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最糟糕的是金融危机

Because the world — and your inbox — do not need another article called “Ten Years on: Lessons From the Financial Crisis”

Legendary switch-hitter and New York Yankee Mickey Mantle once quipped, “You don’t realize how easy this game is until you get up in that broadcasting booth.”

同样用于呼叫和解决市场危机。

大约十年前全球金融系统介绍了死亡。标记该里程碑,商业媒体和华尔街公司释放了出现问题的洪流,如何处理它是如何处理的,以及新鲜恐怖即将到来 - 而且方便地,何时。

可以肯定,市场参与者和评论员从最后的毁灭危机中学到了强大的教训。机构首次聘请首席风险官员。资产经理started respecting them。一代机构投资者认为他们的艺术作为承保,而不是亚博赞助欧冠分配。金融的进化损失深入了解。这些话题已经被华尔街和学术界的最聪明的思想解析和统一。他们做了沉重的思考,所以我们不必。

投资银行雷曼兄弟 - 仍然是2008年9月15日申请破产保护的最大公司。雷曼的申请成为了巨大的金融危机的共同之处。每年市场参与者反映了灾难性及其影响 - 或者为什么“Ben Bernanke是一个完整的白痴和/或病理骗子。” That blog, from Investment Research Dynamics, came out in mid-September 2009. Indeed, the ritual airing of grievances goes back to Lehman’s very first insolvency anniversary. But this year is special.

At亚博赞助欧冠we concluded that the world did not need another think piece called “Ten Years on: Lessons From the Financial Crisis.” But in the spirit of September 15, here is an overconfident case for the worst takes on Lehman’s ten-year anniversary.



“Lehman Insider: Why the Bank Could and Should Have Been Saved”

- 前雷曼兄弟首席行政官员斯科特弗赖德海姆,Financial Times

所有其他银行都得到了救助,所以为什么不是我们?Freidheim的第十周年Takeaway是雷曼的失败,因为那么纽约美联储总裁蒂莫西盖特纳不公平地,“悲惨地”拒绝发现它有点现金。

“We felt like the wounded lion who climbed up the mighty baobab tree to escape a pack of hyenas — only to have the branch break,” writes Freidheim. “Ironically, the Fed turned Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley into bank holding companies one week after Lehman filed for bankruptcy, sending the right message — and giving them exactly what we had been denied.”

The former executive recognizes that his position “may sound self-serving. However, let’s consider the facts.” First, Lehman was healthy — just a little dehydrated! Freidheim argues that the bank “delivered record net revenues and earnings in 2007, giving it the second-best revenue and earnings growth in the industry over the previous five-year period. That year our net leverage — the measure of how much of our company was financed with debt — was in line with that of our peers. And by 2008 we had meaningfully reduced that leverage” and improved other vital signs. (A study by two noted economists offers a不同的结论: “Lehman was insolvent — probably deeply so — whereas the other institutions arguably were solvent.”)

其次,拯救雷曼将有“阻止世界各地所经历的屠杀”。Freidheim认为投资银行的崩溃并没有启动危机;它在很大程度上引起了它。他说他和其他财务高管应该have lost their jobs and wealth. But if they hadn’t, then Main Street wouldn’t have either. And that was a sacrifice worth making.

的读者FT.are a banker-friendly lot, but even they denounced Freidheim’s ten-year take. “Lehman was not a wounded lion, but a sick, bloated, malformed creature,” the top-rated comment says. “In nature such creatures drop dead. They do not propagate, and they most definitely do not pontificate. Next time no bailouts. Let capitalism take its course.”



“[x] Years After the Financial Crisis, We’re at Risk of Another Major Meltdown.”

- 自2008年以来,每年9月1日至30日

Threats of imminent catastrophe define the genre of ten-year GFC anniversary literature. Sound reasons support downturn warnings now — cyclical, fundamental, geopolitical. But they’re well covered by actual experts and also are boring.

The press spices up crisis lookbacks with doomsaying because it works and it’s easy: People click on sensational stories, and there’s nothing a reporter has to prove about something that hasn’t happened. “Will Mark Spitznagel’s Doomsday Bet Pan out in 2014?”IIasked in a headline that year. Nope, but the story got read.

Being wrong has not dissuaded the take-ocracy from marking the GFC anniversary by calling the next one. For example, Business Insider2013年: “Five Years After Lehman, Could Another Collapse Be on the Horizon?” Business Insider2018年:“金融危机10年,华尔街悲观党艾伯特爱德华兹认为我们有冒着另一个重大崩溃的风险。”等等,直到最后,不可避免地,他们被证明是正确的。市场将融化,当他们这样做时,Edwards每周年才能继续下去,作为预测下一个崩溃和呼吸道的天才。

但是,普伦比亚甚至不必等待他们要偿还的策略。Edwards - SociétéGénérale的全球战略联任 - 对游戏显而易见。“以他的长期跑步而闻名,往往是外地的看跌预测,Edwards并没有对我们所取得的进展印象深刻。或者,也许更准确地说,他对我们的进步持怀疑态度think“我们已经制作了,”Reporter Joe Ciolli本月早些时候写了商业内幕,在总结了Socgen Client注释之前。

随着哭泣危机的整洁的小伎俩,爱德华兹必须在MarketWatch和CBS新闻和CBS新闻上谈论Socgen的书巴伦的,FT.,金钱周,和金融论坛(“第一个伊朗英语经济日报”)等等。预测自由宣传厄运是噪音的定义。但作为新闻界的成员,我向爱德华兹和他的崇拜者提供了全额信贷。你已经成功地砍了我们。明年再见。



“很好的投资组合你在那里。如果发生了一些事情,那就感到羞耻。“

— Active money managers, both great and small

投资公司同样具有悬垂危机的独特动力:利润率。对于许多活跃的经理,雷曼的崩溃迎来了最后的旧日子(至少一个周期,至少)。随着机构的投资组合反弹,客户反弹出来。他们去了先锋,Ishares,Blackstone,AQR - 除了传统的长期股权经理之外,几乎无处不在。随着他们现在丰富的业余时间,这些活跃的管理人员搅拌了顶级录制,研究和所有类型的内容。客户注释用十几分析师和合规官员的出汗。

Those notes can also verge on wistful in reflecting on the crisis, when many active managers outperformed the market as their clients’ portfolios cratered in absolute terms. “As a stock picker, it is at this point you can then sit there and look at it and say, ‘Here is a chance to buy the long-term winners I want, as we may never get these prices again,’ ” one PM said during a big-name firm’s lookback. “We did that then, and I hope we have the nerve to do so again.”

崩溃幻想色情普遍普遍的专业危机需要。例如,宣布的一个早期周年纪念博客,“这是2018年为2018年的股票市场,全球 - 波动率已经爆炸,二月一段时间内看到了前10%的市场矫正。那么为什么活跃经理微笑?“我们都知道为什么。

Anniversary specials for institutions broadly trace the same arc. Shot: “It’s been just over a decade since the sale of stricken investment bank Bear Stearns to JP Morgan Chase.” Chaser: “Passive investing can be a very crowded trade and can lead to highly concentrated exposures. If a particular sector or country dominates the index, you are not going to be diversified, and if the market goes down, you’ll go down with it.”

They may well be right. But for a week or so every September, no one has to be.