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只有在美国
In the late 1990s surgeons at New York City's Mount Sinai Hospital kept a computer in the operating room so that they could trade stocks between operations.
In the late 1990s surgeons at New York City's Mount Sinai Hospital kept a computer in the operating room so that they could trade stocks between operations.
By Steven Brull
March 2002
亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者杂志
回想起来，这种展示可以被视为推测过量的迹象过于明显，但随着泡沫膨胀，怀疑论者作为股票分析师的销售评级稀缺。纽约人员工作家约翰卡西迪，少数少数铸造了新经济炒作的黄褐色纳斯达克5000，回顾了达摩亚的DOT.CON：最伟大的故事出售。他旋转了一个好纱线。
Cassidy offers little fresh reporting in his 372-page book, which regurgitates the stories of Netscape, Amazon.com, day trading and other well-worn business sagas, but his narrative is well written and entertaining, and it usefully highlights the peculiarly American character of the bubble. "The Internet boom and bust was about America - how it works and what it thought of itself in that short interregnum between the end of the Cold War and September 2001," the author writes.
A central myth of the dot-com era, as the British-born Cassidy sees it, was that the Internet was a triumph of American capitalism and that the union of computing and communications technologies would liberate people from history and geography and usher in an era of endless prosperity.
Instead, as Cassidy reminds us, the Internet was created not by clever entrepreneurs but by Pentagon-funded academics. What's more, in 1990 a European, Tim Berners-Lee, invented its most important application, the World Wide Web, at a particle physics laboratory near Geneva.
作者将互联网繁荣和胸部成为一个“史诗迷你赛”，鼓舞人体乌托邦主义的观念，并以“瞬间可识别的美国类型”，如Netscape创始人Marc Andreessen，“Gawky Farm Boy，”和Merrill Lynch分析师Henry Blodget，“顺利说话的预备。”
"When all is said and done, Cassidy writes, "this was primarily a story of greed and gullibility."
The author recalls that George Gilder, "the high priest of the conservative technology cult," predicted in 1995 that the Internet would "displace both the telephone and the television in the next five years or so." Perhaps still smarting from past disputes with hypemeisters such as Gilder, Cassidy notes gratuitously that the pundit finished last in his class at Phillips Exeter Academy and had "an equally undistinguished academic career" at Harvard University.
Inevitably, Cassidy tackles those familiar targets, the Wall Street analysts who concocted new valuation models based on concepts like "mind share," "eyeballs," and "first-mover advantage." But he adds little to the chorus of critics who have already taken them to task.
Nor is Cassidy the first to remark upon the transformation of business journalists into breathless cheerleaders for the boom. As others have noted, CNBC covered the stock market as though it were a football game, complete with a pregame show, play-by-play commentary during trading hours and a postgame wrap-up. All the hype helped to create a nation of day traders who were more gamblers than investors. The vast majority of them, of course, lost money. One Atlanta day trader, Mark Barton, after losing his life savings, murdered his wife and two children and then nine others at brokerage firms that hosted day traders.
Like some, Cassidy believes that Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan deserves much of the blame for pumping up the bubble. In July 1997, just six months after he warned investors about "irrational exuberance," the Fed chief became a New Economy convert. He told the Senate Banking Committee that the economy's buoyancy was a "once- or twice-in-a-century phenomenon that will carry productivity trends nationally and globally to a new, higher track." This misreading of the U.S. economy, Cassidy argues, explains why Greenspan failed to dampen the economy in 1998 and 1999 and was slow to react after the market peaked in March 2000.
September 11, Cassidy writes, "drew a thick line under the dot-com era." As he sees it, "many of the intellectual assumptions that had underpinned the Internet bubble" - that the business cycle was extinct, that Alan Greenspan could do no wrong, that the productivity miracle was real - collapsed along with the Twin Towers.
That's hardly an original observation, and much of Dot.con covers familiar ground. But Cassidy deserves respect for his early skepticism, and he tells one doozy of an American tale.
By Steven Brull
March 2002
亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者杂志
回想起来，这种展示可以被视为推测过量的迹象过于明显，但随着泡沫膨胀，怀疑论者作为股票分析师的销售评级稀缺。纽约人员工作家约翰卡西迪，少数少数铸造了新经济炒作的黄褐色纳斯达克5000，回顾了达摩亚的DOT.CON：最伟大的故事出售。他旋转了一个好纱线。
Cassidy offers little fresh reporting in his 372-page book, which regurgitates the stories of Netscape, Amazon.com, day trading and other well-worn business sagas, but his narrative is well written and entertaining, and it usefully highlights the peculiarly American character of the bubble. "The Internet boom and bust was about America - how it works and what it thought of itself in that short interregnum between the end of the Cold War and September 2001," the author writes.
A central myth of the dot-com era, as the British-born Cassidy sees it, was that the Internet was a triumph of American capitalism and that the union of computing and communications technologies would liberate people from history and geography and usher in an era of endless prosperity.
Instead, as Cassidy reminds us, the Internet was created not by clever entrepreneurs but by Pentagon-funded academics. What's more, in 1990 a European, Tim Berners-Lee, invented its most important application, the World Wide Web, at a particle physics laboratory near Geneva.
作者将互联网繁荣和胸部成为一个“史诗迷你赛”，鼓舞人体乌托邦主义的观念，并以“瞬间可识别的美国类型”，如Netscape创始人Marc Andreessen，“Gawky Farm Boy，”和Merrill Lynch分析师Henry Blodget，“顺利说话的预备。”
"When all is said and done, Cassidy writes, "this was primarily a story of greed and gullibility."
The author recalls that George Gilder, "the high priest of the conservative technology cult," predicted in 1995 that the Internet would "displace both the telephone and the television in the next five years or so." Perhaps still smarting from past disputes with hypemeisters such as Gilder, Cassidy notes gratuitously that the pundit finished last in his class at Phillips Exeter Academy and had "an equally undistinguished academic career" at Harvard University.
Inevitably, Cassidy tackles those familiar targets, the Wall Street analysts who concocted new valuation models based on concepts like "mind share," "eyeballs," and "first-mover advantage." But he adds little to the chorus of critics who have already taken them to task.
Nor is Cassidy the first to remark upon the transformation of business journalists into breathless cheerleaders for the boom. As others have noted, CNBC covered the stock market as though it were a football game, complete with a pregame show, play-by-play commentary during trading hours and a postgame wrap-up. All the hype helped to create a nation of day traders who were more gamblers than investors. The vast majority of them, of course, lost money. One Atlanta day trader, Mark Barton, after losing his life savings, murdered his wife and two children and then nine others at brokerage firms that hosted day traders.
Like some, Cassidy believes that Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan deserves much of the blame for pumping up the bubble. In July 1997, just six months after he warned investors about "irrational exuberance," the Fed chief became a New Economy convert. He told the Senate Banking Committee that the economy's buoyancy was a "once- or twice-in-a-century phenomenon that will carry productivity trends nationally and globally to a new, higher track." This misreading of the U.S. economy, Cassidy argues, explains why Greenspan failed to dampen the economy in 1998 and 1999 and was slow to react after the market peaked in March 2000.
September 11, Cassidy writes, "drew a thick line under the dot-com era." As he sees it, "many of the intellectual assumptions that had underpinned the Internet bubble" - that the business cycle was extinct, that Alan Greenspan could do no wrong, that the productivity miracle was real - collapsed along with the Twin Towers.
That's hardly an original observation, and much of Dot.con covers familiar ground. But Cassidy deserves respect for his early skepticism, and he tells one doozy of an American tale.