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NATIVE INTELLIGENCE
Private equity firm Warburg Pincus brings lots of cash and contrarian discipline to its big Asia push, but its real edge is brainy locals.
Private equity firm Warburg Pincus brings lots of cash and contrarian discipline to its big Asia push, but its real edge is brainy locals.
By Allen T. Cheng
January 2003
亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者杂志
"Before I got a mobile phone, my wife used to have a tough time getting ahold of me when I went on business trips. She got really frustrated," says New Delhibased Ikea International marketing executive Arun Chandra. Then he bought a cell phone. "Now," he says, "she doesn't need to remember all the prefixes for wireline connections and can reach me anywhere in India or in the world just by dialing my number."
印度最大的移动电话运营商Bharti Tele Ventures董事长兼集团董事总经理苏尼尔•巴蒂•米塔尔（Sunil Bharti Mittal）听了钱德拉的这番话，就如同听到一个清晰的无线信号一样高兴。米塔尔希望在未来三年内将客户群扩大大约四倍，达到1000万订户，在华平的帮助下，他可能会这么做。这家总部位于纽约的全球私人股本公司持有这家移动电话公司20%的股份，正如45岁的米塔尔所说，“华宝不仅给了我2.93亿美元，它的高管也给了我管理Bharti的最佳财务建议。”
Jetting in monthly from the firm's Singapore office, Warburg partners encouraged exbicycle-parts salesman Mittal's grand expansion plans: Last year Bharti spent $328 million to snap up four rival mobile service providers and secure nine new mobile and four fixed-line licenses covering 16 of India's 28 states and seven territories. The firm's participation also helped convince Singapore Telecommunications (Institutional Investor, November 2002) to invest in Bharti and provide substantial technological advice. Analysts now believe the Indian company's annual revenues will triple to $1 billion within three years.
Bharti may be Warburg's biggest Asian holding, but it's only one of more than 30 -- and a number of others also look very promising. Among them: China's top telecom networking company, AsiaInfo Holdings; India's biggest housing lender, Housing Development Finance Corp.; and South Korea's leading credit card issuer, LG Card Co. All are growing fast.
“风险投资公司很多，但高质量的风投公司却很少，”北京亚信的总裁兼首席执行官詹姆斯•丁说华平是我所知道的中国最好的。”
Warburg Pincus, it appears, has solved the riddle of how to succeed in Asian venture capital. Even the most promising young Asian companies are starved for money. Yet 18 venture firms have shuttered their Asian operations in just the past year or two, and new private equity investments in the region (ex-Japan) fell from $7.7 billion in 2001 to $3 billion last year, according to Asian Venture Capital Journal, which tracks such activity. Warburg, on the other hand, invested $200 million last year -- nearly 6 percent of the region's total private equity outlay. It was Asia's leading pure venture capital (excluding buyouts) investor. The firm has built a $1.5 billion Asian portfolio -- most of the money was invested after the Asian financial crisis in 1998 -- and Warburg may put a further $2 billion or more into the area by 2007.
Arguably, Warburg is now the most influential private equity firm in Asia. The U.S.'s well-connected Carlyle Group, H&Q Asia Pacific (which made a spectacular sixfold return on its $30 million 1998 investment in South Korea's Good Morning Securities Co.) and regional specialist Walden International all have Asian portfolios comparable in size to Warburg's. But none has anything like Warburg's cash trove.
The firm's New Yorkbased vice chairman, William Janeway, estimates that as much as a third of Warburg's newly raised $5.3 billion global fund and a further $250 million to $300 million from existing investment vehicles could go to Asian companies.
“华平我肯定会帮助推动的趋势n the industry in the years ahead," says Richard Roque, a managing partner of William E. Simon & Sons (Asia), occasional Warburg co-investor and chairman emeritus of the Hong Kong Venture Capital Association. Among those trends: bigger stakes in the portfolio companies and greater emphasis on senior management skills. Warburg's Asia commitment is also a pretty big bet for a firm best known for hugely profitable early-stage investments in U.S. companies, like applications infrastructure builder BEA Systems, medical services provider and insurer UnitedHealthcare and leading storage software maker Veritas Software Corp., and for turnarounds at Mellon Bank and toy maker Mattel.
“亚洲（日本除外）是世界经济增长最快的地区。我们将其视为我们整体投资组合中不断增长的一部分。华宝在亚洲的投资组合将在五年内与欧洲持仓持平，甚至超过欧洲持仓。该公司目前持有美国65%的股份；欧洲，20%；亚洲占15%。
Rising economies such as China's and India's, where Warburg plans to invest the bulk of the money, will continue to gain for decades, says Janeway, who personally oversees his firm's global technology investments. Where Warburg differs most from its Asian rivals is in betting on the emergence of a huge consumer market in India. A handful of other firms have invested in Indian software companies around Bangalore and Madras, but virtually none is shepherding consumer-oriented businesses like Bharti. "We want to plug into these megatrends around the world," Janeway says. "Asia is very important to us."
