共同基金分配从未如此至关重要。也没有这么昂贵。
By Rich Blake
May 2001
亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者Magazine
共同基金分配从未如此至关重要。也没有这么昂贵。但随着成本增长，围绕“收入共享”的问题所以提出争议销售经纪公司的有争议的方式。
漫步在任何一家美国超市的过道上，仔细看看货架。在那里的眼睛水平坐着象牙雪或潮汐洗涤剂或悬赏纸巾。他们如何得到如此突出的位置不是偶然的-或神秘-但一个基本的事实，消费者营销。宝洁公司（Procter&Gamble）及其竞争对手急于为这一特权买单，每年斥资数亿美元购买优质货架空间，以吸引顾客，提高市场份额。
If it works for soap, why not mutual funds?
在这种情况下，宝斯特和赌场是共同基金公司，安全略的是金融中介机构，最常见的是Merrill Lynch＆Co.或花旗集团的Salomon Smith Barney等大型经纪房屋。粗鲁的资金，基金公司正在向这些中介机构向这些中介商付出不断增长的关税。通过经纪人的所有卖市支付了东西;越来越多地支付相当于眼睛级别货架空间的金融营销 - 访问经纪人和销售人员，以教育和鳄鱼，葡萄酒和用餐，以出售资金。
少数基金投资者甚至知道这是持续的。但是，向经纪公司提供的付款，而不是经纪人，并以委婉语在收入共享而闻名 - 已成为业务的必备方面。虽然合法，但他们越来越受争议。亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者了解到，该付款现在已经引起了证券交易委员会的注意。
美国证交会投资管理部副主任道格拉斯·施希特（Douglas Schiedt）表示：“为分销付费确实会引发问题。”我们正在研究是否有必要进行更多的披露。”
虽然许多基金公司高管捍卫该实践，但有证据表明了反弹酿造。“收入支付所以失控的是，小型和中型企业的许多基金高管实际上希望看到监管机构进入并结束，”波士顿的CERULLI伙伴顾问Matthew Mcginess说。
The sums involved are enormous. According to estimates by Boston-based strategic consulting firm Financial Research Corp., fund sponsors, mostly load players such as Franklin Resources, Putnam Investments and AIM Management Group, pay the Merrill Lynches of the world as much as $2 billion a year. By comparison, mutual fund companies spent $515 million on advertising in 2000, calculates FRC. It estimates that revenue-sharing fees have more than doubled in the past five years. "Revenue-sharing is considered the dirty little secret of the mutual fund industry," says Neil Bathon, FRC's founder and president. "Nobody likes to talk about it, but the reality is that it has become a major expense."
The remarkable upsurge of revenue-sharing, which did not exist a decade ago, underscores a dramatic change in the mutual fund business. Even as the rising tide of the bull market lifted all yachts, certain fundamentals of the industry deteriorated. Now, in the grip of a nasty bear market, many mutual fund executives are struggling to keep their firms above water. With revenues shrinking as assets under management decline because of redemptions and poor performance, fund companies are caught in a classic squeeze as their costs continue to ratchet up.
“分布的成本正在上升。收入分享是它越来越大的部分，这是一个十年前的成本，”普南总统劳伦斯·卢克斯说。“这些交易受到保护，并通过资产的戏剧性崛起得到了价值。现在我们看到事情开始换句话说。”
Last month one public fund company after another began reporting lower earnings and falling operating margins. These announcements were accompanied by the grim news of layoffs - 4 percent of staff at Putnam, 24 percent at Janus Capital Corp. - and other cutbacks.
"The market has taken away a whole lot of revenue in a short period of time, and no company can reduce expenses that fast," moans Edward Bernard, chief of retail sales and distribution for T. Rowe Price Associates. His firm saw operating margins drop in the first quarter to 32 percent, down from 41 percent a year ago.
这一次潜在T. Rowe价格以及其他公司的主要原因是分布的螺旋成本。十年前，大多数资金都没有负担，并通过报纸和无线电广告和免费电话直接销售给消费者。今天，直接卖家正在通过经纪，基金超市和金融规划者增加负荷资金。在过去的五年中，中介机构销售的所有资金的比例
根据纽约的研究公司战略洞察力的估计，根据估计，根据60％至80％飙升。经纪渠道占这些销售额越来越大的份额 - 去年年度45％，从1998年的32％估计，估计FRC。
今天的成本挤压源于20世纪90年代在20世纪90年代享有的共同资金的庞大源于自大的成功，因为他们成为消费者节省的钉，点燃了竞争激烈的竞争。购物者现在可以通过8,433个共同基金，从十年前的3,086年开始，他们可以重新清除;即使在去年的可怜的市场中，也推出了221个新资金。
为了削减这种杂乱，资金需要强大的性能和坚实的品牌名称。但是在开放式建筑时代 - 只有大家似乎愿意兜售其他人的产品 - 他们也需要很多帮助销售他们的商品。从来没有比今天更真实：2月和3月在伊拉克入侵科威特之后，1990年8月和9月以来，净股权基金的第一个背靠背月。仅在3月份，股票基金遭受了创纪录的206亿美元的流出。因此，依赖中介机构和收入共享。
"Simply having performance isn't enough any more," says Putnam's Lasser. "Good numbers don't sell themselves."
因此，几乎每一个主要的基金家族，包括那些坚持直销的公司，都接受了中介渠道。今年1月，苏黎世斯卡德尔投资公司（Zurich Scudder Investments）在其30只斯卡德尔基金的整个阵容中大举销售；强大的资本管理增加了6只零售基金的费用，这些基金被指定通过券商进行分销。杰纳斯和T。历史上主要的直销商Rowe Price一直在斥巨资将部分资金注入经纪公司赞助的共同基金包装计划和401（k）平台。另外还有Waddell&Reed Financial，该公司长期以来一直依赖自己的3000名销售代表的分销网络，主要分布在中西部地区。甚至它也首次选择性地进入经纪渠道。”我们了解成本动态，并试图在有经济意义的地方与分销合作伙伴接洽，”该公司首席营销官托马斯·布奇（Thomas Butch）解释说。亚博篮球怎么下串
Increasingly powerful, brokerages have used their leverage to exact ever-higher tolls. Technically compensation for any service connected to fund distribution - such as technology, annual meetings, special events, sales conferences and training seminars - revenue-sharing is simply money that fund companies pay brokerage houses to get access to their brokers. It's a tab for renting the retail sales armies that most mutual fund companies don't have.
For additional money, fund companies can buy their way onto the lists of "preferred" providers that most brokerage houses maintain. Often limited to a dozen or fewer fund companies, these lists are confidential and never revealed to the buying public or even to a firm's brokers, though astute sales reps can figure them out. Preferred status carries real advantages: In some cases, the wholesale marketers of the fund companies can get virtually unfettered access to brokerage sales forces to convince them to sell their funds.
Revenue-sharing is just part of the cost. Distribution is the second-biggest expense for fund companies - after compensation. But a big chunk of that budget goes toward wholesale marketing costs. To reach intermediary channels, fund companies need to employ scores of high-paid marketers who, in effect, sell to the sellers. According to FRC, a fund company spends on average some $50 million a year compensating these sales executives.
For the intermediaries, all this money is manna from heaven. Revenue-sharing, paid in hard or soft dollars, comes in addition to the ordinary loads and sales commissions - typically 5 percent, and split between salesperson and firm. And it also comes on top of any so-called 12b-1 fees that fund companies are permitted to charge for marketing and distribution; as it is, the 12b-1 fee is gobbled up by the brokerage firms.
Loads, commissions and 12b-1 charges come right out of the fund shareholders' pockets. Revenue-sharing comes straight off the fund companies' bottom lines. When markets soared through the late 1990s and into 2000, no one complained too loudly. In good times, mutual funds enjoy extraordinary economics, collecting fees on ever-rising assets that have to be gathered only once. But there's nothing like a bear market to make people growl.
