As the bull market raged in the late 1990s, more than a few value managers threw caution to the wind and chased Nasdaq highfliers. Not Jeremy Grantham. Just a few weeks after the market peaked in March 2000, Grantham, a co-founder and chairman of Boston-based money manager Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo & Co., publicly predicted that the Nasdaq composite index would fall from 5,000 to 1,250 and that the Standard & Poor's 500 index would drop from 1,500 to 750.
对他没什么好处。像大多数有价值偏见的管理者一样，GMO已经损失了大量客户，让成长型公司的竞争对手痛苦不已。”我极力恳求。我告诉客户市场估值过高，但客户不听，”格兰瑟姆回忆道当所有的专家都在宣布一个神奇的新时代时，为什么人们会相信我们？有一堵巨大的宣传墙，从艾伦·格林斯潘的高层开始，渗透到整个投资行业。”
GMO nearly unraveled. From a peak of $31 billion in mid-1998, assets shrank to $20 billion in mid-2001, a roughly 35 percent decline, as long-time clients dismissed GMO as hopelessly out-of-date. "It was a grim time to be knocking on the doors of potential clients," says Anthony Ryan, the partner in charge of marketing.
GMO遭受了大多数有价值的经理，而且该公司 - 一个26岁的私人伙伴关系 - 也更加剧烈地反弹，赢得了旧客户，吸引了新的客户。5月底，GMO报告的资产为350亿美元，如果格兰德汉不能抵抗触及Schadenfreude，那么谁可以责怪他？即使是Janus Capital Group和Putnam投资这样的较大竞争对手，他的公司也在增长。“我想我并不是很多人想到的一半，”他说。
当然，GMO从价值投资的复苏中获益匪浅。但这只是故事的一部分。在90年代末和新世纪初，当这个机构资金经理陷入困境时，格兰瑟姆抓住了缰绳，加强了他的公司，挽救了他毕生的工作，尽管他拒绝像许多价值经理那样为高价的成长股买单。面对资产流失，他花费了稀缺的资源，扩大了GMO的产品供应，投资于市场营销，并成立了客户服务部，目前有8名投资专业人员。
该公司曾经被称为价值股票商店，占80亿美元的八个对冲基金，一个资金基金，40亿美元的战术资产配置战略，新兴市场债务20亿美元，新兴市场股票股权和3亿美元在木材资产。总体而言，80％的资产投资库存，固定收入证券13％，现金为7％。大约60％的资产被投资于美国以外。
"As a firm, we were very early into international markets and very early into quantitative investing," says Grantham. "We have always believed in diversification, for the benefit of the clients and the business. Today, with U.S. assets so unattractive, that is more important than ever."
这位64岁的Grantham和他的合作伙伴都希望出售GMO，现在现金进入，股票市场显示生命迹象？“独立是迄今为止为我们提供的策略。随着更多的货币管理人员成为不了解这项业务的巨型金融服务的武器，肯定是未来的竞争优势，”格兰特汉说。事实上，去年GMO GMO的40个合作伙伴 - 从200名员工 - 拒绝从BNP Paribas提供的提议购买20％的股权，以期权增加份额，以获得未披露的价格。（另外两个创始伙伴，Dick Mayo于2001年12月离开了与他的儿子的对冲基金，虽然是一名活跃的董事会成员，但自1996年以来尚未拥有日常的金钱管理角色。）
Says Grantham: "As a money manager, you live for moments like the huge dislocation created by the bubble. It is a tremendously exciting, tremendously entertaining time to be in this job. Why would I want to do anything else?"
当然,他有值得庆祝。GMO reported record net new account gains of $5 billion in 2002. For the first five months of 2003, it gathered assets at an even faster pace, adding some $4 billion. Among its more high-profile mandates: $200 million in international equities from the Nebraska Public Employees' Retirement System, an $80 million emerging-markets equity account from International Paper Co. and a E50 million ($53 million) emerging-markets equity account from the ABB Foundation.
In the long term GMO's core portfolios have handily beaten their benchmarks. Over the past ten years, the firm's U.S. Core equity product has beaten the S&P 500 by 1.23 percentage points on an annualized basis. GMO's international active product -- benchmarked against the MSCI Europe, Australasia and Far East index -- has outperformed by an annualized 5.34 percentage points.
"Apart from market conditions, which have obviously brought its style back into favor, GMO's attitude to servicing institutional clients has evolved. It has brought people in from outside who understand the needs of institutional investors," says Jeffrey Nipp, director of investment manager research at Watson Wyatt Worldwide in Atlanta. "There has always been much to like about GMO, but in the past they haven't gotten to grips with what sophisticated institutions want."
GMO remains an American operation. Though it has had a London office since 1987 (it opened a Sydney outpost in 1995 and a Zurich branch in 2002), some 85 percent of GMO assets come from U.S. institutions.