华宝近23%的复合年回报率（净）超过30年，证明了在投资组合管理的某种精明。但拥有巨额现金并不能减轻亚洲投资的巨大风险。迄今为止，华宝已注销了约8%的亚洲投资（价值约1亿美元），一些乌云正在地平线上聚集：地区增长失去动力，股市下跌，政治风险依然存在。亚洲各国政府经常停止有可能危及社会稳定的经济改革。近几个月来，巴厘岛和菲律宾发生恐怖袭击，印度和巴基斯坦互发核威胁，以及朝鲜秘密核武器计划的披露，只不过凸显了风险的普遍性。
此外,在underfinanc寻找机会ed parts of the world carries special perils even for successful investors. Although Warburg may be able to find first-class investments like Bharti, it may not be able to extricate itself from them in a timely fashion in Asia's illiquid markets.
华宝的一次亚洲退出尝试证明是一个令人尴尬的失败：该公司试图在2002一月在香港证券交易所上市时出售其在中国户外广告公司媒体国家32%的股权。但市场陷入混乱，多疑的投资者无法理解华宝为何要抛售。
"Fund managers felt Warburg's sell-down indicated a lack of faith in the company," says Allen Lee, deputy editor of the Asian Venture Capital Journal. Warburg had to call off the sale. Shortly thereafter sketchy reports surfaced of management infighting at Media Nation. Warburg's lead Asia partner, Chang Sun, stepped in to restructure the company. "We made the mistake of not detecting the underlying management problems," he acknowledges. "The business is still a great one, however."
华宝在亚洲的历史非常短暂。查尔斯（筹）Kaye，去年四月成为华宝全球业务的联合总裁，在不到十年前被派往香港，与亚洲的美国和欧洲企业建立合作伙伴关系。他在1999年回到纽约，五年后在亚洲，但留下了一个快速增长的投资组合，一个强大的高级管理团队和一个办公室网络，不仅涵盖了区域枢纽香港，而且包括Bombay、汉城、新加坡和东京。
One of Warburg's earliest investments under Kaye, in 1995, was a $25 million stake in Bank Tiara Asia of Indonesia, a part of the family-run conglomerate Ometraco Group. The bank was professionally managed and highly profitable. But when the Asian crisis hit in 1997, Bank Tiara was devastated, eventually becoming one of the dozens of failed private banks taken over by the Indonesian government. The crisis in the region "was totally out of our control," recalls Sun. "We were fortunate we had only that investment in Indonesia."
这种不和谐的经历塑造了凯在亚洲投资的观点。他想要真正的本地知识，熟悉亚洲其他地区。”“从一开始，我们就认为印度和中国是一个大而穷的国家，”孙说因为市场很大，所以有很大的发展空间。他的理论证明是正确的。现在大多数人都把东南亚一笔勾销了。”
Shortly after the Bank Tiara debacle, Kaye hired a number of highly regarded Asian nationals, who have gone on to play key roles in guiding Warburg's investments in the region. Among his recruits were Sun, 46, a onetime air force officer in China's People's Liberation Army with an MBA from the Wharton School and experience on Wall Street and in Hong Kong working for Goldman, Sachs & Co., and Shanghai-born technology specialist Wayne Tsou, 35, who holds an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering from the University of Michigan, a master's in the field from the California Institute of Technology and a joint law/MBA diploma from Harvard University. In 1997 they joined Kaye and Dalip Pathak, 51, an extremely able Indian executive who had come on board from the World Bank's International Finance Corp. in 1995.
凯伊说：“我们能够吸引既有世界级人才又有亚洲本地人才的不同寻常的人，然后营造一个释放他们潜力的环境，这是我们所做的最重要的事情之一。”。帕塔克在公司受到高度评价，9月份他被提升为华宝在伦敦以外的欧洲业务负责人。
这些聪明的新员工与凯一起，将沃伯格的注意力转向了中国、印度，在较小程度上还转向了韩国。这些国家可能仍然是该公司在该地区新投资的重点。
华宝的亚洲的投资是基于三个expected developments over the next decade, says Janeway: the emergence of large-scale consumer markets, the creation of world-class manufacturing operations that can serve as centers for global outsourcing and the establishment of a vastly improved technological infrastructure. India and China, which together account for a quarter of the world's population, are likely to be major beneficiaries of these trends; a vibrant middle class, like Bharti customer Chandra, will begin to form -- and spend. Included in this upwardly mobile group will be a class of well-trained entrepreneurs, like Mittal, who will attempt to take advantage of liberalized markets.
华宝投资7.5亿美元在印度的十几家公司，投资3亿美元在十几家中国企业。”人均国内生产总值为1000美元的中国和人均国内生产总值为500美元的印度即将起飞。他认为两国人均GDP在二三十年内翻了两番。孙说：“我们想在他们起飞时赶到那里。”
印度和中国虽然创业人才丰富，但财力却很差。”“资本市场仍处于初级阶段，”孙指出因此，将有机会套利。当好的公司没有融资机会时，他们就会来找我们，我们可以发挥巨大的影响力。”
Although South Korea is in a later stage of development, it meets Warburg's investment criteria. "Korea is unusual as it represents a relatively sizable country entering middle-income status," explains Kaye. "The unleashing of the Korean consumer and changes in the industrial structure after the Asian crisis are prompting the ongoing transformation of the Korean financial infrastructure. This is creating a variety of interesting investment opportunities." Financial institutions, branded consumer products and services and export-oriented manufacturers hold allure, says Hwang Sung Jin, head of Warburg's South Korea portfolio.