考虑在堕落工业的父亲亲爱的Janus的父母父母的成本堆积。即使在一年前的斯蒂威尔的资产从3240亿美元下降到20.5亿美元，公司也很大程度地占据了基金超市，经纪包装计划和401（k）平台。2000年，STILWELL在第三方分销3.15亿美元 - 超过1999年的14300万美元。在今年的第一季度，Stilwell脾气暴躁的支出，但仍花费大量的6600万美元，从一年的每年下降9％。与此同时，收入占18％以上。
Stilwell有公司感到挤压。与同一季度相比，215亿美元的装载巨型富兰克林资源在第一季度的收入下降了6％。与此同时，营业费用仅为2％。根据公司声明，“承保和分发费用”是责任。该公司的分销利率 - 净写作和分配费减少净承保和分销费用 - 从一年前的11％从今年第一季度下降到9％。联盟资本的分销利润率从2000年第四季度的22％下降到今年第一季度的12％。
"It's one of those things that keep you up at night," says Greg Johnson, president of Franklin's U.S. retail and institutional arm. "Everybody knows there's far more investment management capacity and limited distribution, and that in tough times distributors are known to squeeze suppliers."
紧缩可能hardest on small and midsize firms, adding more pressure for consolidation. Their profit margins have begun to lag those of their bigger rivals; three years ago the small firms were more profitable. In 1999 fund families with assets of $20 billion to $50 billion reported a median operating margin of 28.2 percent, a steep drop from the 38.5 percent average in 1998, according to West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania-based industry consulting firm Investment Counseling. Firms with assets of more than $50 billion posted a median margin of 35.2 percent in 1999, down slightly from 37 percent in 1998. "Distribution costs are rising, and the midsize money management firms are having to eat those costs," says Mustafa Soylemez, an analyst at Investment Counseling.
“它曾经只是只有大型经纪人会给货架空间收取费用，但最近它在所有渠道中都变得更加普遍 - 每个人都在收费，”维克多·乌戈琳，70亿美元的企业资金群体。“较小的公司进入门来说，这是更强硬的。但这些交易是业务的一部分。”
然而,越来越多的争论的道具riety of these revenue-sharing arrangements, which inside the industry are intentionally opaque and to the outside world are all but invisible. The critical question: Does an investor have a right to know whether his broker or financial adviser, whose independent judgment he trusts, is possibly recommending a mutual fund in part because the fund company has paid the broker's or adviser's firm a substantial distribution fee?
Last year Paul Roye, director of the SEC's division of investment management, directed his staff to advise whether additional disclosure should be required. No report has yet surfaced, though the SEC has commented in a related lawsuit.
"It's pay to play, no question," says a former top executive at one of the biggest mutual fund companies. "And it's starting to stink."
毫不奇怪，Refenure-Sharing最突出的批评者之一是Vanguard集团首席执行官的杰克布伦南，它悬挂了其纯粹的空载状态，从未向经纪人付款。“没有人迫使这些公司罢工安排。经纪人想要被赔偿的事实并不令人惊讶，”他说。“问题是客户是否应了解他们所在的资金正在提供经纪公司的额外补偿。我认为他们应该。”
Responds William Rittling, director of nonproprietary fund sales at Merrill Lynch: "For a distributor to assign costs to organizations who benefit from their infrastructure is not an unreasonable business proposition. Do the fund companies want to pay less? Yeah, sure. And they don't have to pay if they don't want to. For them, it's a simple business decision, simple math."
Mutual fund math has certainly changed over the years. Back in the late '70s and early '80s, selling funds was a straightforward business. No-load firms followed a simple business model, selling their wares, overwhelmingly money market funds, directly to consumers tired of low passbook rates at their local banks. Fund companies invested in marketing and advertising campaigns to build their brands, taking orders on toll-free telephone networks or by mail. Load funds, for which fund investors paid brokers an 8.5 percent sales commission, offered consumers a more expensive investment choice.
但随着1982年8月的股票市场开始历史上升，游戏改变了。股权基金在1991年起飞，黯然金币市场和债券资金。和爆炸的资金数量。例如，在1983年，该行业销售了大约1,026个基金。到1990年，总数为3,000。
那些双胞胎力量 - 转向股票基金和产品的扩散 - 使空载资金更困难，仅仅在华尔街日报中取出广告，等待他们的手机戒指。消费者被选择不堪重负，直接卖家发现他们的注意力越来越难。
The two no-load giants, Fidelity Investments and Vanguard, flourished thanks to their powerful brand names - just as, thanks to its performance, Janus did in the late 1990s. But most other no-load families struggled.
No-load funds needed a new route to reach their potential customers - their own financial intermediaries - and they found it with the 1992 opening of Schwab's OneSource. The fund supermarket, whose sales took off almost at once, emerged as a powerful new distribution channel, even as the success of the Schwab mart blurred the distinction between load and no-load funds. At Schwab, and later at other fund supermarkets, such as those run by Fidelity and TD Waterhouse, investors could buy top-performing funds, both load and no-load, without paying a brokerage sales commission. At the beginning, fund companies paid Schwab a fee of about 25 basis points on assets sold, to get into Schwab's no-transaction-fee program. Before long, Schwab had increased the toll to 35 basis points.
Mainstream brokers woke up. They quickly calculated that if Schwab could exact a toll from fund families, they could do the same. Another factor played a part: The SEC began frowning on a common practice at brokerage firms, in which individual brokers received substantial incentives, including higher commissions and sales quotas, to sell in-house funds. The biggest wire houses - with the notable exception of Dean Witter Reynolds - began to distribute a higher percentage of outside funds. In 1996 roughly 22 percent of total fund net flows went to wire house brokerage firms' proprietary funds, according to Cerulli Associates. Two years later that percentage had fallen to just 3 percent, and last year the flows were negative.
经纪商开始远离基于交易的活动以及包装账户的更多资金 - 长期，资产的费用课程，以资金为基础。因此，负载玩家同时跳入空载超市渠道，无负载播放器如T. Rowe价格和Janus插入经纪销售的包装计划，允许投资者访问一系列基金产品基于单一资产的费用。
施瓦巴的成功帮助将行业转移到“开放式建筑”模型。虽然共同基金提供商曾经与特定分销商击中独家安排，但现在每个渠道都成为公平的比赛。竞争，基金公司需要在每个渠道中。凭借成千上万的资金，只有少数全国全方位服务经纪人，金属丝房屋，帕里韦贝伯和史密斯巴尼举行。
“经纪公司知道它们是一种稀缺资源，”所罗门史密斯巴尼（Salomon Smith Barney）负责资金管理和经纪公司的分析师盖伊·莫斯科夫斯基（Guy Moszkowski）说因此，近年来他们能够从基金经理那里获得更多的资金。只会上升；而现实是，管理者对此无能为力。”
The first step in cementing a deal between the brokerages and fund managers is what's known as a selling-group agreement. This is a legally binding contract among the brokerage house, the underwriter or sponsor of the fund and the fund manager. For fund companies, one measure of success in a world of open architecture is the number of signed selling-group agreements it holds. For example, Conseco Capital Management, which got into the game only three years ago, boasts that it has formed about 200 selling-group agreements with brokerages and banks.
The selling-group contract defines the terms of the relationship, such as which funds will be sold - in other words, which goods the store will stock. But just having something in inventory doesn't mean it's going to sell; the merchandise needs to move off the shelves.
