Dobson可以修复schroders吗？

MICHAEL DOBSON IS SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE -- OF HISTORY。作为198岁的英国金融王朝舒尔德的首席执行官，Dobson被指控转向一家尊重的坚定，倾向于瘦身，平均货币经理。没有人会羡慕他的任务。自2001年在2001年税前税前损失了810万英镑（1250万美元），自银行超过二十年前公开的首次损失。利润率是Paltry 5％，而行业规范为20％至30％。由2002年中亚2002年的资产截至2000年初的1420亿英镑，从2000年初到了1420亿英镑 - 这部分是客户磨损的结果，部分是两代最差的熊市。在584升中，斯科罗德斯的股票两年前从15.90英镑的峰值下降了大约三分之二。该公司的DWWINDLING市场资本化意味着它几乎没有于其在U.K.领先公司的FTSE 100指数中的成员资格。

Family-controlled since its creation, Schroders is one of a vanishing breed in the City of London: an independent financial house that has, so far, resisted selling out to a deep-pocketed bank or insurer. Its largest shareholder, Baron Bruno Schroder, wants to keep it that way. And Dobson insists that Schroders can be reborn as a stand-alone money manager, able to compete with such global giants as Capital Guardian Trust Co. and Fidelity Investments, manufacturing products for retail and institutional clients around the world.

"Independence has been a winning strategy in the U.S., and I see no reason why Schroders can't replicate that in Europe," he declares.

During his first year at the helm, Dobson has worked overtime to make it happen. He has cleaned house, axing many top executives (and often replacing them with former colleagues of his own). He has brought in a new crop of fund managers to boost performance and round out Schroders' investment expertise. In September he hired Richard Horlick, who ran Fidelity's U.K. operations from 1994 to 2001, to oversee Schroders' global institutional business. The personnel shuffle has borne fruit. At the end of 1999, more than three quarters of Schroders' portfolios -- institutional and retail alike -- were below their benchmarks; at midyear 2002, 68 percent of institutional and 75 percent of retail funds were outperforming.

德意志资产管理前的多斯森正在掌握成本，通过巩固后台功能和修剪工作，在牛市期间循环失控。他还在该公司陷入困境的私人银行部门，以及美国子公司Schroder投资管理北美，他还解决了斯基罗德＆Co.的流行性弱点。一些分析师印象深刻。“我的感觉是，新的管理层对施罗德斯给予了急需的推动力，”美林林奇＆林业学院专业财务研究负责人菲利普·米德尔顿说“这对我来说是一个比下方的更尖锐的组织以前的首席执行官。“

至少一些养老基金都同意。8月剑桥县议会保留了斯科尔德，管理额为2.5亿英镑的7.5亿英镑基金，被解雇了J.P.摩根弗莱明资产管理，并在U.K.和国际债券中获得了6000万英镑的额外6000万英镑。托尼，贝尔斯＆Co的专业金融分析师Tony Cummings表示：“Schroders几乎肯定会在12个月前几乎肯定地失去了这一营业。这是一个令人鼓舞的迹象，即一个角落已经转变。”

But Schroders still faces a strategic crisis. One problem is its size: In a fund management industry bifurcating between global heavyweights and featherweight boutiques, Schroders is a drifting middleweight. It barely scrapes into the top 20 of亚博赞助欧冠资产的欧洲基金管理人员列表（see Euro 100），它在全球范围内排名第60。它缺乏规模，以提供产品范围，可确保保真度或Vanguard集团稳定的胜利基金，无论市场状况如何。

Another problem is distribution. Independent money managers thrive in the U.S. because the market has plenty of disinterested intermediaries selling funds, from financial supermarkets to independent advisers. In Europe sales power still rests largely with big banks and insurers, most of which sell only proprietary products. According to Morgan Stanley, even distributors that sell third-party funds -- a practice known as open architecture -- don't give them more than 30 percent of their shelf space. Manufacturers like Schroders must pay huge distribution fees -- as much as 60 percent of revenues, according to management consulting firm Oliver, Wyman & Co.

Then, too, Schroders' traditional strengths have turned into weaknesses. So-called balanced management, in which pension funds award one or two external managers large mandates and give them discretion over asset allocation, provided the firm's bread-and-butter business during the 1980s and early 1990s. But funds are increasingly turning to specialists, hiring many money managers, each with expertise in a particular asset class, to execute an investment strategy decided on by the plan and its consulting firm. Now Schroders is scrambling to climb on the specialist bandwagon, which is already full of competitors.

