巨型分配者喜欢非资源的投资。他们忽略了风险吗？

在支付退休时，我正在展示我销售一些艺术品，几个小银勺和一个古老的僧侣家庭花瓶（发音为“Vahz”）的能力。Throw some baseball cards, obscure stamps, and a really old coin into the mix, and I’ll be living the high life — that is, if I can find somebody to actually buy these things at a price that matches what I think they’re worth.

The good news for me is that it’s getting easier to convert all sorts of illiquid assets into liquid cash. For example, there’s now a platform that allows people to sell fractions of classic cars, which means an investor can build a diversified portfolio of cars that don’t work. I also just saw a new hedge fund focused exclusively on buying small batches of Kentucky bourbon and reselling them opportunistically to people who prefer their whiskey when it’s liquid. (I’ll be here all night.) The world seems intent on bringing more liquidity to the world of highly illiquid assets.

And there’s good reason for this: Illiquid investments such as timberland, agriculture, infrastructure, and real estate do, in fact, outperform traditional asset classes, such as stocks and bonds. Recent research by Francesco Franzoni, Eric Nowak, and Ludovic Phalippou shows that the unconditional illiquidity risk premium, at least for private equity, is 3 percent annually — meaning that if your private equity manager isn’t earning 3 percent above public markets every year, then he’s literally doing nothing of value. Other research by BlackRock’s Andrew Ang indicates lock-ups should be associated with a specific premium: If you are locked up for a year, you should earn an extra percent per year. If it’s a decade lock-up, you should get an additional 6 percent per year.

面对飞涨的退休和其他成本social obligations, as well as lower future expected returns, allocator Giants are moving aggressively into illiquid assets to capture these higher returns. The portion of illiquid and alternative assets held by American pensions increased from 5 percent in 1995 to 20 percent in 2011, and is probably well above 25 percent today. At last count, a quarter of the assets held by sovereign funds are illiquid; today there’s close to

专业货币管理人员根据管理层7万亿美元的替代资产。

因此，不用的资产似乎是我们养老金危机的解决方案，以及我们作为社会的所有其他资金的社会义务。正确的？

这是摩擦：虽然巨头应该完全能够加强这种过度，但大多数人都有弊病，准备管理这种风险。我知道这似乎是奇怪的，因为金融服务行业的其他部分 - 像银行和保险公司一样 - 看待流动资金风险的管理对他们的运营至关重要。但是，让我们不要忘记，Altiquity推动了2008年的金融危机。谦卑的斯坦福和哈佛！显然，它应该是巨人的头脑，特别是因为他们升起了暴露于非挑战资产。

但这不是。在过去的一年中，我一直在进行流动性，现金流预测和风险工具的研究项目，我发现几乎所有的巨人都被妥善了。我已经了解到，尽管投资团队可能对非高速公路充满热情，但董事会，风险团队和业务团队的董事会尚未对非魅力风险的影响。

我花时间的所有资金都有一些版本的全本草或顾问内置的电子表格，将Excel推动到其能力的非常边缘。其中一些电子表格是，我承认，令人难以置信。但Excel易于出错，因为它是手动和耗时的，并且不起任何更深的数据科学能力。此外，为了填补这些电子表格中的假设，大多数资金依赖于普通合伙人或顾问估计和关于资本呼叫和现金流动的预测。因此，它非常难以解开实际上设定这些假设，并对他们的维护负责。总而言之，大多数巨人都没有意识到他们在退货方面应该从他们的非水资源投资中需求的需求，因为大多数人没有正确评估他们的流动性风险。

这是非常危险的。如果您在需要时没有流动性，则可以最终违反承诺，并且由于需要而不是欲望来销售不足的资产可能非常痛苦。此外，大多数非凡投资都有深邃的J曲线，需要在任何退回物质化之前支付费用和成本。你确定是一个J曲线，而不仅仅是一种表现不佳的资产吗？你怎么能说出差异？通常答案是现金流量。

流动性管理 - 预测现金流入和流出 - 非常重要。应监测和重新评估假设和预测，应当委派特定人员监督和更新这些假设。应追究允许自动化和同行协作的新技术。

在高水平，目前对非水分和替代资产的关注很大。但它必须与善政。如果有人努力销售肯塔基比尔孔或他拥有的经典汽车，他最终可以喝它或驱动它。（请不要同时。）

Unfortunately, institutional investors don’t have that luxury.