正如基金公司需要打破所有可供出售基金的混乱局面一样，它们也必须吸引普通销售人员的注意，他们可能只熟悉某一特定资产类别数百只基金中的少数几只(例如，晨星（Morningstar）的数据显示，目前有800多只大盘股成长型基金。券商需要有动力；而要想获得激励他们的机会，基金公司必须首先激励经纪人的雇主。
这就是收入分享的地方。如果它足够支付，基金公司可以惊人地获得令人惊叹的 - 并获得奖励 - 获得经纪销售队伍。即使是基金巨头忠诚也积极加强了其经纪人销售资金的批发努力，该资金于1986年推出，但在过去四年中，在资产中增加了一倍。
"To be on the preferred lists, to gain access, you have to pay," says Michael Kellogg, head of distribution at Fidelity Investments Institutional Services, which distributes the adviser-sold funds at Fidelity. These funds account for about $60 billion of the firm's roughly $900 billion in assets under management. "The cost to distribute through the large brokerage firm has been going up, but it's not unreasonable; otherwise we wouldn't pay it."
Neither Kellogg nor any other fund company executive interviewed for this story would specify how much he pays, or to what brokerages. Revenue-sharing takes place in a gray world, with minimal disclosure. Brokerages and fund managers appear to want to keep it that way, in part to prevent firms from exchanging information and possibly getting better terms. As a result, there is little hard information about pricing and terms, and much scuttlebutt.
一个例子：资本研究和管理公司的嫉妒基金公司高管在嫉妒基金公司高管之间广泛传播，不会为其最佳履行和经纪人销售的美国资金进行收入分担。不是真的，CRM主席詹姆斯·罗滕贝格说：“与人们的想法相反，我们确实制作了这些付款 - 并没有与大多数其他公司的相同水平。”
The structures of the selling-group agreements vary, depending on the levels of access accorded, as well as the type of program that a fund company wants to be in - direct mutual fund sales versus wrap programs, for example. The revenue-sharing deals are done sotto voce; the specific terms kept confidential. Rarely are they even committed to writing. Fund companies pay their tabs through a mix of hard and soft dollars. Says FRC consultant Gavin Quill, "This information is something of a closely guarded secret."
SEC将这种类型的薪酬称为“非12B-1付款”;因为金钱没有来自股东资产，但没有关于公司可以支付的金额限制。“没有授权必须披露支付，”CERULLI伙伴顾问詹姆斯·沃尔威尔指出。“不同的经纪公司与不同的基金公司攻击不同的交易，您不希望任何人都在做任何比较购物。您不会在旧车上贴上贴纸 - 您看看市场将支付的费用。”
To the extent that funds do disclose payments, they keep the details to a minimum. A 1995 Alliance Capital Management fund prospectus, for example, refers to "substantial monies" paid to broker-dealers and other financial intermediaries "for their distribution assistance." "There is no real standard fee," says Cerulli's Folwell. "It might be based on a percentage of assets or gross sales, or it might be a straight dollar amount." The extra payments were traditionally set as a percentage of gross fund sales, but increasingly they are pegged to a percentage of fund assets under management at the brokerage firm. The payments can include up-front hard dollars earmarked for special events, though fund companies are frequently asked to write additional checks to brokerage firms for sales conferences and training seminars.
Brokerage firms may also require fund companies to direct certain minimal amounts of brokerage business their way on a quarterly basis. According to a former mutual fund executive, the soft-dollar payments are sometimes referred to as "marketing credits," because the fund manager is effectively providing directed commission revenue that is supposed to be earmarked by the brokerage firm for shared marketing expenses.
“这有一个狡猾的方面，”福尔威尔说。“你可以用支票支付代理人支付硬币和定向经纪人。一些经纪人想要硬美元。它总是有所不同。”
Adds Richard Phillips, a securities lawyer with Washington, D.C.-based Kirkpatrick & Lockhart: "It's perfectly legal for a fund manager to pay money for shelf space. The companies would prefer not to pay, but this is the cost of doing business."
这种“开展业务成本”有多高？FRC的受过教育估计：一些资金支付经纪人和金融超市，每净资产中的每款新元的40个基点。这是五年前估计的10到15个基点。“插入经纪公司的成本大幅增加，”Quill说。
FRC数据，收入分担代表基金公司的第二大分销费用。第1组成部分：补偿基金的销售队伍，平均约为6000亿美元的基金集团的5000万美元。
美林的Rittling拒绝评论该规范ifics of his firm's selling agreements, but he concedes that the cost of doing business with Merrill has risen considerably over the past three years. But then, Merrill can command top dollar. Rittling holds the keys to direct mutual fund sales by 15,000 brokers worldwide, and no army of brokers sells more funds than does Merrill. Of the $340 billion in fund sales through brokerages in 1999, Merrill accounted for roughly 20 percent. Analysts estimate that the firm accounted for the same share in 2000.
One clear sign of the firm's clout: In August 1996 Merrill sent a letter to fund managers stating that the firm expected to be compensated at a rate not lower than that of any other brokerage. Vendors must pay "maximum dealer compensation offered or paid to any seller," the letter stated. "Because we believe that our superior service is deserving of compensation at the highest level, we are asking you to agree to [these] terms."
"Merrill basically sent out the message that it expects a most-favored-nation status," says Burton Greenwald, a mutual fund consultant based in Philadelphia. "Everybody wants to get into the Merrill system. There's just not room for everybody; so Merrill can be selective, and it can demand more from the providers."
美林与共同基金公司签署了大约100份销售协议。每年一次，通常是在12月或1月，Rittling将邀请顶级共同基金销售主管来评估上一年的计划。据一位前基金销售主管说，在新泽西州普林斯顿的办公室里主持法庭的里特林往往直言不讳他会给你回顾过去一年，他会告诉你基金的表现，无论是在销售方面排名前五还是前十最终，他会说，如果你想继续成为我们首要的供应商之一，这就是它的成本。他非常直截了当
这位前基金高管表示，在一年前的一次此类会议上，里特林要求预付60万美元，用于支付会议和销售会议的费用，另外每净增一美元加上25个基点，以及对持续资产加上10个基点。”基本上是要么接受要么放弃，”这位高管说。
Ritting坚持认为，Merrill有一个级别的比赛领域，许多行业成员都同意该公司不提供对其业务的100个基金公司中的任何一个提供优惠待遇。一旦进入门口，基金公司就可以通过全国各地的Merrill的区域经纪办事处获取培训研讨会和销售会议。
That's not how it works elsewhere. Other brokerage firms set up distinct tiers of access and privilege for the fund companies on their rosters. Second-tier funds sign revenue-sharing deals; but for the most exclusive entry to a brokerage sales force, a handful of funds pay for preferred status.
A second-tier fund company might be allowed to call on a brokerage's branch offices a few times a year; but a preferred firm typically enjoys nearly unlimited access, an invaluable asset that allows fund company wholesalers to drop off literature, mingle with brokers and schmooze the branch managers, whose support is critical.
Salomon Smith Barney的优先地位，知情的来源报告，授予AIM，联盟，美国资金，富兰克林Templeton，John Hancock资金，主，Abbett＆Co.，MFS投资管理，Oppenheimer资金，Putnam和Van Kampen基金。这意味着无限地访问基层批发的分支机构以及从管理产品的管理人员的一系列积极支持。没有首选地位的二级公司支付基本收入分享十分之一，但他们没有从分行经理获得任何额外的提升，并只接受对销售部队的有限访问。“除非您有首选的状态，否则在门上更难以更加困难，”汉考赫克斯销售与营销总监Keith Hartstein说。
A client will often trust his broker to select funds, and, as long as the performance is competitive, the broker is apt to routinely direct business to funds with which he is most familiar. Strong personal rapport between the fund wholesaler and the broker can often be the deciding factor when there are many options from which to choose.
