1990年，哈佛商学院Michael Jensen教授共同写道articlemaking the then-bold claim that CEO compensation should be tied to stock price performance. The point, Jensen and his co-author argued, was to better align incentives and ensure that corporations were able to attract “the best and brightest individuals to careers in corporate management.”
In short: Pay up, or lose out.
当时，Jensen在学术界之外很着名。但是 - 也许难以置信 - 他对首席执行官新模式的宣传迅速使他在商业学术界和企业会议室中成为一个知名的名字，寻求建议和肯定。很快，“对齐激励措施”横跨公司爆炸。
The results were staggering. According to data from the Stanford Graduate School of Business, average CEO compensation at the largest firms玫瑰20世纪80年代的每年从180万美元起 - 大致符合前45年 - 20世纪90年代的410万美元。到了2000年代初，它已升至920万美元。这些数字是后adjusting for inflation. The majority of that growth came in the form of options and stock grants, just as Jensen had recommended.
But what if Jensen was wrong?
如果首席执行官在驾驶股价表现方面发挥大部分作用，以及股权激励奖励的“对齐激励措施”何时何时担任股东股东的任何方式改变行为？
What if the “best and brightest” — those executives with the most dazzling CVs and track records — don’t perform any better than less credentialed executives?
如果Jensen的哲学为CEO和商学院毕业生产生了更好的结果，那么包括来自他自己学校的人 - 但对投资者或社会的大量成果没有更好的成果
在过去的一年，we set out to answer these questions. We created a database of approximately 8,500 CEOs and their characteristics, each individually mapped to their respective companies for the duration of their tenure, and pulled company fundamentals from Compustat, stock returns from the University of Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), CEO tenure and education from BoardEx, and long-form CEO biographies from Capital IQ. We then ran a battery of tests on the new data set, looking for correlation, persistence, and predictive power. We wanted to answer two sets of questions:
首席执行官特征预测股票价格执行吗ance? Do CEOs with MBAs perform better than CEOs without MBAs? Do CEOs with MBAs from the best MBA programs outperform other CEOs? Do CEOs who worked at top consulting firms and investment banks outperform other CEOs? More broadly, are the “best and brightest” better at running companies?
Is CEO performance persistent? If someone was a successful CEO of one company and took over as CEO of a different company, does his or her performance at the first company predict performance at the second company? If a CEO does a good job for three years, does that predict stock price performance over the subsequent three years? More broadly, are some CEOs better than others at driving share price performance?
该研究对投资具有重要意义。投资者之间存在广泛的共识，即人们应该寻求“管理良好的”公司。评估管理质量有什么更好的方法，而不是审查行政长官的简历和记录？
这种方法是直观的感觉。当然，投资于令人惊叹的退货的明星首席执行官比Schmuck投资，比S＆P表现得不佳。如果明星在哈佛大学商学院坩埚伪造的话，更好。关于这些天才CEO的书籍有一个大市场，以及他们如何取得成功 - 以及课程的企业高管和投资者应该从“伟人”的历史上消除什么课程。
国旗歌曲的信誉和企业的故事“伟人”是诱人的。大多数大学生学习和解释历史的教育学是教育学。但是如果数据显示CEO性能并不持久，或者如果恢复特征我们通常与质量相关联，事实上，实际上，预测性能，都是投资者在管理质量上花费的时间犯了错误？
MBA做得更好的首席执行官吗？
在20世纪80年代，Jensen注意到哈佛MBA的职业选择中的大班。在20世纪70年代后期，毕业生约有55％选择了企业管理的职业，但到了20世纪80年代后期，只有30％的人就是这样做。
Jensen担心这意味着美国的“最佳和最聪明”的领导人不会运行美国最大的公司 - 而且公司需要增加CEO补偿，以利用更多哈佛MBA进入企业管理职业。
商业教育的中央前提是，领导和管理可以在课堂上教授。哈佛商学院表示，其使命是“教育在世界上有所作为的领导者”，其中一个差异被定义为为创造“社会的真正价值”。一种nd so, Jensen’s logic makes sense: Harvard attracts the very best students and, presumably, is good at educating them to be better business leaders, so corporate America should want more Harvard graduates running companies — and this logic should extend to MBA programs beyond just Harvard.
但回归结果完全提出了不同的结果。我们通过他们参加的MBA计划标记了CEO，每位首席执行官经营学院分解的公司每月组合的组合，并将这些投资组合的退货与更广阔的市场进行了比较。
We found no statistically significant alphas —despite testing every possible school with a reasonable sample size。MBA计划根本不生产在运行公司更好的首席执行官，如果股票价格回归衡量。
We ran similar regressions controlling for industry and found that — even after controlling for industry — elite MBAs did not produce positive statistically significant alpha. Elite MBAs did perform relatively well as CEOs in healthcare and consumer staples, but relatively poorly in energy and materials businesses, though those results were not statistically significant. Our study is not the only one to come to this conclusion. A
study by economists at the University of Hawaiiasked similar questions and found that firm performance is not predicted by the educational background of the CEOs.