无论如何，斯科罗司机严重依赖于Fickle机构客户，该客户占管理层的80％。它的投资组合是74％的股票，这不是当前资产的选择。该公司的60％的资产来自U.K.客户。Sums Up Sarah Ing，Ubs Warburg专业融资分析师：“太多的U.K.，太多的机构和太多的股票。Schroders处于错误的资产管理业务的错误。”

Dobson argues that Schroders is a firm in transition, still moving from bank to specialist asset manager. (It sold its investment banking business to Citigroup subsidiary Salomon Smith Barney in 2000, for $2.2 billion -- just in time for global markets to go into free fall.) Dobson says his strategy is focused on diversifying the client and asset mix. For example, he plans to beef up fixed income from its current 21.5 percent of assets, double the firm's alternative investments (from 5 percent of assets now) and raise the ratio of retail to institutional assets, although he has not set a specific target.

Dobson also argues that Schroders' independence is a core strength that safeguards the company's integrity. "Independence is a great asset, particularly with increased focus on conflicts of interest," he says. "If you look at the top 20 asset management companies in Europe, there is only one independent firm: Schroders. We don't have a brokerage arm, we don't have an investment bank, we aren't owned by a commercial bank, we aren't owned by an insurer. We are a pure asset management firm."

首席执行官认为,拒绝出售出去big distributor, Schroders is positioning itself for a European future in which third-party fund sales are the rule, not the exception. (Schroders' products are already sold through American International Group, AMP, Canada Life Financial Corp., Norwich Union, Scottish Mutual Assurance, Scottish Widows, Skandia and Zurich Financial Services, among others.) And he is confident that the firm's solid track record in U.K. equities, U.K. bonds and Asian stocks will give those funds an advantage over competitors. "I have come from Deutsche, which has a trillion under management and a huge banking network through which it can sell products," he says. "I won't pretend there aren't some advantages to that model. But open architecture is a reality, and it means distributors are looking for best-of-breed products."

He had better be right. In August 2001 Baron Schroder and his relatives, who together hold 48 percent of Schroders' shares, ousted CEO David Salisbury, a lifelong Schroders veteran. The official explanation was that the firm needed a change. But current and former employees say Salisbury was fired for questioning the firm's viability as an independent.

Dobson is under pressure to make the independence strategy work. His contract expires in 2004 -- the same year Schroders will reach its bicentennial, an anniversary the family no doubt wants to celebrate in style. If Dobson can bolster the bank's flagging fortunes and position it solidly among Europe's major money managers, he will earn himself a warm baronial handshake, not to mention a multimillion-pound bonus on top of his £10.5 million in guaranteed compensation.

Dobson抵达施罗德有很多of baggage. He is most famous for rising from relative obscurity in 1989 at the tender age of 36 to become CEO of Morgan Grenfell & Co., which had just been bought by Deutsche Bank. Between 1993 and 1998 Dobson headed Deutsche's investment banking division, then known as Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, and became only the second non-German to join Deutsche's board of directors. However, his influence began to wane in the mid-1990s. The late Edson Mitchell, whom Dobson had hired from Merrill Lynch to head global markets, displaced him as Deutsche's investment banking star. In 1998 Dobson was shuffled sideways to head asset management, before resigning in 2000 in protest of chairman Rolf Breuer's abortive plans to merge with Dresdner Bank and sell off Deutsche's stellar fund management business, DWS Investments, to Allianz.

His meteoric ascent has made Dobbo -- as he is widely, if unfelicitously, known in the City -- a man about whom many people have strong opinions, whether or not they know him personally. Those close to him say he is charming and engaging. But he is more often described as arrogant and aloof. One analyst who follows Schroders even admits, "Secretly, I would love it if he failed."