“经纪人推荐资金出于不同的原因，但你会感到惊讶的是，衬衫，高尔夫球，旅行的衬衫，高尔夫球，旅行，”作为一个主要的金属丝房子所说的一位资深经纪人。“随着这么多的这些资金如此相似，你结束了与照顾你的人做很多事业。”
Brokers may sell funds that don't appear on their firms' preferred lists. But they are far more likely to sell the names they know - and those are almost certainly funds that have paid the most to get the brokers' attention. Edward D. Jones, for example, has selling agreements with about 100 fund companies, but the seven that are on its preferred list account for 90 percent of the firm's $5 billion in annual fund sales, according to Cerulli Associates.
One industry statistic testifies to the power of the brokerages' preferred lists. Nearly all of the ten largest broker-sold fund families - AIM, Alliance, American Funds, Fidelity, Franklin Templeton, Kemper Funds, MFS, Oppenheimer, Putnam and Van Kampen (which together account for 74 percent of broker-sold-fund assets) - pay for preferred status at the largest wire houses. Only three of these fund families - Alliance, American and Van Kampen - rank among Lipper's ten best-performing fund families over the past five years.
The brokerages approach their preferred lists in different ways. Prudential Investments sports an A-list of 11 elite fund providers, or "strategic connections partners," from among the nearly 100 fund companies with which it does business. These 11 are featured in a major marketing promotion that began this year. To pay for their preferred status, the fund companies are reportedly being asked by Prudential to begin to make revenue-sharing payments based on a percentage of their fund assets under management at the firm, not gross sales. In exchange, the funds' wholesalers will be able to participate in quarterly and annual sales meetings.
PAILEWebBEBBBEBBEBBER在其选择列表中保留16家公司。六家基金公司参加了摩根士丹利计划，据报道，支付了传统的25个基点12B-1费用和每年的15个基本点资产的费用。最后一次充电被电线屋标准被认为是侵略性的，因为它立即踢进并继续连续。
Revenue-sharing agreements between fund companies and brokerage firms have historically covered traditional fund sales, but there are other channels within each brokerage firm, including mutual fund and separate-account wrap products, variable-annuity wrap products and 401(k) platforms. Each channel usually falls under a different unit or division of the brokerage firm, and access to each comes at a separate price.
Salomon Smith Barney最近将其与外部基金经理进行交易。在此之前，以前，非专业基金销售，包装计划和国内都被不同的执行情况领导，该活动现在属于Jerry Hampton管理的一个独特地区，他以前只跑上年金业务。“这些协议正在发展从覆盖单一产品，以更加综合的关系，”Cerulli的Folwell说。“一些经纪公司将有单一的产品线路接触点。”
是否有不同渠道的接入ö 按单点菜或按一个价格支付，价格并不便宜。所罗门的共同基金总结计划涉及约40家基金公司，去年，这些公司被要求每人支付6.5万美元，以支付年度和季度尽职调查会议的费用，总共有5项活动，在这些活动中，经纪商接受了有关基金及其投资资产类别的教育。通常这些都是在天气温暖的地点举行的为期一周的研讨会，会上邀请100至200名顶级券商参加，学习和聆听基金高管的演讲——更不用说打高尔夫球和闲聊了。
面向衰落的现金流入共同基金，公司认为他们必须支付主要货架空间。在他们变得更好之前可能会变得更糟。“分布对公司作为增长来源的资金是如此至关重要，即可能有可能比经纪公司正在充电的可能性，”Salomon的Moszkowski说。“在这种情况下，经纪人可以获得更多的战利品。”
同样,首席执行官保罗·洪德罗斯维拉诺瓦生产技术tal, the money management arm of Nationwide Financial, thinks that some fund companies may elect to do a little pruning. When times are good, sharing a few million a year with your best distributors is no big deal," he says. "But when times are rough, as in the past six months, you'll start to see fund companies be more selective as far as who they partner up with, because the revenues won't be there to pay everyone." But, adds Hondros, who once oversaw Fidelity's distribution strategy, "the national wire houses will continue to command these payments because their revenues are down and they are looking for every ounce of profit they can get. They could squeeze the fund companies. Certainly they won't be any cheaper to deal with."
And if costs keep going up, only the biggest - not necessarily the best-performing - fund sponsors may be assured of shelf space.
When is revenue-sharing a conflict of interest?
How much should investors be told about the financial arrangements that their brokers have made with the companies whose mutual funds those brokers recommend?
这个问题在1995年8月曼哈顿一名律师罗伯特·斯特鲁戈和其他六名投资者提起的集体诉讼中占据了重要地位。原告指控少数几家券商-贝尔斯登公司。；唐纳森、卢夫金和詹瑞特及其潘兴分部；美林证券公司。；国家金融服务；以及史密斯-巴尼（Smith Barney）将大量现金注入次级货币市场基金，这些基金之所以被经纪公司选中，是因为这些基金的顾问向他们提供报酬。货币市场基金由联盟资本管理公司和富达投资公司管理。
即将到来的法律问题：顾问在证券法案下透露的顾问是否适当披露？
In the end, the defendants prevailed. In July 2000 the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals for the Southern District of New York upheld a 1997 District Court ruling that dismissed the case. The lower court concluded that the arrangements between the brokers and the fund companies were properly, if vaguely, disclosed in fund prospectuses and that the plaintiffs did not prove a willful attempt to deceive shareholders.
Had the plaintiffs won, fund company payments to brokerage firms would no doubt have come under assault. But the issue will likely be resurrected. "When the market goes down, the warts start to show," says Stuart Wechsler, the lead attorney for the plaintiffs in the Strougo case.
In that case, says Wechsler, the key legal issue became whether the brokerage firms "were intentionally putting clients in underperforming money market funds in exchange for extra compensation from fund companies." To make his argument, Wechsler had to demonstrate that the broker-dealers violated Rule 10b-10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rule 10-b10 requires a brokerage to inform its customers of any remuneration from third parties made in connection with a customer transaction.
原告据称，资金向经纪公司提供了两种类型的付款：根据其自身资源支付的资金资产和非12B-1费用的规则12B-1费用。投资公司法案第12B条禁止使用股东资产支付分配费用的共同资金。但是，“规约”确实允许基金公司使用高达100个基点12B-1费用，以支付某些分销成本，例如广告和促销材料。法律没有定义基金公司可以支付经纪人的分销费用，因为他们自己的口袋：天空是极限。
在课程案例中，涉及的安排披露于他们收集的股份资产的经纪人12B-1支付，以及仅含糊不清的额外付款。例如，联盟招股说明书披露了公司支付经纪人“来自顾问自身资源的大量资源”进行分销费用。
当第二巡回上诉法院去年维持下院判决，它就向证券和交换委员会提出了关于解释规则10B-10的意见。证券委员会提出了一份意大利州简介，指出“我们认为，在招股说明书中披露了12B-1费用和非12B-1费用符合规则的要求。”
但是,美国证券交易委员会(SEC)短暂继续说道,“我们并不是说that this is necessarily all the disclosure about these types of fees that should be required as a matter of policy, only that the disclosure made here satisfies the existing rule." The SEC has directed its staff to recommend whether additional disclosure is needed.
Meanwhile, SEC staffers are reportedly being lobbied aggressively by the Investment Company Institute to basically leave well enough alone. The ICI made clear its stance in a May 8, 2000, letter to the SEC from ICI general counsel Craig Tyle, that read in part: Rule 10b-10 "should provide that the payments by the investment adviser or principal underwriter of an investment company to a broker-dealer who sells the investment company's shares need not be disclosed in specific detail on a confirmation."
