Shinsei的方式

这是Shinsei Bank 71岁的首席执行官Masamoto Yashiro这是一个。On December 28, 2001, Shinsei became the first major Japanese bank to file for one of its own borrowers to get legal protection from creditors without that client's consent -- indeed, despite the client's vigorous opposition.

Shinsei所做的是申请在最近颁布的企业重建法下代表第一家信贷公司申请康复，这是东京过度股票市场上市的抵押贷款专家。它在与一群日本金融机构的贷款重新安排的关键点处做了这么做。贷款书估计为130亿日元（11亿美元），Shinsei是第一个信用32个贷款人。

第一信贷挑战Yashiro的先发制人行动，但在3月份东京地区法院裁定时，该公司的摇摇欲剧财务状况意味着在没有法院任命的接收者的帮助下重建的几乎没有机会。法院裁决是Yashiro和外商独资的胜利，但它并没有让普通的日本银行在他们的传统束缚行业中享受令人痛苦的新抵达。

“十二月的新生举动是一个巨大的震惊，”东京四个新创造的“梅吉纳斯”一名规划人员的成员表示，他们坚持留下匿名。It's not unknown for banks in Japan to guide a corporate client to the bankruptcy courts by delaying acceptance of a loan renewal request, he says, "but to file directly for the equivalent of Chapter 11 in the U.S. without the client's consent is simply not acceptable in the Japanese system."

Shinsei had sound reasons for acting as it did. If the bank had not filed for creditor protection for First Credit, it could have been left without collateral on its loans to the company. But the planning manager at Shinsei's rival argues that driving companies into bankruptcy will damage the mutual trust between lenders and borrowers. "That trust," he concludes, "is essential when Japan stands on the brink of a deflationary spiral that could cause a wave of corporate failures and a huge rise in unemployment."

In fact, no one should have been surprised by the First Credit affair -- least of all the big Japanese banks that have been watching Shinsei's tactics with a mixture of alarm and admiration since a group of foreign institutional investors led by U.S.-based Ripplewood Holdings bought the former Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan from the government in March 2000.

During its 28 months in business, Shinsei has overturned nearly every convention in the Japanese banking world, including the time-honored practice of automatically rolling over loans to corporate borrowers, regardless of whether they can repay principal. Apart from simply getting tough with borrowers, Shinsei has tried to introduce what to Tokyo is a novel combination of investment and commercial banking, offering clients an array of sophisticated financial products as well as, or more often in place of, plain-vanilla corporate loans.

一年前，Shinsei通过推出零售银行业务开始突破其批发的债券的资金制度，旧的LTCB从未考虑过。它通过雇用一支印度顾问来震惊自己的技术人员，以帮助将银行信息技术系统从大型机切换到个人电脑。

“关于Shinsei的最卓越的事情不是原创性的，”东京证券（日本）的基于东京银行分析师James Fiorillo说。“这是它在两年内推动的方式，改革其他银行一直在谈论十年。”

Yashiro说流利的英语，“日本银行通过无利可图的企业贷款和缺乏多样化被推到墙上。他们别无选择，只会改变。”

作为Shinsei的改变为激进的，以日本标准的速度为光线，引起了银行内部的速度以及在金融界大。在Ripplewood接管后的第一年，300名前LTCB工作人员自愿离开银行，70人被邀请了70人加入银行所谓的“第二职业计划”。

这些偏离建议过渡并不总是顺利运行。仍然，Yashiro相信银行已经出现了一个明显增强的企业文化 - 以及更加激烈变化的准备。亚慱体育app怎么下载CEO说，幸存的LTCB男性不仅仅是银行的旧工作人员最聪明的人，但他们有“硬背”，并在满足Shinsei抛出他们的挑战方面表现出创造力。似乎奇怪的是，这不是员工日本深深陷入困境的银行业的精英薪水。

然而,所有新生的活力,观察人士怀疑that the bank will provide a template for change in the underfinanced and arthritically managed Japanese banking industry. To start with, the bank isn't large: Its assets of ¥8 trillion and its branch network of 24 outlets make it a minnow compared to the four Japanese megabanks, whose assets range from ¥80 trillion to ¥140 trillion. Moreover, Shinsei is actually getting smaller as its tough policy on loan rollovers forces corporate borrowers to switch to other banks. And despite its stringent lending standards, the bank's portfolio of nonperforming loans remains stubbornly high, a source of concern to the credit rating agencies and hardly a model for the industry.