In India, Warburg is betting that the government will continue to withdraw from its intrusive role in the private sector. That expectation is based in part on the experiences of portfolio companies like Moser Baer India, an optical electronics company that sold a 23 percent stake to Warburg for $80 million in 2001. Executive director Ratul Puri, 30, recalls that his family-owned business struggled with the notorious Indian bureaucracy for about half of its 20-year existence.
"Up through the early '90s, my father [Deepak Puri, Moser's 60-year-old chairman] had to go to the government to get permission for production quotas," says Puri. "I remember once he sought to get permission to make 6 million compact discs, and the government gave him permission only for 600,000 discs. We had all these orders from overseas that we couldn't fill."
The Indian government, however, has gradually permitted its entrepreneurs to export with fewer and fewer restrictions, allowing companies like Moser to become global players. Since 1998 Moser has established itself as one of the world's largest manufacturers of recordable video compact discs. Warburg's investment is helping the company build a 110-acre manufacturing park in Noida, an industrial town outside of New Delhi. Moser's ambition: to become the largest VCD maker in the world.
Mobile phone company Bharti is benefiting from New Delhi's decision to permit private companies to compete with state monopolies. Since Bharti won its first mobile phone license in 1995 -- the year the government opened up the sector to private players -- the company's AirTel-branded service has come from virtual nonexistence to take the No. 1 market position, with a 28 percent share; its government-owned rival controls less than 3 percent.
Rajesh Khanna新加坡华宝伙伴who oversees the India portfolio, says the firm intends to devote a lot more investment to the telecom industry. "Overall, in the next five to seven years we will see significant growth," says Khanna. India has 8.5 million mobile subscribers, a penetration of less than 1 percent of its total population. By contrast, more than 16 percent of China's citizens, or 200 million people, use mobile phones. Analysts expect India's mobile market to grow to 50 million users by 2007.
One measure of Warburg's own expectations: Its $293 million investment in Bharti is its third largest in the world, behind the $500 million it has put into communications systems and software play Avaya, a U.S.-based Lucent Technologies spin-off, and the $445 million it has given to Bermuda-based insurer and reinsurer Arch Capital Group.
IN CHINA, WARBURG IS APPLYING THE SAME strategy of pursuing companies positioned to reap benefits from exploding consumer markets, outsourcing-geared technology and government liberalization of certain markets. The firm's leading bet is AsiaInfo, which has greatly benefited from the gradual easing of restrictions on private telecom businesses. AsiaInfo is now the country's top integrator of telecom systems for China's biggest mobile phone operators. With the nation's number of mobile users projected to double to 400 million in the next decade, AsiaInfo is expected to continue its rapid growth.
华宝还试图培育更强大的中国资本市场。这样做的目的是鼓励企业家，同时也帮助自己这样的风险资本家。今年6月，孙政才成立了中国风险投资协会（China Venture Capital Association），旨在推动创业权利，打击对私营企业的歧视。他召集了50多位私募股权专家，为该协会在北京的成立做准备。
"Warburg co-founder Lionel Pincus helped set up the National Venture Capital Association in the U.S. 30 years ago," says Sun. "If we can do the same in China, we can push venture capital forward. The time is ripe: The entrepreneurial pool is getting bigger."
华宝最直接的消费市场可能在韩国，其最大的股份在韩国领先的借记卡和信用卡发行商LG Card。随着韩国金融业的积极自由化，信用卡使用量在短短几年内增长了近四倍。”公司的首席执行官H.C.Lee解释说：“我们发展很快，但仍有很大的发展空间。”。
在上述每个国家，华宝的投资战略都围绕着与管理层“合作”，以实现积极的长期成果。这意味着公司非常重视主持节目的人。”“我们投资的所有这些公司——如果没有高层，我们是不会投资的，”曹说许多风投公司从一项技术或一种商业模式开始，然后招聘一名首席执行官。我们必须从一位杰出的首席执行官开始。对我们来说，如果首席执行官不好，就不值得投资。”
例如，巴蒂的米塔尔公司（Mittal）曾在五年内将AirTel打造成印度北部领先的移动服务公司，随后华堡公司（Warburg）进行了投资我们会见了一些参与者，”普拉克·普拉萨德回忆道，他是一位总部设在新加坡的华堡董事总经理，负责管理印度投资组合我们在苏尼尔发现，他确实在电信领域有着深厚的知识，非常注重利润，对生活有着非常平衡的看法，而不是戴着有色眼镜。他对电信业的金融有着无可挑剔的理解，拥有一支伟大的团队，一支伟大的创业团队。”
无独有偶，华宝结识了深圳华为技术有限公司前高级副总裁李一南，并研究了他在一家宽带设备制造商的商业计划，之后与他一起投资了5300万美元。”他对市场的深入了解让人印象深刻，”曹国伟谈到李彦宏时说，李彦宏曾帮助华为凭借其强大的政府关系，成为中国领先的电信设备供应商，甚至领先于美国的思科系统公司(华为最近在美国可能更出名，因为它在美国国会的反对下建立了伊拉克的移动电话网络。）
When Li, 31, and four colleagues approached Warburg in mid-2001 after they'd left Huawei, all they had was a vision of breaking into the Ethernet and data-switching business for carriers and commercial enterprises. "He wanted to build a next-gen market leader that was free of Huawei's bad habits," says Tsou. "We took a bet and helped Li recruit his full management team and built his company." Li's Harbour Networks Co. grossed $20 million last year and made a small operating profit. Brags Tsou, now a Harbour Networks director, "It has emerged as one of the leaders of next-gen broadband equipment in China and is taking market share away from Huawei, Cisco and the big boys."