Now 50, Dobson has much in common with his boss. Both men are products of Eton College and Oxbridge. Both abhor publicity. At 6-foot-4¹/ 2，Dobson可以在眼中或多或少地看6英尺6英尺的男爵。最重要的是，他对家族线独立。

立即在办公室后，Dobbo开始填补了志同道合的人的银行的关键插槽。他解雇了尼克马樱街的首席财务官，他在斯科德勒度过了整个职业生涯，并在德意志摩根格林芬德德国首席运营官乔昂沙琼带来了乔纳森。阿奎斯，前自由主义总理赫伯特·索邦的后裔加入了大学的摩根格雷芬毕业生毕业生计划，就像多斯森一样。而且像Dobson一样，asquith在dmg争夺了旧式商家银行的价值观，抵制了米切尔和他的美国贸易商的价值观。现在，Dobson正在努力帮助刮胡子的80％的成本收入率。

Next, Dobson launched a purge at private banking division Schroder & Co., where assets under management slipped from £6.7 billion at year-end 2001 to £6.4 billion in June 2002 and revenues have recently been no better than stable. He fired CEO Mike Bussey (who has since been hired to head Rothschild Group's private client division) and replaced him with Sally Tennant. Tennant headed Gartmore Investment Management's institutional business during its most successful period, in the early and mid-1990s, and was a partner at Beaumont Capital Management, the hedge fund business that Dobson founded and that Schroders acquired in October 2001 to gain his services.

More controversially, Sharon Haugh, chairwoman of Schroder Investment Management North America in New York, was shown the door in May. Dobson cites poor performance at the bank's U.S. arm, which manages $32 billion in U.S. pension fund money. Haugh, 56, responded by filing a multimillion-dollar suit against Schroders for age discrimination. No successor has yet been named, although Dobson says he will fill the post by year-end.

But Schroders' most important new hires have been at headquarters in London. Global institutional chief Horlick, a product of Harrow School and the University of Cambridge, presided over a highly successful period for Fidelity in the U.K. -- assets rose from less than $10 billion to $60 billion on his watch. As a veteran of one of the world's most successful independent specialists, Horlick's job is to help John Troiano, head of U.K. and European institutional management, revamp Schroders' product line and spread the word that the new Schroders is no longer just a balanced shop.

Troiano自己已经过去很长一段路有限公司uple of years toward freshening Schroders' portfolio management. He has expanded the European and U.S. equity and global fixed-income teams, introduced a sector-based approach to equity management and created a dedicated client-services division. In July 2000 he hired Susan Haroun from UBS Brinson to oversee the institutional investment process. That same year, he brought Deborah Chaplin from Zurich Scudder Investments to manage Schroders' core Europe, Australasia and Far East (EAFE) international equity portfolios. Both Haroun and Chaplin come from Continental asset managers that fought their way to success in the ultracompetitive U.S. institutional arena. Troiano also brought in Baring Asset Management's star European equities manager, Mark Pignatelli, who was recently promoted to chief investment officer.

Pignatelli在沼泽的前老板，U.K.对冲基金经理Crispin Odey，认为Schroders正在Dobson下塑造。“施罗德斯曾经敏感我有点像公务员。现在有一个认真的善良的人，高级职位：多斯森，索奎斯，霍洛克，帕涅泰利。这是真正的人才，他们在转过身来，他们在转过身来射门，”他们在转过身来，他们在转过身来，他们越来越多，“odey。

The new blood was badly needed. Schroders had underperformed during the best of the bull market. In both 1998 and 1999, it turned in bottom-quartile performance in two of its core portfolios: multi-asset-class balanced management, mostly for U.K. pension funds, and U.K. equities. Even though Schroders has not traditionally been considered a value manager, Troiano explains, "this was partly the result of very strange markets. We took the view that the valuations of many businesses were at odds with the fundamentals. We were right, but in the short term, that hit our performance."

The management shake-up has helped. For the three years ended in June, Schroders had median or better performance in balanced management and in all equity asset classes except emerging markets (though it is in the top quartile year-to-date), according to the Russell/Mellon Caps performance measurement service. There are pockets of stellar results over one and three years in U.K. and Japanese equities and in U.K. bonds. "There has been a major turnaround in performance," declares Dobson. "We are increasingly being included on consultants' shortlists."

But even the best portfolio managers can slip up. Pignatelli made a famously bad call in early 2001, betting that U.S. interest rate cuts heralded the end of the global bear market. Instead, European stocks kept falling, and Pignatelli's flagship Schroder European Fund wound up in the bottom performance decile for the year, according to Standard & Poor's. And in retail Schroders hasn't broken out of the pack. Fund-rating groups such as Micropal give 31 percent of its retail funds four stars or more -- just above the 30 percent industry average and nowhere near Fidelity's 63 percent.