"I'm not blaming Shinsei for this," says Koyo Ozeki, credit analyst for financial institutions at Merrill Lynch Japan, "but there's no doubt that for various reasons, including opposition by some politicians to foreign ownership of financial institutions, the bank is in a challenging situation."

仍然，竞争对手银行可以从其榜样中学到。从公司治理开始：Shinsei在2000年通过任命一个完全由外部董事组成的董事会进行了新的地面，与通常的管理层主导的日本银行委员会相比，这可能拥有一个符号局外人。

权力下放是另一个谢泼的痴迷。在Ripplewood接管后不久，银行报告了一项关于所有其他部门向所有其他部门发出强制性生产规范的一般规划单位。这些部门，如零售，机构关系和风险控制，现在设定了自己的目标，甚至雇用了自己的员工。该银行不再有员工旋转系统，它已废除了大多数日本银行的主力中心 - 一个人事部门，唯一的仲裁者是谁在哪里以及多长时间。

Shinsei的决心走向自己的方式已经获得了混合的评论。两年前，该银行在媒体中遭到努力，当时它拒绝加入其他贷方在纾困的领先店铺Sogo Co.，这迅速陷入破产。但大规模循环yomiuri.newspaper featured Shinsei in a November 2001 story on "how foreigners can reform Japanese industry." Its banking peers offer a similarly divided view. "Shinsei's attempt to nudge customers away from conventional bank borrowing to capital market finance doesn't make sense, because Japan's capital markets just aren't big enough," says a banker at one of the megainstitutions. Yet this same banker says Shinsei was absolutely right to abolish central planning.

谢赛尼银行的过去几乎没有暗示其革命者的礼物。该银行的前任LTCB于1952年成立。它通过债券问题提高了资金，并使用了对日本经济至关重要的所谓战略借款人的贷款所得款项。LTCB于1998年底在积累了大规模的不可收入的贷款组合后在1998年底为决定非实质的房地产开发商，百货商店和消费者贷款公司进行了巨大的不可抗拒的贷款组合。在为LTCB的书籍的部分清理之前，政府在LTCB的书籍中占据了3.8万日元的纳税人资金，以便恢复私营部门以获得令牌价格。

因为LTCB所要求的昂贵的重组，政府不允许投标人在其贷款书中窥视，只有两个优惠来自Chuo Mitsui Trust和Banking Co.以及来自重量级团队的另一个人由Ripplewood亚博赞助欧冠创始人和首席执行官蒂莫西柯林斯汇总了外国机构投资者。在团队更加突出的成员中：ABN AMRO银行，德意志银行，GE Capital商业金融，Mellon Financial Corp.，花旗集团的旅行者投资组和UBS Parewebber。

金融服务部长Hakuo Yanagisawa然后是金融重建委员会主席，是1998年成立的临时机构，以抵御迫在眉睫的银行危机，并处理LTCB的销售。他接受了Ripplewood的出价，因为它提供了更好的术语 - 在银行出售额定¥10亿日元的销售后，在LTCB之后，在LTCB之后的资本注入为120亿日元。

Although he didn't say so publicly, Yanagisawa may also have wanted to prod other banks into action by creating something new -- a Japanese bank owned and run by foreigners. "The idea," says Tim Marrable, a bank analyst for Crédit Agricole Indosuez Securities in Tokyo, "seems to have been that only a bunch of empowered outsiders could break through Japan's banking traditions."

Shinsei CEO Yashiro isn't a foreigner. He's a Japanese citizen with a blue-ribbon background, including degrees from Japan's two most exclusive universities, those of Tokyo and Kyoto. But he's no ordinary Japanese business leader, either.