华宝广泛的多元化投资方式包括寻找不受欢迎的行业。在几乎没有行业限制的情况下，合作伙伴将资金投入从早期公司到扭亏为盈的所有领域，并提供收购融资。1999年和2000年，当股市仍在飙升时，该公司在全球范围内变现了大部分投资组合，将120亿美元的现金和证券返还给了有限合伙人。这是一个惊人的举动——事后看来也很聪明。
“我们真的是逆向的，”曹说当其他人在投资时，我们在退缩。我们有智慧看到我们正在投资泡沫。人们总是不理智的。价格高的时候，他们不卖。但当价格低的时候，他们害怕投资。我们正好相反。”
"Most important," adds vice chairman Janeway, "we believe very deeply that a company's ability to generate positive cash flow on a predictable basis is the single most important criterion. No matter how cheaply or freely available capital may be, one should never lose sight of that fundamental truth. When the stock market loses track of it, that's when we're contrarians."
Warburg operates through a single pool of funds and one global partnership. "This one pool of resources allows local managing directors to draw upon the resources and talent of partners globally when it comes to investment decisions," says Asian Venture Capital Journal's Lee. "They can do this because every partner shares in the same incentive scheme. When an investment in Asia does well, partners elsewhere share in the gain too." Most of Warburg's rivals tend to have different funds for different regions or industry sectors, which can preclude sharing of ideas among partners.
Having a large trove of cash allows Warburg to act independently -- and therefore swiftly. Says Sun, "We have enough money and proprietary deal flow that we don't need to get into large investment clubs, which has a downside of slowing deals down."
The global nature of Warburg's portfolio serves as a lure to entrepreneurs seeking access to international customers and expertise on foreign markets. Harbour Networks' Li says: "They have a lot of investments in technology in the U.S., and this helps us to build strong ties with companies in the U.S. From a business point of view, we need outsiders who have a different management point of view." Adds LG Card's Lee: "We are a local company -- we didn't know what global standards were. With Warburg Pincus's help, we could change our way of thinking to become more shareholder-oriented and transparent. As a result, our Korean institutional investors feel we are more reliable and have peace of mind."
沃伯格的独立性并不适合某些人。一位局外人形容该公司的合伙人“傲慢自大”。就连华宝支持的公司的首席执行官也承认，该公司在进行硬交易，这可能导致不良情绪。
AsiaInfo's Ding relates that when he and co-founder Edward Tian, both U.S.-educated techies, put together their business plan back in 1997, they offered Warburg 15 percent to 20 percent of a company then valued at $90 million in exchange for an $18 million investment ($10 million from Warburg, which in this case co-invested with venture capital firms ChinaVest and Fidelity Ventures, which put up the rest). Over a year of talks, Warburg and the other co-investors were able to squeeze out a 30 percent stake in AsiaInfo from Ding and Tian.
"They were very tough," recalls Ding, betraying a bit of resentment. "They knew the telecom sector well, and they felt our valuation was too high. At that time, we really didn't know enough about valuations."
Tsou recalls the discussions differently. "Yes, there was a huge valuation gap between what the founders demanded and what we offered, because the two sides had very different beliefs about the basis of that valuation: the prospective projected financial performance of the company," he says. "We thought the founders' projections were overly aggressive and unrealistic based on our experience and understanding about the market."
In the end the two sides settled on a wager of sorts. If AsiaInfo's sales hit a target, the investors' stake would be 15 percent; if not, the investors got 30 percent. Ding and Tian fell well short of the bogey, so Warburg and its co-investors held on to the larger stake.
"Though they're tough," says Ding, "they definitely helped us the most among our investors." Warburg's Sun persuaded Ding and Tian to take the company public on the Nasdaq Stock Market in early 2000. "At first, we didn't want to -- we didn't feel we were ready. But they convinced us of the timing," says Ding. "Going public has been very good to us."