总管理资产第一哈lf of 2002, to £102 billion, from £110 billion in the first half of 2001. But attrition of assets has slowed -- to £2.3 billion, compared with £5.6 billion in the first half of last year. Profits dropped to £46.8 million, 37 percent less than in first-half 2001. Nick Sykes, a senior investment consultant at William M. Mercer, thinks Schroders has yet to live down the stale reputation it earned at the end of the past decade. "In this business perception lags reality," says Sykes. "Schroders has been seen as a problem house because of 1998 and 1999. The hangover from the late 1990s may linger for a while yet."

That sums up Dobson's biggest challenge. In asset management, stand-alone manufacturers live and die by performance. And that, ultimately, may be beyond his control.

施罗德是伟大的幸存者family-controlled British banks, such as Barings and Robert Fleming, that were swept away in the 1990s when globalization and bulge-bracket investment banks overcame their genteel variety of capitalism. The firm was born when Johann Heinrich Schröder traveled from Hamburg to London in 1804 and formed a banking business with his brother. They established J. Henry Schröder & Co. in 1818, and during the 19th century it became one of Britain's preeminent merchant banks.

Like its U.K. peers -- including Robert Fleming, Morgan Grenfell & Co. and S.G. Warburg & Co. -- Schroders 50 years ago considered fund management secondary to the more glamorous business of deal making. But from the 1970s onward, as companies built up pension schemes and investments institutionalized, the merchant banks' asset management function grew in importance.

施罗德成为U.K.的四大四大国内管理人员（以及Gartmore，Mercury Asset Management和Phillips＆Drew），似乎赢得了20世纪90年代初期奖励的每一项养老金任务。只有Merrury，曾经是S.G.Warburg的一部分，现在由Merrill Lynch拥有，更明显地成功，管理层的资产和国内市场份额更大。

Internationally, Schroders was arguably the most prominent British firm, having built a strong U.S. institutional presence in the 1980s with EAFE-linked equity portfolios. It won big mandates from the Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association, the state of Hawaii and the Minnesota State Board of Investment, among others. Overall, funds under management grew from $29 billion in 1987 to $78 billion at the end of 1993. By the close of the decade, the firm clocked in to theII欧元100欧元兑换欧元（2150亿美元）。

但在某些方面，Schroders最大的实力也是责任。在20世纪80年代和20世纪90年代初，U.K.养老基金在很大程度上忽视了他们美国同行正在采用的治理结构。在美国咨询公司决定资产配置，然后向专门投资利基的多名经理授予基金的资金。英国基金，即使是最大的，仍然是少数经理人酌情酌情 - 平衡的方法。这四个占主导地位。

Thus they had the most to lose when U.K. pension funds began taking the specialist approach in the mid-1990s. Specialist mandates command better fees -- 25 to 100 basis points, compared with 10 to 25 basis points for balanced briefs -- but they are also smaller. In many instances, clients yanked balanced mandates of hundreds of millions from one or two managers and parceled them out to as many as a dozen specialists. Even those incumbents that retained a few bits lost millions in assets. For example, the British Broadcasting Corp. pulled a £700 million balanced mandate from Schroders last year, though the firm continues to manage a £750 million global equities brief. Other clients, such as the Bristol-based Environment Agency, sacked Schroders outright.

Schroders专注于赚取其条纹作为专家。最近的客户赢得了来自约克郡电力集团养老基金的英镑债券的2.8亿英镑任务，来自爱尔兰国家养老金储备基金和7000万美元的瑞典AP7的亚洲股权授权。

A net loss of £4.3 billion in institutional business in the first half of this year, compared with £6.9 billion in 2001, positively surprised analysts, most of whom had predicted a steeper plunge. The worst outflows were in the U.S.

In retail, however, Schroders is firing on all cylinders. Retail funds under management stand at £12.6 billion -- double the amount in 1999 -- or about 14 percent of total assets. In the first half of 2002, net retail sales of £2 billion were 120 percent higher than in first-half 2001.

The firm sees great potential among continental European retail customers, who are contributing more and more to Schroders' total funds. Out of £4 billion in gross sales during first-half 2002, the Continent accounted for £1.9 billion. And according to Feri Fund Market Information, Schroders ranked sixth among cross-border fund groups in average net sales during the second quarter. Its close rivals include Fidelity, Franklin Templeton Investments, J.P. Morgan Fleming and Morgan Stanley -- exactly the kind of company Dobson wants Schroders to be keeping.