Yashiro在花旗银行日本十年后来到Shinsei，其中一名非行为主席，他负责设立迄今为止日本最成功的外国零售银行特许经营权;事实上，CITI的外币账户范围，消费者贷款和对全球ATM网络的访问权限远远领先于大多数日本银行所提供的。在Citi Yashiro在埃克森公司（现为埃克森美孚公司）工作了30年之前，他担任埃克森斯塞克森主要子公司的埃索塞奇州总统两次。

在日本和盎格鲁撒克逊商业文化中同样出现的少数商业领袖，Yashiro表示，Shinsei CFO David Fite，“在引导Shinsei的公共形象和获胜接受时，这是一个无价和独特的资产亚慱体育app怎么下载日本商业设施。“但即使有一个魅力的首席执行官，Shinsei也有一些商业领袖和政治家的常用。

2001年6月，Yashiro被称为日本议会的上部财务委员会之前，以解释为什么Shinsei遵循了Shinsei - 通过拒绝支持其他银行组合在一起的¥22亿日元贷款重新安排包来推动Sogo陷入破产。

这不仅是生气的政治家。其他日本银行对Shinsei感到愤怒，他们被声称，在Ripplewood的购买协议中触发了一个政府的一个条款，允许它返回从LTCB继承的贬值贷款。他们据称参加救援套餐，他们所称，谢谢现有的Sogo贷款不合适，因此受政府回购。但是Yashiro准备好了反驳。他能够说服委员会的一些成员，即政府将一直摧毁自己的手工，如果它强迫Shinsei加入Sogo救援。

在接受采访时阐述这一点亚博赞助欧冠根据其他银行的要求，Yashiro凭借其他银行的要求，如果Shinsei凭借其他银行的要求，它将引发借调其自身贷款书的信用质量的强制下降，而是由政府准则的基金决定。反过来，又将花费280亿日元的增加的索波贷款的规定，足以将新的第一年作为私有化银行淘汰。

“在花费3.8万亿日元的纳税人的钱来清理LTCB后，政府真的希望这种情况发生在3.8万亿日元之后发生吗？”问Yashiro。在议会辩论时，答案尚不清楚，但两个月后，另一个暂时国有化的长期信用银行 - 日本信贷银行，自从更名为Aozora Bank - 被销往日本的联盟。该交易包括类似的回购条款。据推测，如果不认为是必要的话，政府将不再同意他们的第二次。

In addition to his ability to fend off external pressures, Yashiro boasts an unmatched network of contacts dating from his days at Citibank. This has enabled him to fill a lot of top posts at the bank with friends and former colleagues. IT boss Dhananjaya Dvivedi, an Indian-educated engineer who at Shinsei has ruthlessly sliced his way through many of the problems that bedevil Japanese banks' IT departments, was head of IT at Citibank Japan in the early 1990s before moving on to similar jobs in New York and Singapore.

K. Sajeeve Thomas, the Indian-born head of Shinsei's one-year-old retail banking unit, was Yashiro's treasurer at Citibank Japan before moving to New York to head the risk management department at Citi's global corporate and investment banking division. Janak Raj, head of corporate risk-return assessment, spent 25 years at Citi before joining Shinsei.

“Janak和其他人都在东京为我工作，当他们继续走向其他工作时，我继续与他们联系，”Yashiro说。“他们来到Shinsei，因为他们想，不是因为他们被Ripplewood猎杀了。”

当然，整个顶级管理团队不是前花旗。CFO Fite came to Shinsei after a career that began in consulting (at the U.S.'s Bain & Co.) and included helping Australia's Westpac Banking Corp. to overcome a bad-loan crisis in 19992000. "I learned a lot at Westpac about how to get back to business as usual after a workout at a seriously troubled bank," says the 39-year-old.