与所有的亚洲投资一样（除了失败的媒体国家出售），华宝没有试图通过公开发行来套现其持有的亚洲信息。这就引出了一个问题：何时以及是否会找到另一个合适的机会退出公司。随着亚洲ipo放缓，本地收购活动减弱，全球市场大幅下跌，华宝除了长期坚持现有公司外，别无选择。威廉E。西蒙的罗克：“只要有一点运气和时机，华堡在亚洲会有很好的表现。但这在很大程度上取决于运气和时机。”
By Allen T. Cheng
January 2003
亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者杂志
"Before I got a mobile phone, my wife used to have a tough time getting ahold of me when I went on business trips. She got really frustrated," says New Delhibased Ikea International marketing executive Arun Chandra. Then he bought a cell phone. "Now," he says, "she doesn't need to remember all the prefixes for wireline connections and can reach me anywhere in India or in the world just by dialing my number."
印度最大的移动电话运营商Bharti Tele Ventures董事长兼集团董事总经理苏尼尔•巴蒂•米塔尔（Sunil Bharti Mittal）听了钱德拉的这番话，就如同听到一个清晰的无线信号一样高兴。米塔尔希望在未来三年内将客户群扩大大约四倍，达到1000万订户，在华平的帮助下，他可能会这么做。这家总部位于纽约的全球私人股本公司持有这家移动电话公司20%的股份，正如45岁的米塔尔所说，“华宝不仅给了我2.93亿美元，它的高管也给了我管理Bharti的最佳财务建议。”
Jetting in monthly from the firm's Singapore office, Warburg partners encouraged exbicycle-parts salesman Mittal's grand expansion plans: Last year Bharti spent $328 million to snap up four rival mobile service providers and secure nine new mobile and four fixed-line licenses covering 16 of India's 28 states and seven territories. The firm's participation also helped convince Singapore Telecommunications (Institutional Investor, November 2002) to invest in Bharti and provide substantial technological advice. Analysts now believe the Indian company's annual revenues will triple to $1 billion within three years.
Bharti may be Warburg's biggest Asian holding, but it's only one of more than 30 -- and a number of others also look very promising. Among them: China's top telecom networking company, AsiaInfo Holdings; India's biggest housing lender, Housing Development Finance Corp.; and South Korea's leading credit card issuer, LG Card Co. All are growing fast.
“风险投资公司很多，但高质量的风投公司却很少，”北京亚信的总裁兼首席执行官詹姆斯•丁说华平是我所知道的中国最好的。”
Warburg Pincus, it appears, has solved the riddle of how to succeed in Asian venture capital. Even the most promising young Asian companies are starved for money. Yet 18 venture firms have shuttered their Asian operations in just the past year or two, and new private equity investments in the region (ex-Japan) fell from $7.7 billion in 2001 to $3 billion last year, according to Asian Venture Capital Journal, which tracks such activity. Warburg, on the other hand, invested $200 million last year -- nearly 6 percent of the region's total private equity outlay. It was Asia's leading pure venture capital (excluding buyouts) investor. The firm has built a $1.5 billion Asian portfolio -- most of the money was invested after the Asian financial crisis in 1998 -- and Warburg may put a further $2 billion or more into the area by 2007.
Arguably, Warburg is now the most influential private equity firm in Asia. The U.S.'s well-connected Carlyle Group, H&Q Asia Pacific (which made a spectacular sixfold return on its $30 million 1998 investment in South Korea's Good Morning Securities Co.) and regional specialist Walden International all have Asian portfolios comparable in size to Warburg's. But none has anything like Warburg's cash trove.
The firm's New Yorkbased vice chairman, William Janeway, estimates that as much as a third of Warburg's newly raised $5.3 billion global fund and a further $250 million to $300 million from existing investment vehicles could go to Asian companies.
“华平我肯定会帮助推动的趋势n the industry in the years ahead," says Richard Roque, a managing partner of William E. Simon & Sons (Asia), occasional Warburg co-investor and chairman emeritus of the Hong Kong Venture Capital Association. Among those trends: bigger stakes in the portfolio companies and greater emphasis on senior management skills. Warburg's Asia commitment is also a pretty big bet for a firm best known for hugely profitable early-stage investments in U.S. companies, like applications infrastructure builder BEA Systems, medical services provider and insurer UnitedHealthcare and leading storage software maker Veritas Software Corp., and for turnarounds at Mellon Bank and toy maker Mattel.
“亚洲（日本除外）是世界经济增长最快的地区。我们将其视为我们整体投资组合中不断增长的一部分。华宝在亚洲的投资组合将在五年内与欧洲持仓持平，甚至超过欧洲持仓。该公司目前持有美国65%的股份；欧洲，20%；亚洲占15%。
Rising economies such as China's and India's, where Warburg plans to invest the bulk of the money, will continue to gain for decades, says Janeway, who personally oversees his firm's global technology investments. Where Warburg differs most from its Asian rivals is in betting on the emergence of a huge consumer market in India. A handful of other firms have invested in Indian software companies around Bangalore and Madras, but virtually none is shepherding consumer-oriented businesses like Bharti. "We want to plug into these megatrends around the world," Janeway says. "Asia is very important to us."