类动作诉讼程序自然提供了不同的视角。威奇勒说：“基金公司并不是这些招股说明，如此故意塑造一种拯救墨水的方法;它埋葬在那里开始，它并没有告诉你谁在付谁支付谁和多少。对我而言，这不是披露，我的书中的未公开的付款被称为反思。“
By Rich Blake
May 2001
亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者Magazine
共同基金分配从未如此至关重要。也没有这么昂贵。但随着成本增长，围绕“收入共享”的问题所以提出争议销售经纪公司的有争议的方式。
漫步在任何一家美国超市的过道上，仔细看看货架。在那里的眼睛水平坐着象牙雪或潮汐洗涤剂或悬赏纸巾。他们如何得到如此突出的位置不是偶然的-或神秘-但一个基本的事实，消费者营销。宝洁公司（Procter&Gamble）及其竞争对手急于为这一特权买单，每年斥资数亿美元购买优质货架空间，以吸引顾客，提高市场份额。
If it works for soap, why not mutual funds?
在这种情况下，宝斯特和赌场是共同基金公司，安全略的是金融中介机构，最常见的是Merrill Lynch＆Co.或花旗集团的Salomon Smith Barney等大型经纪房屋。粗鲁的资金，基金公司正在向这些中介机构向这些中介商付出不断增长的关税。通过经纪人的所有卖市支付了东西;越来越多地支付相当于眼睛级别货架空间的金融营销 - 访问经纪人和销售人员，以教育和鳄鱼，葡萄酒和用餐，以出售资金。
少数基金投资者甚至知道这是持续的。但是，向经纪公司提供的付款，而不是经纪人，并以委婉语在收入共享而闻名 - 已成为业务的必备方面。虽然合法，但他们越来越受争议。亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者了解到，该付款现在已经引起了证券交易委员会的注意。
美国证交会投资管理部副主任道格拉斯·施希特（Douglas Schiedt）表示：“为分销付费确实会引发问题。”我们正在研究是否有必要进行更多的披露。”
虽然许多基金公司高管捍卫该实践，但有证据表明了反弹酿造。“收入支付所以失控的是，小型和中型企业的许多基金高管实际上希望看到监管机构进入并结束，”波士顿的CERULLI伙伴顾问Matthew Mcginess说。
The sums involved are enormous. According to estimates by Boston-based strategic consulting firm Financial Research Corp., fund sponsors, mostly load players such as Franklin Resources, Putnam Investments and AIM Management Group, pay the Merrill Lynches of the world as much as $2 billion a year. By comparison, mutual fund companies spent $515 million on advertising in 2000, calculates FRC. It estimates that revenue-sharing fees have more than doubled in the past five years. "Revenue-sharing is considered the dirty little secret of the mutual fund industry," says Neil Bathon, FRC's founder and president. "Nobody likes to talk about it, but the reality is that it has become a major expense."
The remarkable upsurge of revenue-sharing, which did not exist a decade ago, underscores a dramatic change in the mutual fund business. Even as the rising tide of the bull market lifted all yachts, certain fundamentals of the industry deteriorated. Now, in the grip of a nasty bear market, many mutual fund executives are struggling to keep their firms above water. With revenues shrinking as assets under management decline because of redemptions and poor performance, fund companies are caught in a classic squeeze as their costs continue to ratchet up.
“分布的成本正在上升。收入分享是它越来越大的部分，这是一个十年前的成本，”普南总统劳伦斯·卢克斯说。“这些交易受到保护，并通过资产的戏剧性崛起得到了价值。现在我们看到事情开始换句话说。”
Last month one public fund company after another began reporting lower earnings and falling operating margins. These announcements were accompanied by the grim news of layoffs - 4 percent of staff at Putnam, 24 percent at Janus Capital Corp. - and other cutbacks.
"The market has taken away a whole lot of revenue in a short period of time, and no company can reduce expenses that fast," moans Edward Bernard, chief of retail sales and distribution for T. Rowe Price Associates. His firm saw operating margins drop in the first quarter to 32 percent, down from 41 percent a year ago.
这一次潜在T. Rowe价格以及其他公司的主要原因是分布的螺旋成本。十年前，大多数资金都没有负担，并通过报纸和无线电广告和免费电话直接销售给消费者。今天，直接卖家正在通过经纪，基金超市和金融规划者增加负荷资金。在过去的五年中，中介机构销售的所有资金的比例
根据纽约的研究公司战略洞察力的估计，根据估计，根据60％至80％飙升。经纪渠道占这些销售额越来越大的份额 - 去年年度45％，从1998年的32％估计，估计FRC。
今天的成本挤压源于20世纪90年代在20世纪90年代享有的共同资金的庞大源于自大的成功，因为他们成为消费者节省的钉，点燃了竞争激烈的竞争。购物者现在可以通过8,433个共同基金，从十年前的3,086年开始，他们可以重新清除;即使在去年的可怜的市场中，也推出了221个新资金。
为了削减这种杂乱，资金需要强大的性能和坚实的品牌名称。但是在开放式建筑时代 - 只有大家似乎愿意兜售其他人的产品 - 他们也需要很多帮助销售他们的商品。从来没有比今天更真实：2月和3月在伊拉克入侵科威特之后，1990年8月和9月以来，净股权基金的第一个背靠背月。仅在3月份，股票基金遭受了创纪录的206亿美元的流出。因此，依赖中介机构和收入共享。
"Simply having performance isn't enough any more," says Putnam's Lasser. "Good numbers don't sell themselves."
因此，几乎每一个主要的基金家族，包括那些坚持直销的公司，都接受了中介渠道。今年1月，苏黎世斯卡德尔投资公司（Zurich Scudder Investments）在其30只斯卡德尔基金的整个阵容中大举销售；强大的资本管理增加了6只零售基金的费用，这些基金被指定通过券商进行分销。杰纳斯和T。历史上主要的直销商Rowe Price一直在斥巨资将部分资金注入经纪公司赞助的共同基金包装计划和401（k）平台。另外还有Waddell&Reed Financial，该公司长期以来一直依赖自己的3000名销售代表的分销网络，主要分布在中西部地区。甚至它也首次选择性地进入经纪渠道。”我们了解成本动态，并试图在有经济意义的地方与分销合作伙伴接洽，”该公司首席营销官托马斯·布奇（Thomas Butch）解释说。亚博篮球怎么下串
Increasingly powerful, brokerages have used their leverage to exact ever-higher tolls. Technically compensation for any service connected to fund distribution - such as technology, annual meetings, special events, sales conferences and training seminars - revenue-sharing is simply money that fund companies pay brokerage houses to get access to their brokers. It's a tab for renting the retail sales armies that most mutual fund companies don't have.
For additional money, fund companies can buy their way onto the lists of "preferred" providers that most brokerage houses maintain. Often limited to a dozen or fewer fund companies, these lists are confidential and never revealed to the buying public or even to a firm's brokers, though astute sales reps can figure them out. Preferred status carries real advantages: In some cases, the wholesale marketers of the fund companies can get virtually unfettered access to brokerage sales forces to convince them to sell their funds.
Revenue-sharing is just part of the cost. Distribution is the second-biggest expense for fund companies - after compensation. But a big chunk of that budget goes toward wholesale marketing costs. To reach intermediary channels, fund companies need to employ scores of high-paid marketers who, in effect, sell to the sellers. According to FRC, a fund company spends on average some $50 million a year compensating these sales executives.
For the intermediaries, all this money is manna from heaven. Revenue-sharing, paid in hard or soft dollars, comes in addition to the ordinary loads and sales commissions - typically 5 percent, and split between salesperson and firm. And it also comes on top of any so-called 12b-1 fees that fund companies are permitted to charge for marketing and distribution; as it is, the 12b-1 fee is gobbled up by the brokerage firms.
Loads, commissions and 12b-1 charges come right out of the fund shareholders' pockets. Revenue-sharing comes straight off the fund companies' bottom lines. When markets soared through the late 1990s and into 2000, no one complained too loudly. In good times, mutual funds enjoy extraordinary economics, collecting fees on ever-rising assets that have to be gathered only once. But there's nothing like a bear market to make people growl.