FITE的经验一直非常宝贵，因为即使是非日本标准，银行也在正处于一个非常紧张的时间表。“有一个明显的理由，”金融咨询公司负责人说。这项高管表示，作为私募股权公司的Ripplewood需要在相对较短的时间内兑现其投资，可能没有超过另外四到五年。日本职员亚洲省亚洲州·斯冈萨··斯库扎基坐落在统治自由民主党的议会上，说Yashiro的简介是“准备Shinsei，尽可能快地迅速地依赖于[东京证券交易所]。”

在Shinsei的几乎所有顶级工作中都有局部的存在可以加速重建，但过程并不容易。考虑到Michiyuki Okano的案例，这是一个系统工程顾问，当Ripplewood接管时是Shinsei的IT部门的17年的退伍军人。奥卡诺说，他在Dvivedi的前三个月里失去了11公斤（大约24磅），因为银行的新的IT老板，一夜只睡了三到四个小时。

"Dvivedi was telling us to change the entire system, but at first we just didn't understand what he was talking about," says Okano. "And when he started calling for specific functions like a central internal payments system instead of a branch-based system, we just didn't know how to do it."

IT部门的运营和规划总经理Hidehhiko Araakawa以及另一个LTCB退伍军人，他和他的同事因Dvivedi通过来自各种系统供应商的80至90名印度软件顾问的团队沟通的习惯而烦恼谁被带到了矛头的变化。“当我和他一起提出这个时，他让我把印第安人视为使者，”阿拉克说。Dvivedi解释说，他没有足够的时间告诉旧LTCB IT人员的个人成员，他想要的所有事情以及如何做到这一点。

Gradually, Arakawa and Okano began to get the hang of Dvivedi's ideas -- many of them more cost-effective than traditional solutions. "Jay's basic idea is that an IT system should be adjustable to whatever new business the bank wants to enter," says Okano, using Dvivedi's nickname at the bank. "It shouldn't be a fixed system designed years in advance to serve predetermined needs." That meant phasing out mainframes and replacing them with a networked system of personal computers. "The PCs function like a Lego set," explains Okano. "Each individual piece is small, but you can add or subtract to make the system do whatever the bank needs."

In contrast, executives at other Japanese banks typically submit requests to the IT division and wait months for an answer -- which is sometimes that a certain project is impossible.

After two stressful years Okano thinks the Dvivedi revolution is beginning to pay dividends. Shinsei has spent ¥6 billion on IT since Ripplewood took over, down from an annual IT budget of ¥10 billion under the old regime. But it's gotten a lot for its money: a management information system that can measure the profit or loss performance of any new product within six or seven days, compared with twice-yearly summaries before, and a unified payments system that replaced decentralized payments at the branch level.

IT革命不仅仅是管理专家提供整个银行利益的例子。Fite说，Lego的方法已成为实施Yashiro商业模式的几乎所有其他部分的关键。拥有灵活的快速响应系统允许银行设计衡量风险的过程，并在截至9月止六个月的六个月内为其筹集的公司贷款升高的净净额从0.6％提高到1％2001年。

改进的技术也使分散的决策，允许诸如零售或体制关系等各个部门来运作更自由。该银行不会投入大量资源来集中规划。“我们仍然有一个七人的战略规划小组，但其工作也包括政府关系，其成员实际上花了大部分时间，”Frite说。相比之下，其他银行，他说，设定了规范，将其传递给强制执行的业务部门。当大型机搅拌了银行的半年业务成果时，管理人员只能每六个月评估他们的表现。

Most critically, Shinsei's distributed IT system has enabled the bank to develop investment banking services that LTCB didn't have, including project finance, acquisition finance, asset-backed securitization and credit derivatives. A main pillar of the bank's strategy is to reduce dependence on earnings from loan spreads and increase fee income from services.

为了推动战略，在1月份，Shinsei创建了一个单一的机构关系部门，为企业客户提供金融服务菜单，从企业贷款到复杂的衍生产品。该机构部门在高级董事总经理Hidebumi Mori下工作，LTCB的少数顶级管理申诉人之一。森林的两位首席级中尉是Brian Prince和LTCB老将Teruaki Yamamoto的Exlehman Brothers高级副总裁。“说王子做投资银行和Yamamoto贷款是不正确的，”Yashiro说。“他们都做了两者。”

Yet for all the change orchestrated by Yashiro, results are still uncertain. It's not that the bank isn't profitable. Unlike the big four (Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, Mizuho Holdings, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. and UFJ Holdings), which all reported net losses after massive bad-loan write-offs in the year ended in March, Shinsei posted a comfortable net profit of ¥61 billion on sales of ¥235 billion. But skeptics say the bank may be too far ahead of the game -- or too small compared with competitors -- to make its innovative policies stick. Shinsei's share of the Japanese corporate loan market is a minuscule 0.4 percent. Making customers pay higher rates may simply drive them elsewhere for services.