作为一名土木工程师的儿子，格兰瑟姆在英国约克郡的唐卡斯特镇长大。他获得了谢菲尔德大学经济学学士学位和哈佛商学院工商管理硕士学位。格兰瑟姆曾在荷兰皇家壳牌公司（Royal Dutch Shell）担任经济学家，并在Keystone托管基金（Keystone cortification Funds）担任投资组合经理。Keystone托管基金是总部位于波士顿的共同基金集团，现为常青基金的一部分。
Then in 1969, Grantham and Dean LeBaron co-founded Batterymarch Financial Management, a Boston-based quantitative money manager that made its name by avoiding the Nifty Fifty before they nose-dived in 1973'74. Several years later Grantham had a falling-out with LeBaron, and in 1977 he joined forces with Boston portfolio managers Mayo, Van Otterloo and King Durant. They launched their firm as a conservative, value-oriented money management shop.
Through the 1980s and 1990s, GMO's U.S. and international funds outperformed their peers. One of Grantham's shrewdest moves: cutting the Japanese exposure of GMO's international funds in 1986, well before the Nikkei cracked in 1989.
By 1998 Grantham had become very leery of stock valuations. Applying a quantitative measure known as Tobin's Q ratio, which calculates the replacement value of corporate assets, Grantham and Ben Inker, then head of GMO's asset allocation, determined that the S&P 500 at the start of 1998 would be fairly valued at a price-earnings ratio of around 16.
In 1999, as the S&P 500 soared to 30 times earnings and beyond, GMO began positioning portfolios more defensively. Grantham had no doubt that he was witnessing a stock market bubble of historic proportions. One sure sign, in his view: the curious behavior of small-cap stocks. Between March 1998 and March 1999, he noted, U.S. small caps were down 18 percent and large caps were up 25 percent.
什么解释了发散？格兰德姆分析了历史数据，发现在1929年和1972年之前的崩溃之前，只有两次，在小帽子的表现中发生了这种差异。但客户正在享受赠款的看跌姿态，但是很好的推理：GMO的资金表现不佳。例如，在1998年和1999年，GMO的核心EAFE投资组合仍然在指数上涨25.9％时，平均每年14.9％。2000年，埃克森美孚公司和Bechtel集团在其他长期客户中，解雇了Gmo。
“客户完全陷入了对相对业绩的追逐，”营销人员瑞恩回忆道我们试图解释，他们投资组合的绝对风险远高于表现不佳的相对风险。”
随着泡沫扩大，越来越多的转基因客户取消了他们的股权授权，该公司的营销人员强调了转基因最近扩大的产品阵容。1997年，GMO成立了GMO可再生资源公司，这是一家专业的木材管理公司。从1997年到1999年底，资产增长到2亿美元。
格兰瑟姆说：“木材是最好的投资之一。随着时间的推移，它的表现轻松地超过了标准普尔500指数，并拥有更高的收益率。“GMO预测，管理木材资产在未来7年将产生9.5%的年化实际回报率，轻松超过美国大盘股预计的2.1%的年化实际回报率。
GMO's first hedge fund, a long-short strategy in emerging-market debt, debuted in 1996. Since then it has returned an impressive 17 percent annualized net of fees. Then in July 2000 GMO rolled out a U.S. equity market-neutral hedge fund, followed that September by an aggressive U.S. long-short equity fund. In the next two years, GMO launched five more hedge funds as well as a fund of funds whose assets are invested only in GMO hedge funds. Its aggressive U.S. long-short equity fund returned an impressive 28.2 percent net of fees last year; the market-neutral hedge fund returned 1.93 net of fees over the same period.
Grantham说：“由于平均经理人扣除费用后的表现肯定会不佳，可以说对冲基金所做的就是增加支付的费用。”。但他相信，GMO可以充分利用对冲基金经理的自由度。”投资限制和严格定义的授权是长期经理的祸根。相对而言，在低回报投资环境中，这些限制条件的成本更高”（见第20页方框）。
With some $3 billion in hedge funds, GMO's alternative business is roughly comparable in size to that of far bigger institutional rivals such as Barclays Global Investors, which has $5.2 billion in hedge funds, and Alliance Capital Management, with $2.6 billion.
Naturally, GMO has been doing more than pitching alternative products. After the bubble burst the money manager began to make a more forceful case for its skepticism, to solidify its existing client relationships. In early 2001 GMO set up a client service department dedicated to getting its message out. Though most money managers GMO's size already had such a function, it was a first for GMO, which now has eight full-timers handling clients and an additional four staffers working with consultants.
“在牛市期间，我们没有有效地与客户打交道，也没有解释为什么我们会采取这样的立场，”瑞安解释道我相信，在另一个泡沫中，我们将再次忠于我们的投资理念。我希望我们能更好地向投资者解释我们的立场。”
To bolster its presence outside the U.S., GMO's three foreign outposts, in London, Sydney and Zurich, have been working more closely with the Boston headquarters, selling GMO's full range of products rather than just local equity strategies. To lead the European marketing push, the firm last year hired Alex Orus, who was running the Swiss office of State Street Global Advisors.
GMO will need to continue to expand internationally and in the U.S. if it is to retain and attract talent. The firm already boasts a strong bench: quantitative chief Chris Darnell, who joined GMO in 1979; head of emerging markets Arjun Divecha, who joined in 1993; and chief investment officer Inker, who joined straight from Yale University in 1992.