考虑在堕落工业的父亲亲爱的Janus的父母父母的成本堆积。即使在一年前的斯蒂威尔的资产从3240亿美元下降到20.5亿美元，公司也很大程度地占据了基金超市，经纪包装计划和401（k）平台。2000年，STILWELL在第三方分销3.15亿美元 - 超过1999年的14300万美元。在今年的第一季度，Stilwell脾气暴躁的支出，但仍花费大量的6600万美元，从一年的每年下降9％。与此同时，收入占18％以上。
Stilwell有公司感到挤压。与同一季度相比，215亿美元的装载巨型富兰克林资源在第一季度的收入下降了6％。与此同时，营业费用仅为2％。根据公司声明，“承保和分发费用”是责任。该公司的分销利率 - 净写作和分配费减少净承保和分销费用 - 从一年前的11％从今年第一季度下降到9％。联盟资本的分销利润率从2000年第四季度的22％下降到今年第一季度的12％。
"It's one of those things that keep you up at night," says Greg Johnson, president of Franklin's U.S. retail and institutional arm. "Everybody knows there's far more investment management capacity and limited distribution, and that in tough times distributors are known to squeeze suppliers."
紧缩可能hardest on small and midsize firms, adding more pressure for consolidation. Their profit margins have begun to lag those of their bigger rivals; three years ago the small firms were more profitable. In 1999 fund families with assets of $20 billion to $50 billion reported a median operating margin of 28.2 percent, a steep drop from the 38.5 percent average in 1998, according to West Conshohocken, Pennsylvania-based industry consulting firm Investment Counseling. Firms with assets of more than $50 billion posted a median margin of 35.2 percent in 1999, down slightly from 37 percent in 1998. "Distribution costs are rising, and the midsize money management firms are having to eat those costs," says Mustafa Soylemez, an analyst at Investment Counseling.
“它曾经只是只有大型经纪人会给货架空间收取费用，但最近它在所有渠道中都变得更加普遍 - 每个人都在收费，”维克多·乌戈琳，70亿美元的企业资金群体。“较小的公司进入门来说，这是更强硬的。但这些交易是业务的一部分。”
然而,越来越多的争论的道具riety of these revenue-sharing arrangements, which inside the industry are intentionally opaque and to the outside world are all but invisible. The critical question: Does an investor have a right to know whether his broker or financial adviser, whose independent judgment he trusts, is possibly recommending a mutual fund in part because the fund company has paid the broker's or adviser's firm a substantial distribution fee?
Last year Paul Roye, director of the SEC's division of investment management, directed his staff to advise whether additional disclosure should be required. No report has yet surfaced, though the SEC has commented in a related lawsuit.
"It's pay to play, no question," says a former top executive at one of the biggest mutual fund companies. "And it's starting to stink."
毫不奇怪，Refenure-Sharing最突出的批评者之一是Vanguard集团首席执行官的杰克布伦南，它悬挂了其纯粹的空载状态，从未向经纪人付款。“没有人迫使这些公司罢工安排。经纪人想要被赔偿的事实并不令人惊讶，”他说。“问题是客户是否应了解他们所在的资金正在提供经纪公司的额外补偿。我认为他们应该。”
Responds William Rittling, director of nonproprietary fund sales at Merrill Lynch: "For a distributor to assign costs to organizations who benefit from their infrastructure is not an unreasonable business proposition. Do the fund companies want to pay less? Yeah, sure. And they don't have to pay if they don't want to. For them, it's a simple business decision, simple math."
Mutual fund math has certainly changed over the years. Back in the late '70s and early '80s, selling funds was a straightforward business. No-load firms followed a simple business model, selling their wares, overwhelmingly money market funds, directly to consumers tired of low passbook rates at their local banks. Fund companies invested in marketing and advertising campaigns to build their brands, taking orders on toll-free telephone networks or by mail. Load funds, for which fund investors paid brokers an 8.5 percent sales commission, offered consumers a more expensive investment choice.
但随着1982年8月的股票市场开始历史上升，游戏改变了。股权基金在1991年起飞，黯然金币市场和债券资金。和爆炸的资金数量。例如，在1983年，该行业销售了大约1,026个基金。到1990年，总数为3,000。
那些双胞胎力量 - 转向股票基金和产品的扩散 - 使空载资金更困难，仅仅在华尔街日报中取出广告，等待他们的手机戒指。消费者被选择不堪重负，直接卖家发现他们的注意力越来越难。
The two no-load giants, Fidelity Investments and Vanguard, flourished thanks to their powerful brand names - just as, thanks to its performance, Janus did in the late 1990s. But most other no-load families struggled.
No-load funds needed a new route to reach their potential customers - their own financial intermediaries - and they found it with the 1992 opening of Schwab's OneSource. The fund supermarket, whose sales took off almost at once, emerged as a powerful new distribution channel, even as the success of the Schwab mart blurred the distinction between load and no-load funds. At Schwab, and later at other fund supermarkets, such as those run by Fidelity and TD Waterhouse, investors could buy top-performing funds, both load and no-load, without paying a brokerage sales commission. At the beginning, fund companies paid Schwab a fee of about 25 basis points on assets sold, to get into Schwab's no-transaction-fee program. Before long, Schwab had increased the toll to 35 basis points.
Mainstream brokers woke up. They quickly calculated that if Schwab could exact a toll from fund families, they could do the same. Another factor played a part: The SEC began frowning on a common practice at brokerage firms, in which individual brokers received substantial incentives, including higher commissions and sales quotas, to sell in-house funds. The biggest wire houses - with the notable exception of Dean Witter Reynolds - began to distribute a higher percentage of outside funds. In 1996 roughly 22 percent of total fund net flows went to wire house brokerage firms' proprietary funds, according to Cerulli Associates. Two years later that percentage had fallen to just 3 percent, and last year the flows were negative.
经纪商开始远离基于交易的活动以及包装账户的更多资金 - 长期，资产的费用课程，以资金为基础。因此，负载玩家同时跳入空载超市渠道，无负载播放器如T. Rowe价格和Janus插入经纪销售的包装计划，允许投资者访问一系列基金产品基于单一资产的费用。
施瓦巴的成功帮助将行业转移到“开放式建筑”模型。虽然共同基金提供商曾经与特定分销商击中独家安排，但现在每个渠道都成为公平的比赛。竞争，基金公司需要在每个渠道中。凭借成千上万的资金，只有少数全国全方位服务经纪人，金属丝房屋，帕里韦贝伯和史密斯巴尼举行。
“经纪公司知道它们是一种稀缺资源，”所罗门史密斯巴尼（Salomon Smith Barney）负责资金管理和经纪公司的分析师盖伊·莫斯科夫斯基（Guy Moszkowski）说因此，近年来他们能够从基金经理那里获得更多的资金。只会上升；而现实是，管理者对此无能为力。”
The first step in cementing a deal between the brokerages and fund managers is what's known as a selling-group agreement. This is a legally binding contract among the brokerage house, the underwriter or sponsor of the fund and the fund manager. For fund companies, one measure of success in a world of open architecture is the number of signed selling-group agreements it holds. For example, Conseco Capital Management, which got into the game only three years ago, boasts that it has formed about 200 selling-group agreements with brokerages and banks.
The selling-group contract defines the terms of the relationship, such as which funds will be sold - in other words, which goods the store will stock. But just having something in inventory doesn't mean it's going to sell; the merchandise needs to move off the shelves.