“Shinsei留下了深刻的印象，但现在我想知道他们的利润表现是否真的是可持续的，”Merrill的Ozeki说。

虽然Shinsei发言人巡回局将银行取得了成功，以增加收费和委员会的收入，减少对企业贷款传播的依赖，ozeki指出，银行非互际收入的重要部分似乎来自贷款交易。非互补的收入占3月份的申城收入的34.2％，但费用和委员会仅贡献了4.8％。“其他业务收入”，银行未在其账目中进一步指明，占收益的15.1％。

竞争对手银行的企业规划人员，他们不同意Shinsei推动抵押贷款人的首先信用进入法院受保护的破产有其他疑虑。他认为，由于日本资本市场的慢性不发达，施谢公司客户对各种形式的直接融资转换为各种形式的直接融资可能需要更长时间。他指出，日本公司通过直接融资提出的¥50万亿日元只是¥500万亿日元的奖金。

Shinsei's Prince表示，基于公司债券市场的规模的批评是不正确的。Shinsei不会承保债券;它提供更广泛，更复杂的金融服务。即便如此，机构银行业务山顶的王子和联合主管也承认他们正在提前阶段，使其多元化的销售战略工作。

"You could divide corporate customers into three types," says Prince: "companies that are changing the way they handle corporate finance by moving from bank borrowing to direct financing, companies that want to change but can't because of internal bureaucracy and those that are happy the way they are." In its first two years, says Prince, Shinsei has mainly served the first type of customer. Shinsei is just beginning to attack category No. 2, which includes other banks' clients.

将这些客户的一大块转换为其他融资选择，需要时间，但Shinsei确实具有在这一领域的主要竞争对手，国际投资银行的主要竞争对手。“大多数外国人都处理了最顶级的日本业务，”莫里高级董事总经理说。“我们很幸运，我们继承了来自LTCB大约4,000名公司的客户群。Shinsei还与区域银行和购买债券购买其其他当地财务实体的密切关系。”

Shinsei's retail banking service, the other important leg of the bank's diversification strategy, is equally hard to evaluate, partly because it's only one year old. "When we took over the old LTCB, we found we had 500,000 retail customers [debenture holders], but we didn't treat them like customers," says CFO Fite. "They came back every four years to cash in or renew their investments, and that was that."

新生银行的零售银行推出了6月5日,2001年ims to double this client base to 1 million, but numbers aren't the point. The bank wants to build deposits, rather than debentures, into its main source of funding by offering a select clientele a range and quality of service it can't get from mainstream "city" banks. It's doing all this with just 24 branches, not the 200-plus boasted by megabank rivals. The small network was all the former LTCB needed for its long-term lending business.

Shinsei的诱饵培养零售投资者包括与其他金融机构的系列，让客户在全球范围内获得66万辆ATM机;免费ATM服务每天24小时，每年365天（日本大多数银行在下午6点之后提款）;并将其分支机构重新发布进入金融中心，这些中心提供的不仅仅是传统的现金处理服务。

Among the bank's most attractive products are a five-year deposit carrying a fixed 1 percent interest rate -- nothing remarkable by U.S. or European standards but a treasure trove for Japanese consumers who are used to one-year yen deposits paying 0.03 percent. It also offers a "power smart" housing loan, which allows the user to make payments ahead of schedule, thereby cutting future interest payments; holders can withdraw surplus funds to meet payments like tax bills or school fees.