但是Dobson有麻烦的斑点来修复。一个是Schroder＆Co，该公司于2000年凭借这项公司的私人银行业部门。在投资银行出售后，管理层兴奋地谈到私人银行作为未来的省力业务。但尽管斯科罗德名称的铭文，但谈话尚未翻译成客户和利润。

新的首席执行官坦特希望将Schroder＆Co.作为投资产品的供应商，而不仅仅是一个继续支票和储蓄账户的地方。自5月控制以来，她已经改变了银行的制度，以确定客户的最佳资产分配。她已经扩展了产品系列，具有更多替代投资，包括一个即将推出的对冲基金资金，并与Frank Russels Co.提供了独家协议，以提供其经理的经理产品（IN罗素向其他经理分配资金）沿着斯科罗德斯的内部资金。Tennant说：“这将开放的架构到更高的级别。Frank Russell拥有一流的产品，将为客户提供世界上一些最优秀的金钱管理人才。”

Another problem area is the U.S., which Dobson says is a priority. Assets have declined by approximately 25 percent thanks to a combination of declining markets and poorly performing EAFE portfolios. "The U.S. still accounts for 16.5 percent of our business [by assets in June 2002], but it is fair to say we are not as strong there as we were five years ago," Dobson admits. The unit's new CEO will have to improve the EAFE portfolios' performance and polish Schroders' reputation among consultants.

Dobson努力重振管理，将投资表现转向并将Schroders重定向到更有利可图的地区，尚未对底线产生很大影响。他在公司的成本基础上有很多工作要做，这是为了处理大量资产和牛市的成本基础。（他作为成本刀具的记录很好：在摩根格雷芬福尔，首先是副行政长官，然后担任首席执行官，多斯森削减了25％的劳动力 - 约500个就业机会 - 1988年至1990年之间。）

他在这场竞选中的主要中尉是新的CFO·索奎斯，最近负责巴克莱的私人客户业务。索奎斯答应于今年年底，从1月份的2,890截止到今年年底，达到2,500人。（已经从2001年初的3,178起已经下降了。）一些裁员将从旧投资银行业务的40名前营销办公室中收取多达十分之一的裁员，以及南非和泰国等。

世行还将继续outsourcing projects that previous management had begun. These include subcontracting Schroders' entire fund administration, custody and accounting processes to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.'s investor ser-vices division. Asquith predicts that this and other initiatives will shrink Schroders' cost base by more than 25 percent, to the tune of £60 million, by 2003. Says Dobson, "Once the restructuring of the cost base is complete, we will be a very efficient firm, able to run substantially more assets at little extra cost."

分析师认为Dobson可以通过播放他的袖子，从而提高盈利能力：超过投资银行销售的7亿英镑的剩余资本，可以帮助支付战略性收购。到目前为止，挂在金钱上看起来很聪明 - 由于市场崩溃，基金经理只是继续越来越便宜。但分析师越来越不耐烦。马丁十字架在腾讯和格林伍德上说：“即使是谦虚的成功收购也应该有高兴股权回报，因为7亿英镑正在赚取兑现的返回率。”克尔顿福克斯皮特的基金管理分析师John Kirk同意。“我认为Dobson应该明确宣布他打算在年底达到7亿英镑，”他说。

Dobson是他对这款货币可能做的事情的不同意见。“在目前的市场环境中，我们希望在固定收益方面更强大，”他立即添加：“我们可以加强我们的欧洲业务。我们可以做一系列的事情。”

SO FAR, THE ALL-IMPORTANT CONSULTANTS WHO决定哪些基金经理赢得养老金基金的金钱被多斯森的第一年表现令人谨慎留下深刻的印象。“我认为Schroders在专业基金管理年龄，大公司必须与精品店竞争，明确地了解在专业基金管理的时代，以便在那里竞争中，”Mercer的Sykes说。““在某些地区已经存在。”

假设Sykes是对的，Dobbo确实转向了银行，仍然会给斯科罗队的未来留下问题。一个选择，悄悄地伤害了一些城市，可能会私下。7亿英镑的现金盈余不会迈出欧洲的分销权，甚至以制造方式走得太远。相反，这个家庭可以把它放在买断（Schroders的总市场上限约为12亿英镑，所以家庭的股份价值约5.8亿英镑），提高私募股权的差异。如果市场和银行的财富恢复，男爵和他的亲戚可以与一个值三倍的公司结束，这是现在的三倍。

目前 - 公开，至少 - 没有人暗示这样的行动方案迫在眉睫。为家庭实现他们的推定利润，他们必须放松控制控制。除非在他们这样做，除非，Dobson的工作就是继续与潮流进行战斗。