华宝近23%的复合年回报率（净）超过30年，证明了在投资组合管理的某种精明。但拥有巨额现金并不能减轻亚洲投资的巨大风险。迄今为止，华宝已注销了约8%的亚洲投资（价值约1亿美元），一些乌云正在地平线上聚集：地区增长失去动力，股市下跌，政治风险依然存在。亚洲各国政府经常停止有可能危及社会稳定的经济改革。近几个月来，巴厘岛和菲律宾发生恐怖袭击，印度和巴基斯坦互发核威胁，以及朝鲜秘密核武器计划的披露，只不过凸显了风险的普遍性。
此外,在underfinanc寻找机会ed parts of the world carries special perils even for successful investors. Although Warburg may be able to find first-class investments like Bharti, it may not be able to extricate itself from them in a timely fashion in Asia's illiquid markets.
华宝的一次亚洲退出尝试证明是一个令人尴尬的失败：该公司试图在2002一月在香港证券交易所上市时出售其在中国户外广告公司媒体国家32%的股权。但市场陷入混乱，多疑的投资者无法理解华宝为何要抛售。
"Fund managers felt Warburg's sell-down indicated a lack of faith in the company," says Allen Lee, deputy editor of the Asian Venture Capital Journal. Warburg had to call off the sale. Shortly thereafter sketchy reports surfaced of management infighting at Media Nation. Warburg's lead Asia partner, Chang Sun, stepped in to restructure the company. "We made the mistake of not detecting the underlying management problems," he acknowledges. "The business is still a great one, however."
华宝在亚洲的历史非常短暂。查尔斯（筹）Kaye，去年四月成为华宝全球业务的联合总裁，在不到十年前被派往香港，与亚洲的美国和欧洲企业建立合作伙伴关系。他在1999年回到纽约，五年后在亚洲，但留下了一个快速增长的投资组合，一个强大的高级管理团队和一个办公室网络，不仅涵盖了区域枢纽香港，而且包括Bombay、汉城、新加坡和东京。
One of Warburg's earliest investments under Kaye, in 1995, was a $25 million stake in Bank Tiara Asia of Indonesia, a part of the family-run conglomerate Ometraco Group. The bank was professionally managed and highly profitable. But when the Asian crisis hit in 1997, Bank Tiara was devastated, eventually becoming one of the dozens of failed private banks taken over by the Indonesian government. The crisis in the region "was totally out of our control," recalls Sun. "We were fortunate we had only that investment in Indonesia."
这种不和谐的经历塑造了凯在亚洲投资的观点。他想要真正的本地知识，熟悉亚洲其他地区。”“从一开始，我们就认为印度和中国是一个大而穷的国家，”孙说因为市场很大，所以有很大的发展空间。他的理论证明是正确的。现在大多数人都把东南亚一笔勾销了。”
Shortly after the Bank Tiara debacle, Kaye hired a number of highly regarded Asian nationals, who have gone on to play key roles in guiding Warburg's investments in the region. Among his recruits were Sun, 46, a onetime air force officer in China's People's Liberation Army with an MBA from the Wharton School and experience on Wall Street and in Hong Kong working for Goldman, Sachs & Co., and Shanghai-born technology specialist Wayne Tsou, 35, who holds an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering from the University of Michigan, a master's in the field from the California Institute of Technology and a joint law/MBA diploma from Harvard University. In 1997 they joined Kaye and Dalip Pathak, 51, an extremely able Indian executive who had come on board from the World Bank's International Finance Corp. in 1995.
凯伊说：“我们能够吸引既有世界级人才又有亚洲本地人才的不同寻常的人，然后营造一个释放他们潜力的环境，这是我们所做的最重要的事情之一。”。帕塔克在公司受到高度评价，9月份他被提升为华宝在伦敦以外的欧洲业务负责人。
这些聪明的新员工与凯一起，将沃伯格的注意力转向了中国、印度，在较小程度上还转向了韩国。这些国家可能仍然是该公司在该地区新投资的重点。
华宝的亚洲的投资是基于三个expected developments over the next decade, says Janeway: the emergence of large-scale consumer markets, the creation of world-class manufacturing operations that can serve as centers for global outsourcing and the establishment of a vastly improved technological infrastructure. India and China, which together account for a quarter of the world's population, are likely to be major beneficiaries of these trends; a vibrant middle class, like Bharti customer Chandra, will begin to form -- and spend. Included in this upwardly mobile group will be a class of well-trained entrepreneurs, like Mittal, who will attempt to take advantage of liberalized markets.
华宝投资7.5亿美元在印度的十几家公司，投资3亿美元在十几家中国企业。”人均国内生产总值为1000美元的中国和人均国内生产总值为500美元的印度即将起飞。他认为两国人均GDP在二三十年内翻了两番。孙说：“我们想在他们起飞时赶到那里。”
印度和中国虽然创业人才丰富，但财力却很差。”“资本市场仍处于初级阶段，”孙指出因此，将有机会套利。当好的公司没有融资机会时，他们就会来找我们，我们可以发挥巨大的影响力。”
Although South Korea is in a later stage of development, it meets Warburg's investment criteria. "Korea is unusual as it represents a relatively sizable country entering middle-income status," explains Kaye. "The unleashing of the Korean consumer and changes in the industrial structure after the Asian crisis are prompting the ongoing transformation of the Korean financial infrastructure. This is creating a variety of interesting investment opportunities." Financial institutions, branded consumer products and services and export-oriented manufacturers hold allure, says Hwang Sung Jin, head of Warburg's South Korea portfolio.
