian engaged Salomon Smith Barney and Goldman, Sachs & Co. to consider "a broad array of financial and strategic alternatives." As often as not, of course, that's synonymous with a sale, but when new CEO Saunders took the helm, he vowed to keep Providian independent.
Some research analysts continue to believe that Providian's competitive advantages in credit analysis and financial mass marketing were genuine. Most bankers were unwilling to take Providian's risks, but few could match the size of its consumer database or the sophistication of its analytical models. "I think Providian really did have a superior platform," says J.P. Morgan Securities credit industry analyst Michael Freudenstein. "I still think they do relative to most of the industry."
甚至以前普遍的看涨分析师越来越普遍，祝福后代的利益，是他们可能给予MEHTA的情绪太多了。“他们的资产回报是该行业中更好的球员的两倍，”Anbanted Abs Amro研究员罗伯特纳波利表示，他在1月份在最喜爱的股票清单上有典雅的股票。“你可以通过他们追求的细分来证明它，但一般来说，当有人比其他人都好得多，这是一个关键的风险指标。”
当然，讽刺是，风险正是Mehta和Providan声称所声称了比其行业中的任何人更好的信息。
彻底改变美国信用卡业务，Shailesh Mehta旅行得很远。
1949年出生于1949年，Mehta赢得了印度理工学院机械工程学士学位，然后在20世纪70年代初前往克利夫兰获得他的硕士和博士。在西部储备大学的运营研究与计算机科学。
In 1973, while still a student, Mehta took on a consulting assignment for a local bank, AmeriTrust Co., which was trying to find a way to save gasoline expenses during the Arab oil-producing countries' embargo on exports. The bank's management wanted to reduce the mileage on trucks that picked up checks from branches and delivered them to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Mehta crunched the numbers and came to the counterintuitive conclusion that economizing on transportation would be a mistake because of the money that would be lost by delayed check-clearing.
很高兴，银行提供了一个全职工作的Mehta。他住了13年，运行后台系统并向执行副总统升起。1986年，他留下了肯塔基州路易斯维尔的保险公司首都持有公司的首席运营官，该公司正在寻求多元化其金融服务产品。首都将重命名为荷兰的AEGON提供的威途金公司并将其保险销售在一起，拥有一家小银行，该银行将成为当今提供的金融金融的核心。
The credit card industry had been dominated by big commercial banks like Citibank and Bank of America that had controlled the business since it went mass-market in the 1960s. The banks mainly marketed their cards through advertising and direct mail aimed at their own customers and others living in regions served by their branch networks. Banks typically invited consumers to send in applications that were evaluated according to a standard scoring system that used age, income, homeownership or rental status and other factors to determine creditworthiness.
在20世纪70年代后期，CITI通过购买邮件列表并用索取洪水淹没国家来破坏旧的营销模式。虽然花旗银行落后了 - 其一些优惠是着名的儿童和宠物 - 该战略使花旗成为世界上最大的卡片发行人;至今，贺卡是其最大的收入发电机之一，在第三季度推出了花旗集团的200亿美元超过30亿美元。
几乎每个主要的商业银行都在加强其直接邮件，以应对花旗银行的成功，但他们的产品几乎没有差异。除了高利法律有限利率的国家外，银行信用卡的利息通常在18到20％之间。当1979年 - '80的记录利率删除他们的利润时，银行在任何地方筹集了高于20％的信用卡率，并开始施加年度费用。
By the mid-1980s the rigidity of bank pricing attracted new competitors. Sears, Roebuck and Co. introduced its Discover card - now part of Morgan Stanley - with an annual rebate, something no bank had ever tried. And American Express Co., then a marketer of travel and entertainment cards without a revolving credit line, rolled out the Optima card, undercutting most banks with a 15 percent interest rate.
即便如此，大银行之间的竞争仍然相对抑制。“当我们于1987年开始查看信用卡业务时，我们对此一无所知，”首都主席兼首席执行官Richard Fairbank说。“但我们确实知道，前十名球员中的每一个都在收取相同的利率 - 19.8％。这是有问题的。我们出发了降低价格和民主信贷。”
Capital One, Providian, MBNA and First USA emerged as a new breed of companies - called monolines - that focused only on the credit card business. (Some of these companies were in fact spin-offs of established banks.) The monolines sold most of their cards by direct mail, but they took a more aggressive, targeted approach than the banks. Rather than wait for customers to come to them, the monolines relied heavily on demographics and credit scoring systems to seek out and fashion pitches to every potentially profitable applicant. These new companies pioneered the use of low interest rates as teasers to attract customers and their balances away from established competitors. And they scrutinized account activity, watching for credit problems and identifying opportunities to pile more credit on good customers.