托马斯是花旗银行的日本行动的前财务主管，他加入街头零售业，该部门在今年12月开始在日本最糟糕的经济衰退之后，在十年和美国的9月11日悲剧中，该部门开始“实现牵引”。托马斯预计Shinsei将在2004财年通过2004财年获得完全加载的利润（于2005年3月结束）。

然而，他很清楚，日本的每个主要银行都竞争了私人持有的¥1300万亿日元。当政府在银行当前现金余额上无限保证时，竞争将仅加强，并替代支付系统，保证存款仅高达1000万日元。“当谈话转向收钱时，我们可以制作各种各样的点，”托马斯说。“一个是我们有17％的资本比率，远高于日本银行的平均值。”另一种是，与几乎所有的大竞争对手不同，Shinsei在2001年获得了净利润。

One thing Shinsei can't say to customers is that its nonperforming-loan ratio is low. Quite the contrary. At the end of March, just under 20 percent of total loans were held by borrowers classified as "special watch," "potentially bankrupt" or "bankrupt," the three categories that are classed as nonperforming in the Japanese system. That compares with a 9 to 10 percent NPL ratio at most major banks.

Shinsei staff are quick to explain the reason for this discrepancy: About ¥2.5 trillion of the ¥7.5 trillion of loans the government selected as appropriate for LTCB to hold when it transferred the bank to Ripplewood were actually dubious or worse. Yashiro says Shinsei downgraded 55 percent of the bank's borrowers and 28 percent of the loans' total value from "normal" to "need caution" status during his first year on the job.

因此，由于政府协议收回糟糕贷款到期，亚士科仍然有信心似乎令人惊讶的是，由于政府的协议到期时，Shinsei可以将其NPL比率降低到大约5％。为了获得低位的速度，银行必须积极使用这一生命线。

The all-important clause will expire at the end of February 2003, three years after ownership of the bank was transferred to the Ripplewood consortium. According to the Deposit Insurance Corp. (the entity that absorbs the loans), the government has taken back ¥710 billion of loans from Shinsei. (Amounts provisioned by Ripplewood against nonperforming loans are not included in the transfer.)

也可能是困扰的是银行对陷入困境的Daiei超市集团的大占优势贷款。（Shinsei将不会透露这一金额，但Daiei表示，它归功于综合的基础上的新闻奖励。）达伊伊于1月份救出，当时其四个主要银行同意贷款套餐，其中包括520亿日元的金融救济债务股权转换和贷款宽恕的形式。但是，救援包的保证了Daiei的长期生存率远远甚至。

“如果Daiei挂在明年3月，但随后崩溃，Shinsei将被塞满，”领先的外国信用评级机构分析师表示。Daiei问题是机构率为Shinsei在Triple-B-minus的债券的一个原因，一个陷波比其四个日本兆头的评级低。

在加斯de, there are good reasons to believe that Shinsei will survive the loan crunch and reach something like Yashiro's 5 percent target by March 2003. The LDP's Shiozaki says the Financial Services Agency, which ultimately decides on loan issues, "has to cooperate" because the government can't afford to fail in the first major attempt at nationalizing and refloating a troubled private bank. Success in his view means more than ensuring Shinsei's mere survival. It includes creating a situation where the bank can relist successfully on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.

Yashiro可以依靠其他支持，并非最不重要的是他有没有被施谢股东的备受支持。这与大多数大日本银行的薪金总统相比，那些遭到管理层而不是投资者。

Yashiro可以强迫改变和废弃过时的系统，因为与大多数日本银行总统不同，他在创建系统时并不周围。这让他可以说是日本的银行最强大的负责人，拯救一些在实际家庭救济的区域银行首席执行官。

Impressive as Yashiro's performance at Shinsei has been, his leadership style and Shinsei's business model may not be copied soon by other Japanese banks. The rate of change at Shinsei has simply been too rapid to be reproduced across the board in an economy that's teetering on the edge of a deflationary spiral. For Shinsei to become a model rather than a maverick, two things will be needed. "First," says a Tokyo-based credit rating analyst, "Japan's economy will have to come back from the brink, so banks can behave with a bit more self-interest. Second, Shinsei itself will have to stay on course for a successful IPO sometime in the next 12 to 18 months." Neither is impossible.