正如基金公司需要打破所有可供出售基金的混乱局面一样，它们也必须吸引普通销售人员的注意，他们可能只熟悉某一特定资产类别数百只基金中的少数几只(例如，晨星（Morningstar）的数据显示，目前有800多只大盘股成长型基金。券商需要有动力；而要想获得激励他们的机会，基金公司必须首先激励经纪人的雇主。
这就是收入分享的地方。如果它足够支付，基金公司可以惊人地获得令人惊叹的 - 并获得奖励 - 获得经纪销售队伍。即使是基金巨头忠诚也积极加强了其经纪人销售资金的批发努力，该资金于1986年推出，但在过去四年中，在资产中增加了一倍。
"To be on the preferred lists, to gain access, you have to pay," says Michael Kellogg, head of distribution at Fidelity Investments Institutional Services, which distributes the adviser-sold funds at Fidelity. These funds account for about $60 billion of the firm's roughly $900 billion in assets under management. "The cost to distribute through the large brokerage firm has been going up, but it's not unreasonable; otherwise we wouldn't pay it."
Neither Kellogg nor any other fund company executive interviewed for this story would specify how much he pays, or to what brokerages. Revenue-sharing takes place in a gray world, with minimal disclosure. Brokerages and fund managers appear to want to keep it that way, in part to prevent firms from exchanging information and possibly getting better terms. As a result, there is little hard information about pricing and terms, and much scuttlebutt.
一个例子：资本研究和管理公司的嫉妒基金公司高管在嫉妒基金公司高管之间广泛传播，不会为其最佳履行和经纪人销售的美国资金进行收入分担。不是真的，CRM主席詹姆斯·罗滕贝格说：“与人们的想法相反，我们确实制作了这些付款 - 并没有与大多数其他公司的相同水平。”
The structures of the selling-group agreements vary, depending on the levels of access accorded, as well as the type of program that a fund company wants to be in - direct mutual fund sales versus wrap programs, for example. The revenue-sharing deals are done sotto voce; the specific terms kept confidential. Rarely are they even committed to writing. Fund companies pay their tabs through a mix of hard and soft dollars. Says FRC consultant Gavin Quill, "This information is something of a closely guarded secret."
SEC将这种类型的薪酬称为“非12B-1付款”;因为金钱没有来自股东资产，但没有关于公司可以支付的金额限制。“没有授权必须披露支付，”CERULLI伙伴顾问詹姆斯·沃尔威尔指出。“不同的经纪公司与不同的基金公司攻击不同的交易，您不希望任何人都在做任何比较购物。您不会在旧车上贴上贴纸 - 您看看市场将支付的费用。”
To the extent that funds do disclose payments, they keep the details to a minimum. A 1995 Alliance Capital Management fund prospectus, for example, refers to "substantial monies" paid to broker-dealers and other financial intermediaries "for their distribution assistance." "There is no real standard fee," says Cerulli's Folwell. "It might be based on a percentage of assets or gross sales, or it might be a straight dollar amount." The extra payments were traditionally set as a percentage of gross fund sales, but increasingly they are pegged to a percentage of fund assets under management at the brokerage firm. The payments can include up-front hard dollars earmarked for special events, though fund companies are frequently asked to write additional checks to brokerage firms for sales conferences and training seminars.
Brokerage firms may also require fund companies to direct certain minimal amounts of brokerage business their way on a quarterly basis. According to a former mutual fund executive, the soft-dollar payments are sometimes referred to as "marketing credits," because the fund manager is effectively providing directed commission revenue that is supposed to be earmarked by the brokerage firm for shared marketing expenses.
“这有一个狡猾的方面，”福尔威尔说。“你可以用支票支付代理人支付硬币和定向经纪人。一些经纪人想要硬美元。它总是有所不同。”
Adds Richard Phillips, a securities lawyer with Washington, D.C.-based Kirkpatrick & Lockhart: "It's perfectly legal for a fund manager to pay money for shelf space. The companies would prefer not to pay, but this is the cost of doing business."
这种“开展业务成本”有多高？FRC的受过教育估计：一些资金支付经纪人和金融超市，每净资产中的每款新元的40个基点。这是五年前估计的10到15个基点。“插入经纪公司的成本大幅增加，”Quill说。
FRC数据，收入分担代表基金公司的第二大分销费用。第1组成部分：补偿基金的销售队伍，平均约为6000亿美元的基金集团的5000万美元。
美林的Rittling拒绝评论该规范ifics of his firm's selling agreements, but he concedes that the cost of doing business with Merrill has risen considerably over the past three years. But then, Merrill can command top dollar. Rittling holds the keys to direct mutual fund sales by 15,000 brokers worldwide, and no army of brokers sells more funds than does Merrill. Of the $340 billion in fund sales through brokerages in 1999, Merrill accounted for roughly 20 percent. Analysts estimate that the firm accounted for the same share in 2000.
One clear sign of the firm's clout: In August 1996 Merrill sent a letter to fund managers stating that the firm expected to be compensated at a rate not lower than that of any other brokerage. Vendors must pay "maximum dealer compensation offered or paid to any seller," the letter stated. "Because we believe that our superior service is deserving of compensation at the highest level, we are asking you to agree to [these] terms."
"Merrill basically sent out the message that it expects a most-favored-nation status," says Burton Greenwald, a mutual fund consultant based in Philadelphia. "Everybody wants to get into the Merrill system. There's just not room for everybody; so Merrill can be selective, and it can demand more from the providers."
美林与共同基金公司签署了大约100份销售协议。每年一次，通常是在12月或1月，Rittling将邀请顶级共同基金销售主管来评估上一年的计划。据一位前基金销售主管说，在新泽西州普林斯顿的办公室里主持法庭的里特林往往直言不讳他会给你回顾过去一年，他会告诉你基金的表现，无论是在销售方面排名前五还是前十最终，他会说，如果你想继续成为我们首要的供应商之一，这就是它的成本。他非常直截了当
这位前基金高管表示，在一年前的一次此类会议上，里特林要求预付60万美元，用于支付会议和销售会议的费用，另外每净增一美元加上25个基点，以及对持续资产加上10个基点。”基本上是要么接受要么放弃，”这位高管说。
Ritting坚持认为，Merrill有一个级别的比赛领域，许多行业成员都同意该公司不提供对其业务的100个基金公司中的任何一个提供优惠待遇。一旦进入门口，基金公司就可以通过全国各地的Merrill的区域经纪办事处获取培训研讨会和销售会议。
That's not how it works elsewhere. Other brokerage firms set up distinct tiers of access and privilege for the fund companies on their rosters. Second-tier funds sign revenue-sharing deals; but for the most exclusive entry to a brokerage sales force, a handful of funds pay for preferred status.
A second-tier fund company might be allowed to call on a brokerage's branch offices a few times a year; but a preferred firm typically enjoys nearly unlimited access, an invaluable asset that allows fund company wholesalers to drop off literature, mingle with brokers and schmooze the branch managers, whose support is critical.
Salomon Smith Barney的优先地位，知情的来源报告，授予AIM，联盟，美国资金，富兰克林Templeton，John Hancock资金，主，Abbett＆Co.，MFS投资管理，Oppenheimer资金，Putnam和Van Kampen基金。这意味着无限地访问基层批发的分支机构以及从管理产品的管理人员的一系列积极支持。没有首选地位的二级公司支付基本收入分享十分之一，但他们没有从分行经理获得任何额外的提升，并只接受对销售部队的有限访问。“除非您有首选的状态，否则在门上更难以更加困难，”汉考赫克斯销售与营销总监Keith Hartstein说。
A client will often trust his broker to select funds, and, as long as the performance is competitive, the broker is apt to routinely direct business to funds with which he is most familiar. Strong personal rapport between the fund wholesaler and the broker can often be the deciding factor when there are many options from which to choose.