创新的Mehta和他的Providan的团队迅速开始发现信用卡业务的盈利细微差别。“大多数人在今年早些时候回忆起基于人口统计学的信用证。“我们发现两个具有相同人口统计数据的两个人的信用行为可能是非常不同的。挑战是发现变量和构建模型。”
Mehta提出了17个风险类别中的每一个消费者的模型。如果旧的毯子对大规模邮件的方法相当于地毯轰炸，那么提供的卫生们从事手术罢工，量身定制信用卡为不同类型的客户提供，并以最大限度地提高自己的利润。定制的能力在2001年产生估计的40亿邮件招揽的行业中尤为宝贵，从1990年的11亿增加，而响应率从1.5％下降到0.5％。
单根模型工作。1990年，十大最大的卡片发行人占万事达卡和签证账户债务的1180亿美元的51％，而且其中一个是单麦片：MBNA，其中位于Citicorp和Chase Manhattan Corp.的第三次落后于2000年，前十名控股据“尼尔逊举报”，82％的471亿美元市场，是加利福尼亚州奥纳德的行业时事通讯。花旗集团领导着名单，J.P. Morgan Chase＆Co.排名第四，但其余的前六个是单麦藤：MBNA，第一美国，普遍的美国和资本第一。（第一个美国被银行一家公司收购，1997年，刚刚从1999年的信贷亏损中恢复，强迫长期银行一级首席执行官约翰麦科伊纳退休。）
Capital One and Providian epitomized the aggressive and intelligent use of technology and computerized modeling. UBS Warburg card industry analyst John McDonald says that the two set themselves apart "by using information about customers to be more creative on the marketing end or smarter on the pricing end than everyone else."
Providian自己设定在另一种方式——它ggressively courted riskier customers. After a couple of years in the 1980s when Providian primarily went after the higher end of the credit spectrum, the company decided to move downscale, focusing on people it labeled "unbanked" or "underserved." Today about 70 percent of Providian's card loans and losses are concentrated in the riskier subprime segments.
“1989年左右，我们发现我们正在下降的前景并没有糟糕的积分 - 我们在我们的档案中没有足够的信息来进行知情的决定，”David Petrini，Providean的副主席监督金融，技术和行政管理，告诉亚博赞助欧冠今年早些时候的机构投资者。“这是一个大型市场，包括人们新的信誉，生活中的人们像离婚一样，他没有对自己的信誉和信贷历史不到恒星的人。”
Providan的热心追求次级市场成为其标志。1999年，公司的策略促进了旧金山市和康涅狄格州的调查，进入了一些涉嫌可疑的销售和收集实践。相关的客户和股东类行动诉讼是提交的;Providan公司同意尽可能高达3亿美元的定居点和重述。
分析师和投资者因这些事件而被解雇，因为他们没有伤害Providanian的底线，因为公司对其有害地反应，增加了其慈善捐款和任命前银行监管机构Konrad Alt担任首席公共政策官。但法律问题表明UBS Warburg的麦当劳麦当劳称之为“过度营销实践”，这将归功于亨特维护人。“他们将自己过度曝光到次级市场的风险领域，”麦当劳说。
普罗维迪亚的拖欠和损失数字反映了这一点。今年第一和第二季度，美国银行家协会（American Bankers Association）的一项调查显示，4.13%的信用卡贷款至少逾期30天，MBNA和Capital One都在4%到5%之间徘徊。但Providian在第二季度达到了8.04%，高于第一季度的7.64%，预示着将有更高的冲销。只要公司继续盈利，高拖欠率是可以的。Providian的竞争分析似乎证实了它的战略。就在5月份，该公司的投资者关系人士还在挥舞着图表，显示每个账户56美元的利润远远超过了MBNA（33美元）、花旗（32美元）和Capital One（16美元）。
The attitude that produced those profits was that "losses are never too high," as chief risk management officer James Redmond explained in an interview earlier this year. "There is no such thing as a level beyond which you won't lend. The point isn't how high losses are but are they predictable and can you price for them."
But by September of this year, with the stock market bubble long since collapsed and the U.S. economy flirting with recession, Providian's prices weren't covering losses like they used to. Mehta could no longer seem to get his earnings and charge-off projections straight, and investors took out their frustrations on the stock. The price-earnings multiple, in the high 20s earlier this year, fell well below 2 in November, while MBNA's was at 18 and Capital One's at 19.