In India, Warburg is betting that the government will continue to withdraw from its intrusive role in the private sector. That expectation is based in part on the experiences of portfolio companies like Moser Baer India, an optical electronics company that sold a 23 percent stake to Warburg for $80 million in 2001. Executive director Ratul Puri, 30, recalls that his family-owned business struggled with the notorious Indian bureaucracy for about half of its 20-year existence.
"Up through the early '90s, my father [Deepak Puri, Moser's 60-year-old chairman] had to go to the government to get permission for production quotas," says Puri. "I remember once he sought to get permission to make 6 million compact discs, and the government gave him permission only for 600,000 discs. We had all these orders from overseas that we couldn't fill."
The Indian government, however, has gradually permitted its entrepreneurs to export with fewer and fewer restrictions, allowing companies like Moser to become global players. Since 1998 Moser has established itself as one of the world's largest manufacturers of recordable video compact discs. Warburg's investment is helping the company build a 110-acre manufacturing park in Noida, an industrial town outside of New Delhi. Moser's ambition: to become the largest VCD maker in the world.
Mobile phone company Bharti is benefiting from New Delhi's decision to permit private companies to compete with state monopolies. Since Bharti won its first mobile phone license in 1995 -- the year the government opened up the sector to private players -- the company's AirTel-branded service has come from virtual nonexistence to take the No. 1 market position, with a 28 percent share; its government-owned rival controls less than 3 percent.
Rajesh Khanna新加坡华宝伙伴who oversees the India portfolio, says the firm intends to devote a lot more investment to the telecom industry. "Overall, in the next five to seven years we will see significant growth," says Khanna. India has 8.5 million mobile subscribers, a penetration of less than 1 percent of its total population. By contrast, more than 16 percent of China's citizens, or 200 million people, use mobile phones. Analysts expect India's mobile market to grow to 50 million users by 2007.
One measure of Warburg's own expectations: Its $293 million investment in Bharti is its third largest in the world, behind the $500 million it has put into communications systems and software play Avaya, a U.S.-based Lucent Technologies spin-off, and the $445 million it has given to Bermuda-based insurer and reinsurer Arch Capital Group.
IN CHINA, WARBURG IS APPLYING THE SAME strategy of pursuing companies positioned to reap benefits from exploding consumer markets, outsourcing-geared technology and government liberalization of certain markets. The firm's leading bet is AsiaInfo, which has greatly benefited from the gradual easing of restrictions on private telecom businesses. AsiaInfo is now the country's top integrator of telecom systems for China's biggest mobile phone operators. With the nation's number of mobile users projected to double to 400 million in the next decade, AsiaInfo is expected to continue its rapid growth.
华宝还试图培育更强大的中国资本市场。这样做的目的是鼓励企业家，同时也帮助自己这样的风险资本家。今年6月，孙政才成立了中国风险投资协会（China Venture Capital Association），旨在推动创业权利，打击对私营企业的歧视。他召集了50多位私募股权专家，为该协会在北京的成立做准备。
"Warburg co-founder Lionel Pincus helped set up the National Venture Capital Association in the U.S. 30 years ago," says Sun. "If we can do the same in China, we can push venture capital forward. The time is ripe: The entrepreneurial pool is getting bigger."
华宝最直接的消费市场可能在韩国，其最大的股份在韩国领先的借记卡和信用卡发行商LG Card。随着韩国金融业的积极自由化，信用卡使用量在短短几年内增长了近四倍。”公司的首席执行官H.C.Lee解释说：“我们发展很快，但仍有很大的发展空间。”。
在上述每个国家，华宝的投资战略都围绕着与管理层“合作”，以实现积极的长期成果。这意味着公司非常重视主持节目的人。”“我们投资的所有这些公司——如果没有高层，我们是不会投资的，”曹说许多风投公司从一项技术或一种商业模式开始，然后招聘一名首席执行官。我们必须从一位杰出的首席执行官开始。对我们来说，如果首席执行官不好，就不值得投资。”
例如，巴蒂的米塔尔公司（Mittal）曾在五年内将AirTel打造成印度北部领先的移动服务公司，随后华堡公司（Warburg）进行了投资我们会见了一些参与者，”普拉克·普拉萨德回忆道，他是一位总部设在新加坡的华堡董事总经理，负责管理印度投资组合我们在苏尼尔发现，他确实在电信领域有着深厚的知识，非常注重利润，对生活有着非常平衡的看法，而不是戴着有色眼镜。他对电信业的金融有着无可挑剔的理解，拥有一支伟大的团队，一支伟大的创业团队。”
无独有偶，华宝结识了深圳华为技术有限公司前高级副总裁李一南，并研究了他在一家宽带设备制造商的商业计划，之后与他一起投资了5300万美元。”他对市场的深入了解让人印象深刻，”曹国伟谈到李彦宏时说，李彦宏曾帮助华为凭借其强大的政府关系，成为中国领先的电信设备供应商，甚至领先于美国的思科系统公司(华为最近在美国可能更出名，因为它在美国国会的反对下建立了伊拉克的移动电话网络。）
When Li, 31, and four colleagues approached Warburg in mid-2001 after they'd left Huawei, all they had was a vision of breaking into the Ethernet and data-switching business for carriers and commercial enterprises. "He wanted to build a next-gen market leader that was free of Huawei's bad habits," says Tsou. "We took a bet and helped Li recruit his full management team and built his company." Li's Harbour Networks Co. grossed $20 million last year and made a small operating profit. Brags Tsou, now a Harbour Networks director, "It has emerged as one of the leaders of next-gen broadband equipment in China and is taking market share away from Huawei, Cisco and the big boys."