格兰特汉仍然是该公司的精神和智力。虽然他仔细称重销售了少数民族的股份，但他认为，转基因的独立性是一个真正的力量。他引用了最近的决定，关闭了两次高性能的策略 - 新兴市场债务和股票 - 对于新投资者，如果该公司是一个更大的金融集团的一部分，可能会受到挑战的决定。
“大小是表现最大的障碍。我们是第一个我所知道的基本公司，即在关闭模式下，”Grantham说。“如果我们认为这是公司和客户的最佳利益，我们将关注我们的所有策略。这是决定独立给你的命运的自由。”
在1999年和2000年他的远见,格兰瑟姆s by no means complacent. His single -- or single greatest -- insight, he says, is that markets revert to the mean. The painful fact for Grantham -- indeed, for every investor -- is that no one can know when that reversion will occur. "There is no joy in being right and being out of business," Grantham says. "Fortunately, we have avoided that fate." i
FREEDOM FIGHTER:
Grantham's take on the markets and money managers
64岁的Jeremy Grantham仍然是一个精明的投资实践观察员的行业的长老兄弟们。他对当今金钱管理业务的许多公约也非常批评。
当养老基金通过风格和市场资本化限制投资组合并限制其跟踪误差时，Grantham认为，基金经理擅长市场的胜利能力。在过去，他说，才华横溢的经理可以将资产从一个部门或风格转移到另一个部门或风格，这是他们找到它的价值。现在经理们对养老基金客户设定的基准甚至太大。
"No one has the job of moving the money around anymore," says Grantham. "And with a handful of honorable exceptions, most policy benchmarks are inherited by investment committees. If they do change them, they look at what the peer group is doing. As the manager's ability to arbitrage is dissipated by these tightly defined mandates, deviations of asset prices will get worse. If you have any doubt, look at the bubble. This is no accident or quirk of history. It is a reflection of how weak the arbitrage mechanism has become."
格兰瑟姆对养老基金的呼吁：给你的基金经理更广泛的授权。他表示，目前，大多数机构基金经理的严格规定意味着，几乎从定义上讲，无约束的对冲基金将表现出色。（过去10年和20年期间，GMO自身的核心投资组合表现优于基准。）
"Hedge funds have the freedom to act on their best ideas, and that will attract talent," notes Grantham, whose firm runs $3 billion in hedge fund strategies. "A disturbingly large number of the best people are being drawn into hedge funds. Let's face it: There is nothing on earth more supremely useless than a mediocre fund manager."
格兰德姆预测金钱管理行业的更加艰难时期，特别是对于依赖零售客户的公司。当投资组合返回的两位数时，投资者可能一直愿意支付帅气的管理费，但那些日子已经消失。“即使市场资本化增长和增长，支付给金钱经理的费用上涨，这是我们通常如何了解规模经济的矛盾。这不能坚持在低收回环境中。”
他认为，在欧洲，整整一代散户投资者可能再也不会购买股票了。”这是墨菲定律，但当德国投资者第一次对股票感到兴奋时，他们就全军覆没了纽尔马克在四年内上涨了12倍。与此相比，纳斯达克真是一个难缠的家伙。诺伊尔市场归还了它所有的收益。我想说，90%经历过这种经历的人不会排队重复这种经历。愿意持有股票的投资者将大幅减少，而完全不愿意投机。基本上，这一点一代人都不会改变。”
展望未来，格兰德姆再次看到市场前往南方。“我最好的猜测是，标准普尔确实将从最近的1,000人传达680。这就是乐趣真正开始的地方。越来越大的倾向于越来越深的颠覆性。这是一个丑陋的想法我们不太沉迷于太多。“
Grantham expects the Standard & Poor's 500 index to hit 680 by next spring and then generate average real annual returns of about 1 percent for the next seven years as the market shakes off the lingering effects of the bubble. Then U.S. stocks should revert to their long-run mean return of 6 percent.
“关于泡沫的伟大事物是它创造了巨大的异常，”格兰特汉说。“在熊市的前两年中，小写值实际上，这是前所未有的。现在发现保护口袋更难。”格兰特汉认为价值股票和小帽价格过高。他正在向国际市场转向全球投资组合，并推荐美国客户牛排他们的海外股票分配。“美国和国际股市之间的差距是两个标准的偏差事件，”格兰特汉说。“在我看来，国际必须重新增加36％，以回归长期趋势与美国”。
Grantham believes that the continuing slide of the dollar will give a further boost to unhedged dollar-denominated portfolios.
"Emerging markets are capable of outperforming the S&P 500 by 20 percentage points a year. There is a decent chance that when the S&P hits its low, emerging markets will be up in absolute terms."
这是什么自然的逆向日本？格兰特汉认为，日经的13年熊市可能已经结束。因此，GMO在日本有一个小的超重位置。"To be underweight is a big, scary bet. Being underweight the U.S. is far easier. Japan is the most dangerous market in the world, because there will be a period in the not-too-distant future when Japan is up 40 percent and the rest of the world is flat or down."-- A.C.