关于在Providan的出现问题的后期应该持续一段时间，但是该公司披露了关于第三季度贷款绩效的一些细节中有诅咒线索。该公司将其卡贷款分为三大类：铂金，最信誉和最高余额账户;和两个主要是次级段，称为中间和标准。
第三季度，白金类平均余额为4,331美元，总贷款为9.6亿美元，亏损率为7.8％。在中间投资组合中，平均余额为1,950美元，总贷款为127亿美元，亏损率为9.9％。
平均标准账户余额为1,496美元 - 竞争对手的次级卡投资组合中的500美元至1,000美元。在Providenian的94亿美元的标准贷款中，第三季度亏损率为13.9％ - 远远差，而不是公司的10.33％的混合率，本身已经提高了分析师的报警。
J.P. Morgan Securities分析师弗洛伊森斯坦，他认为标准卡损失可能会攀升至24.5％的人，说收费太大了。他说，随着经济疲软，普华永道并没有及时从次级市场退回。最终秸秆可能在铂金账户中损失差，弗洛伊森斯坦归因于破产申请中的飙升。他说，拟议的联邦立法旨在使这些申请更加困难，激励许多债务持有的持卡人在仍然是一个简单的选择时寻求破产保护。
Providan不仅为您的客户提供比其他地方更有信用的风险，而且还以较低的价格提供。“他们将他们的APR [年度百分比]缩短了最高风险的客户，以23.9％。如果您从其他发行人查看次次次次次次次数，您将看到收费率接近30％，”UBS Warburg的麦当劳说。
Higher-than-expected losses. Pricing that was a little too low. Shailesh Mehta now has plenty of time on his hands to do the math.
Capital's ideas
Not so long ago Providian Financial Corp. and Capital One Financial Corp. were twin stars of technology-intensive credit card marketing. As Providian's then-CEO, Shailesh Mehta, said in an interview in the spring, "If anyone comes close to our skill set, it is Capital One."
At about the same time, Capital One's investor relations director, Paul Paquin, complimented his rival but presciently pointed to a difference: "Providian is a good, information-based strategy player. They approach the process from a technology point of view much the way we do. But we are much more risk-averse."
风险厌恶有助于推动弗吉尼亚州弗吉尼亚瀑布教会的盈利增长35％，第三季度为1.653亿美元，今年前九个月的36％，达到4.643亿美元。1. 2001年首都，3380万消费贷款账户;到9月30日，该数字跃升了19％，达到4010万。贷款余额攀升90亿美元，或31％，达到385亿美元，但收费率持续下跌3.92％，“任何主要信用卡机构的最佳信用表现”，“资本一董事长兼首席执行官理查德费尔伯克”。
当Fairbank是20世纪80年代的基于纽约战略规划伙伴的顾问时，首都一开始。他和该公司的另一个顾问 - Nigel Morris，他现在是首都总统和Coo的Coo - 写了一个经营计划，其中包含了关于计算机化信用卡营销的想法。他们从最大的20大银行遇到了高管，希望筹集资金来支持他们的愿景，但只有一个，弗吉尼亚州里士满的标志银行同意支持他们。他们于1987年推出了首都，七年后，该公司公开了。（Signet成为现在Wachovia Corp.的一部分）
首都人通过大规模的审判和错误构建业务。它设计和测试定制卡的报价 - 去年它测试了45,000，从1999年的36,000增加到1999年的36,000，而1992年的策略在其初期阶段。如果消费者对考试作出积极响应，首都人会将营销活动指向更多的人认为可能会这样做。
费尔班克说：“我们建立了一个以信息为基础的公司，可以创造出无限数量的产品，并通过大规模的科学测试，从而进入一个单一的市场，或大规模定制。”
该公司偶尔会旨在将其营销娴熟应用于其他部门。1997年，它取得了遗址进入蜂窝电话业务，推理其识别卡客户的方法将携带。但是，在三月首都，一张用Sprint PCS集团将插头拉开了一个联合无线服务企业，因为这一业务的激烈竞争侵蚀了利润率，“明显低于我们的障碍，”帕奎恩说。
1998年，资本一体化，进入汽车贷款业务。它在9月份突出了其严重性，当时它同意以1.48亿美元的股票获得在线汽车贷方人士财务。“基于简单的交易的金融产品的速度比信用卡更快。该模型非常可扩展，”Fairbank断言。
That may be, but the economy is worsening, Capital One is growing at rates reminiscent of Providian before its crash, and a stock market that tends to value specialized financial companies more highly than diversified ones might frown on Capital One's expansion. Still, the company is not backing away from its 20 percent earnings-growth projection for 2002, and Fairbank and Morris are optimistic enough to be taking all their compensation in options, a majority of them performance-based, for the next two years.
说Ubs Warburg卡业分析师John McDonald：“100,000美元的问题是提供了多大的Providan的问题，具体的弱化和弱化经济的反映，提供了首先感受到效果。该问题将在下一个问题得到回答六到12个月。“麦当劳在首都买入推荐的首都，他并不孤单。