华宝广泛的多元化投资方式包括寻找不受欢迎的行业。在几乎没有行业限制的情况下，合作伙伴将资金投入从早期公司到扭亏为盈的所有领域，并提供收购融资。1999年和2000年，当股市仍在飙升时，该公司在全球范围内变现了大部分投资组合，将120亿美元的现金和证券返还给了有限合伙人。这是一个惊人的举动——事后看来也很聪明。
“我们真的是逆向的，”曹说当其他人在投资时，我们在退缩。我们有智慧看到我们正在投资泡沫。人们总是不理智的。价格高的时候，他们不卖。但当价格低的时候，他们害怕投资。我们正好相反。”
"Most important," adds vice chairman Janeway, "we believe very deeply that a company's ability to generate positive cash flow on a predictable basis is the single most important criterion. No matter how cheaply or freely available capital may be, one should never lose sight of that fundamental truth. When the stock market loses track of it, that's when we're contrarians."
Warburg operates through a single pool of funds and one global partnership. "This one pool of resources allows local managing directors to draw upon the resources and talent of partners globally when it comes to investment decisions," says Asian Venture Capital Journal's Lee. "They can do this because every partner shares in the same incentive scheme. When an investment in Asia does well, partners elsewhere share in the gain too." Most of Warburg's rivals tend to have different funds for different regions or industry sectors, which can preclude sharing of ideas among partners.
Having a large trove of cash allows Warburg to act independently -- and therefore swiftly. Says Sun, "We have enough money and proprietary deal flow that we don't need to get into large investment clubs, which has a downside of slowing deals down."
The global nature of Warburg's portfolio serves as a lure to entrepreneurs seeking access to international customers and expertise on foreign markets. Harbour Networks' Li says: "They have a lot of investments in technology in the U.S., and this helps us to build strong ties with companies in the U.S. From a business point of view, we need outsiders who have a different management point of view." Adds LG Card's Lee: "We are a local company -- we didn't know what global standards were. With Warburg Pincus's help, we could change our way of thinking to become more shareholder-oriented and transparent. As a result, our Korean institutional investors feel we are more reliable and have peace of mind."
沃伯格的独立性并不适合某些人。一位局外人形容该公司的合伙人“傲慢自大”。就连华宝支持的公司的首席执行官也承认，该公司在进行硬交易，这可能导致不良情绪。
AsiaInfo's Ding relates that when he and co-founder Edward Tian, both U.S.-educated techies, put together their business plan back in 1997, they offered Warburg 15 percent to 20 percent of a company then valued at $90 million in exchange for an $18 million investment ($10 million from Warburg, which in this case co-invested with venture capital firms ChinaVest and Fidelity Ventures, which put up the rest). Over a year of talks, Warburg and the other co-investors were able to squeeze out a 30 percent stake in AsiaInfo from Ding and Tian.
"They were very tough," recalls Ding, betraying a bit of resentment. "They knew the telecom sector well, and they felt our valuation was too high. At that time, we really didn't know enough about valuations."
Tsou recalls the discussions differently. "Yes, there was a huge valuation gap between what the founders demanded and what we offered, because the two sides had very different beliefs about the basis of that valuation: the prospective projected financial performance of the company," he says. "We thought the founders' projections were overly aggressive and unrealistic based on our experience and understanding about the market."
In the end the two sides settled on a wager of sorts. If AsiaInfo's sales hit a target, the investors' stake would be 15 percent; if not, the investors got 30 percent. Ding and Tian fell well short of the bogey, so Warburg and its co-investors held on to the larger stake.
"Though they're tough," says Ding, "they definitely helped us the most among our investors." Warburg's Sun persuaded Ding and Tian to take the company public on the Nasdaq Stock Market in early 2000. "At first, we didn't want to -- we didn't feel we were ready. But they convinced us of the timing," says Ding. "Going public has been very good to us."
与所有的亚洲投资一样（除了失败的媒体国家出售），华宝没有试图通过公开发行来套现其持有的亚洲信息。这就引出了一个问题：何时以及是否会找到另一个合适的机会退出公司。随着亚洲ipo放缓，本地收购活动减弱，全球市场大幅下跌，华宝除了长期坚持现有公司外，别无选择。威廉E。西蒙的罗克：“只要有一点运气和时机，华堡在亚洲会有很好的表现。但这在很大程度上取决于运气和时机。”