“经纪人推荐资金出于不同的原因，但你会感到惊讶的是，衬衫，高尔夫球，旅行的衬衫，高尔夫球，旅行，”作为一个主要的金属丝房子所说的一位资深经纪人。“随着这么多的这些资金如此相似，你结束了与照顾你的人做很多事业。”
Brokers may sell funds that don't appear on their firms' preferred lists. But they are far more likely to sell the names they know - and those are almost certainly funds that have paid the most to get the brokers' attention. Edward D. Jones, for example, has selling agreements with about 100 fund companies, but the seven that are on its preferred list account for 90 percent of the firm's $5 billion in annual fund sales, according to Cerulli Associates.
One industry statistic testifies to the power of the brokerages' preferred lists. Nearly all of the ten largest broker-sold fund families - AIM, Alliance, American Funds, Fidelity, Franklin Templeton, Kemper Funds, MFS, Oppenheimer, Putnam and Van Kampen (which together account for 74 percent of broker-sold-fund assets) - pay for preferred status at the largest wire houses. Only three of these fund families - Alliance, American and Van Kampen - rank among Lipper's ten best-performing fund families over the past five years.
The brokerages approach their preferred lists in different ways. Prudential Investments sports an A-list of 11 elite fund providers, or "strategic connections partners," from among the nearly 100 fund companies with which it does business. These 11 are featured in a major marketing promotion that began this year. To pay for their preferred status, the fund companies are reportedly being asked by Prudential to begin to make revenue-sharing payments based on a percentage of their fund assets under management at the firm, not gross sales. In exchange, the funds' wholesalers will be able to participate in quarterly and annual sales meetings.
PAILEWebBEBBBEBBEBBER在其选择列表中保留16家公司。六家基金公司参加了摩根士丹利计划，据报道，支付了传统的25个基点12B-1费用和每年的15个基本点资产的费用。最后一次充电被电线屋标准被认为是侵略性的，因为它立即踢进并继续连续。
Revenue-sharing agreements between fund companies and brokerage firms have historically covered traditional fund sales, but there are other channels within each brokerage firm, including mutual fund and separate-account wrap products, variable-annuity wrap products and 401(k) platforms. Each channel usually falls under a different unit or division of the brokerage firm, and access to each comes at a separate price.
Salomon Smith Barney最近将其与外部基金经理进行交易。在此之前，以前，非专业基金销售，包装计划和国内都被不同的执行情况领导，该活动现在属于Jerry Hampton管理的一个独特地区，他以前只跑上年金业务。“这些协议正在发展从覆盖单一产品，以更加综合的关系，”Cerulli的Folwell说。“一些经纪公司将有单一的产品线路接触点。”
是否有不同渠道的接入ö 按单点菜或按一个价格支付，价格并不便宜。所罗门的共同基金总结计划涉及约40家基金公司，去年，这些公司被要求每人支付6.5万美元，以支付年度和季度尽职调查会议的费用，总共有5项活动，在这些活动中，经纪商接受了有关基金及其投资资产类别的教育。通常这些都是在天气温暖的地点举行的为期一周的研讨会，会上邀请100至200名顶级券商参加，学习和聆听基金高管的演讲——更不用说打高尔夫球和闲聊了。
面向衰落的现金流入共同基金，公司认为他们必须支付主要货架空间。在他们变得更好之前可能会变得更糟。“分布对公司作为增长来源的资金是如此至关重要，即可能有可能比经纪公司正在充电的可能性，”Salomon的Moszkowski说。“在这种情况下，经纪人可以获得更多的战利品。”
同样,首席执行官保罗·洪德罗斯维拉诺瓦生产技术tal, the money management arm of Nationwide Financial, thinks that some fund companies may elect to do a little pruning. When times are good, sharing a few million a year with your best distributors is no big deal," he says. "But when times are rough, as in the past six months, you'll start to see fund companies be more selective as far as who they partner up with, because the revenues won't be there to pay everyone." But, adds Hondros, who once oversaw Fidelity's distribution strategy, "the national wire houses will continue to command these payments because their revenues are down and they are looking for every ounce of profit they can get. They could squeeze the fund companies. Certainly they won't be any cheaper to deal with."
And if costs keep going up, only the biggest - not necessarily the best-performing - fund sponsors may be assured of shelf space.
When is revenue-sharing a conflict of interest?
How much should investors be told about the financial arrangements that their brokers have made with the companies whose mutual funds those brokers recommend?
这个问题在1995年8月曼哈顿一名律师罗伯特·斯特鲁戈和其他六名投资者提起的集体诉讼中占据了重要地位。原告指控少数几家券商-贝尔斯登公司。；唐纳森、卢夫金和詹瑞特及其潘兴分部；美林证券公司。；国家金融服务；以及史密斯-巴尼（Smith Barney）将大量现金注入次级货币市场基金，这些基金之所以被经纪公司选中，是因为这些基金的顾问向他们提供报酬。货币市场基金由联盟资本管理公司和富达投资公司管理。
即将到来的法律问题：顾问在证券法案下透露的顾问是否适当披露？
In the end, the defendants prevailed. In July 2000 the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals for the Southern District of New York upheld a 1997 District Court ruling that dismissed the case. The lower court concluded that the arrangements between the brokers and the fund companies were properly, if vaguely, disclosed in fund prospectuses and that the plaintiffs did not prove a willful attempt to deceive shareholders.
Had the plaintiffs won, fund company payments to brokerage firms would no doubt have come under assault. But the issue will likely be resurrected. "When the market goes down, the warts start to show," says Stuart Wechsler, the lead attorney for the plaintiffs in the Strougo case.
In that case, says Wechsler, the key legal issue became whether the brokerage firms "were intentionally putting clients in underperforming money market funds in exchange for extra compensation from fund companies." To make his argument, Wechsler had to demonstrate that the broker-dealers violated Rule 10b-10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rule 10-b10 requires a brokerage to inform its customers of any remuneration from third parties made in connection with a customer transaction.
原告据称，资金向经纪公司提供了两种类型的付款：根据其自身资源支付的资金资产和非12B-1费用的规则12B-1费用。投资公司法案第12B条禁止使用股东资产支付分配费用的共同资金。但是，“规约”确实允许基金公司使用高达100个基点12B-1费用，以支付某些分销成本，例如广告和促销材料。法律没有定义基金公司可以支付经纪人的分销费用，因为他们自己的口袋：天空是极限。
在课程案例中，涉及的安排披露于他们收集的股份资产的经纪人12B-1支付，以及仅含糊不清的额外付款。例如，联盟招股说明书披露了公司支付经纪人“来自顾问自身资源的大量资源”进行分销费用。
当第二巡回上诉法院去年维持下院判决，它就向证券和交换委员会提出了关于解释规则10B-10的意见。证券委员会提出了一份意大利州简介，指出“我们认为，在招股说明书中披露了12B-1费用和非12B-1费用符合规则的要求。”
但是,美国证券交易委员会(SEC)短暂继续说道,“我们并不是说that this is necessarily all the disclosure about these types of fees that should be required as a matter of policy, only that the disclosure made here satisfies the existing rule." The SEC has directed its staff to recommend whether additional disclosure is needed.
Meanwhile, SEC staffers are reportedly being lobbied aggressively by the Investment Company Institute to basically leave well enough alone. The ICI made clear its stance in a May 8, 2000, letter to the SEC from ICI general counsel Craig Tyle, that read in part: Rule 10b-10 "should provide that the payments by the investment adviser or principal underwriter of an investment company to a broker-dealer who sells the investment company's shares need not be disclosed in specific detail on a confirmation."
类动作诉讼程序自然提供了不同的视角。威奇勒说：“基金公司并不是这些招股说明，如此故意塑造一种拯救墨水的方法;它埋葬在那里开始，它并没有告诉你谁在付谁支付谁和多少。对我而言，这不是披露，我的书中的未公开的付款被称为反思。“