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首席执行官采访:Valeo的Thierry Morin:离合器球员
This CEO stepped in after his predecessor quit just ten months into the job. Slashing costs, he restored profits. Now he must rev up sales.
It's a shame that auto-parts maker Valeo was not equipped with one of its lane departure warning systems at the start of this decade: The Paris-based company, which makes everything from wiper blades to electronics, might not have veered so badly off course.
Even as revenues rose -- 18 percent in 2000, to E9.1 billion ($8.6 billion), and 12 percent in 2001, to E10.2 billion -- Valeo's bottom line was hurting. In 2000 net profit fell 35 percent, to E368 million, and that was merely a warm-up to the next year's E591 million loss.
Blame it on management's taking its eyes off the road. Intoxicated by the Web, Valeo embarked on a strategy of shifting all its client and supplier relationships onto the Internet. As farsighted as this may have been, it distracted from fundamental factory management, and costs hurtled out of control.
Valeo's exasperated board decided to change drivers in March 2001. Out after only ten months as chairman and CEO was Andre Navarri, who resigned. He had joined Valeo from conglomerate Alstom in May 1999 to understudy longtime CEO Noel Goutard. To replace Navarri the board tapped the company's veteran finance director, Thierry Morin. The choice has paid off dramatically.
Earnings rebounded to E135 million in 2002 and E181 million in 2003 -- a testament mainly to Morin's aggressive cost-cutting, as Valeo's revenues growth has been lackluster. The CEO has pruned the company's factories from 170 in 2001 to 128 and pared its workers from 77,000 to 68,800. Valeo's operating expenses of E1.2 billion in 2003 were 8 percent below the 2001 level.
But in this age of auto "mechatronics" -- mech-anics combined, not always smoothly, with electronics -- Valeo still has some bugs to work out. In North America, where it earns more than one fifth of its revenues, Valeo mismanaged the 1998 acquisition, for $1.7 billion, of ITT Electrical Systems. The maker of starters and other electronic components was "poorly integrated" with the rest of Valeo, Morin says. Quality control problems at the Michigan company, rechristened Valeo Electrical Systems, put off the Big Three U.S. automakers. Only now, says Morin, is Valeo regaining their trust -- and their business.
莫林想要刺激销售额。他认为公司的成本结构确保盈利增长 - 收入增益将迅速找到前往底线的路线。日益增长的需求,特别是在欧洲,在今年上半年推动了2%的销售收益,达到e4.9百万。Morin预计2005年至2007年期间增长了5%至6%。
促进销售对恢复瓦尔河股票价格至关重要 - e29.51
September. Although that represents a solid recovery from the five-year low of E19.75 in April 2003, it is still well below the E81.90 peak in January 2000.
52岁,莫林有硕士硕士硕士学位,从巴黎IX-Dauphine大学管理层。他作为石油巨头斯南伯格的金融控制员在洛杉矶举行了大约三年的金融控制员,然后在1989年从Goutard接到了Goutard作为其离合器业务的金融总监加入Valeo。Morin于1991年成为集团金融总监,九年后被命名为管理委员会。
He discussed his rise to CEO and the challenges facing Valeo with Institutional Investor Assistant Managing Editor Jeffrey Kutler.
亚博赞助欧冠机构投资者:在你成为首席执行官之前出了什么问题?
Morin: Valeo was well run in the 1990s, generating strong cash flows and profits. But at the end of the decade, just as Noel Goutard was retiring, dot-com and e-strategies were fashionable, and the idea was for us to move in that direction. We weren't successful, and losses began to appear, which was the result of management's loss of focus on the core business. You could see that in the ITT deal. When you acquire something and do not change the management, systems and processes, results will suffer. We had a plant in Rochester, New York, that lost $70 million in 2001 because of lack of integration.
What has changed?
在被任命的主席和首席执行官委任后一周内,我们有一个致力于成本的三年的行动计划 -
竞争力,质量,全球化和技术。
你有你的目标吗?
我们肯定需要更具成本竞争力。我们只是有太多的工厂;我们以每月一个的速度关闭了它们,剥离了一些并在低成本国家开设了其他人。2001年,25%的工厂是低成本国家;现在41%是。
哪些国家?那些动作如何影响底线?
低成本国家包括捷克共和国,匈牙利,波兰,罗马尼亚,斯洛伐克以及巴西,中国,马来西亚,墨西哥和泰国。当然,我们在法国,德国,意大利和西班牙等高科技国家也仍然非常依赖。我的计划始终是在一个地理位置中,并重新组织业务增加资本回报 - 三年后我们已经完成了三到四倍。自2001年第一季度以来,我们还在每季度提高了毛利率和营业收入。生产力提升使我们能够抵消钢铁,铜和其他原材料成本的显着增加。自由现金流量高达2003年上半年销售额高达5%。
您如何衡量全球化和质量?
您可以在我们的工厂接触到我们的工厂中看到我们的全球化,现在包括中国的八个,在北美和南美洲的八个。质量举措包括对供应商基地的精简 - 从4,500升至2,800美元提高了质量和生产力,每个供应商都更幸福,因为它更加开展业务。在内部,我们必须提出质量的痴迷:今天我们有53 ppm - 问题 - 每百万产品。这太多了,但十个工厂处于零ppm。十分之一可以做,128可以做。
你在研究中花了什么?
When I started we were spending 6.5 percent to 7 percent of annual sales on research and development, and if we kept losing money, we would never be able to sustain that. But R&D was one area where productivity was never a priority, and we've changed that.
怎么会这样?
我们就像我们的工厂运营一样接近它:我们将其切成了短期,中期和长期项目;我们介绍了验证流程;在过去两年中,我们提高了15%的生产力。我们将储蓄储蓄加入研发方面,因为目标不是削减,而是更好地工作。证据是,Valeo在过去几个月里推出了更多的产品。日产宣布其无限远可配备VALEO的车道出发警告系统;我们拥有南美洲汽车制造商的商业订单,用于我们的盲点检测系统;和PSA PeugeotCitroën宣布它将使用我们的起始停止系统,这将减少排放量高达8%,通过消除发动机空转,将燃料成本降低8%至10%。这改变了Valeo的形象:汽车和卡车制造商现在认为我们是一种高质量,成本效益的供应商,可以帮助他们区分其产品。
Did you lower the R&D percentage?
It's running at about 6.1 percent, and
I expect it will remain in that range, but as sales increase 5 percent to 6 percent per year, that will generate more for R&D.
你所做的是发明,而不是响应客户需求或要求?
我们所做的一切都是发明。我们是法国最大专利储存库之一 - 今年我们将加500.我们不是一个纯粹的工程公司,提出了想法,然后在市场存在时看到;我们是非常广泛的市场化。我们提出了对北美问题的直接反应的盲点检测和车道偏离警告系统 - 近一半的事故与司机改变车道有关。开发那些技术,我们与Raytheon为Raidar Systems和Iteris进行了摄像机的伙伴关系。亚慱体育app
How does Valeo stack up against the competition?
作为独立供应商没有与任何一家汽车公司相关联,我们是另一种选择:如果其中一个制造商无法通过自己的供应商填充其需求,它将转向我们而不是竞争对手所拥有的公司。在一个或多个利基中还有其他独立公司,如照明或电气或冷却。少数公司就像瓦尔博士,它既是独立的,也是十大或更多的业务线,从电气和电子设备到热系统到传输。
What kind of car do you drive?
I have several, including a Renault, PSA, Jaguar and Audi. If I were in the telephone industry, I'd have ten telephones. I can't understand people who say they can manage only through figures. I certainly manage through figures, but I like to understand what is behind them.