The perceived quality of each institution appeared to have no correlation with stock price returns. Northwestern led with an alpha of 0.58 percent per month. Stanford eked out a barely positive alpha of 0.03 percent per month. Harvard and Wharton had negative alphas of -0.15 percent and -0.19 percent, respectively, per month. While these rankings likely occurred by sheer chance, they do nothing to support Jensen’s thesis.
最后，我们研究了以前在投资银行和精英咨询公司工作过的首席执行官。如果Jensen的核心论文是真的，我们将期待CEO与这些精英凭证以胜过市场。
因此，我们为银行家和顾问组成了每月投资组合。正如我们用MBA所做的那样，我们随后跑了行业控制的FAMA-French三因素回归。结果：银行家和顾问都不会产生统计上有意义的α。我们还回到了测试的投资组合，旨在支持前银行家和顾问，发现没有明显的优势（虽然顾问在银行家上有一个统计上微不足道的边缘）。
This suggests that the “best and brightest” do not have a statistically significant edge when it comes to managing public companies. An elite pedigree — the type of pedigree favored by headhunters and corporate boards — is not predictive of superior management. One of the central rationales for Jensen’s campaign (increasing CEO pay by tying it to share price performance) appears, in retrospect, to have little empirical support. These credentials, however, are significantly overrepresented in the CEO biography database. The elite credentials thus benefit the individual, but there is little evidence that these credentials benefit shareholders.
目前尚不清楚为什么证据表明that highly credentialed CEOs from our most elite MBA programs and their funnel careers, like banking and consulting, appear to add no measurable value to shareholders. However, we found wisdom in a saying of the oldest living CEO, a 100-year-old billionaire from Singapore who still goes to work every day to mentor his son in leading the firm. His son, Teo Siong Seng, said, “My father taught me one thing: In Chinese, it’s ‘yi de fu ren’ — that means you want people to obey you not because of your authority, not because of your power, or because you are fierce, but more because of your integrity, your quality, that people actually respect you and listen to you.”
Bloomberg表明，为100岁的首席执行官张云忠，“没有教育数据”，所以我们不能审查他的教育资质 - 但我们怀疑他没有获得MBA。
CEO表现持久吗？
首席执行官的教育凭证可能无法预测成功，但他们的轨道记录？
Gregg Lowe是一名明星首席执行官，当他在产生股东价值的一致性时衡量。他于2012年6月接管了飞思卡尔半导体。三年后，他在接手时，他管理了飞思卡尔到恩智浦半导体的销售近四倍。2017年9月，他担任Cree的首席执行官。由于他成为首席执行官，股票近60％，而在同一时期的平面标准普尔500指数上涨。
But for every Gregg Lowe, there is an example on the other side.
Brian Woolf LED缓存从2000年到2008年，赚取投资者的投资率为5.8次，在这八年内投资。他曾在五年后被聘为身体中央首席执行官。新闻稿宣布他的招聘引用了他在缓存中的优秀领导力。但到2015年1月，机构中央已关闭其每一个商店，投资者几乎失去了他们所有的资本。
这两个反对的例子突出了关于公司管理的关键问题：CEO表现持久吗？有些人是更好的经理，能够始终如一地为投资者提供高回报吗？我们可以根据对他们的轨道记录的检查来识别这些人吗？
We tested these questions empirically. We looked first at performance persistence within companies: whether a CEO’s early track record predicts later performance. We filtered our database for CEOs who had tenures longer than six years at one company. We then separated each CEO’s return record into two buckets: Years 1–3 and Years 4–6. To eliminate the confounding effect of different market conditions, we adjusted returns by the performance of the S&P 500 index. Within each of the two time-horizon buckets, we sorted the CEOs’ market-adjusted returns into quartiles. We then identified the CEOs who were above the median twice and those who were in the top quartile twice.
To interpret the results, it’s important to consider what we would expect to see by random chance. Similar to a coin flip, 50 percent of CEOs should be above-average performers, and 50 percent of CEOs should be below-average over each three-year time horizon. And just as a coin has a 25 percent chance of landing on heads twice in a row (50 percent x 50 percent), we should expect 25 percent of CEOs to be above average in both Years 1–3 and Years 4–6, purely by chance. But if we were to believe that CEO performance is always persistent, we would expect to see 50 percent of CEOs perform above average in the two successive three-year periods (50 percent x 100 percent).
类似的计算将适用于顶部四分位数的首席执行官。如果每位首席执行官随机有25％的机会，在三年期间就有25％的机会，那么我们期望在连续两年的三年期间有大约6％的首席执行官（25％x 25％））独自运气。但是，如果有完全的表现持久性，那么25％的首席执行官将在1-3和4-6年内在顶部四分位数。
实际的首席执行官绩效结果与我们希望偶然看到的东西密切相关。我们数据库中2,420个CEO中的25％的25％在连续三年期间具有高于平均平均的表现，其中7％的首席执行官在两个连续的三年期间具有顶级绩效。
The above figures are clear: There is almost no persistence in CEO performance. The observed number of CEOs in each category is indistinguishable from what we would expect if the process were entirely random. These results held when controlling for industry and the Fama-French factors.
Visualizations of the underlying return data tell the same story. Figure 3 below compares Years 1–3 returns to Years 4–6 returns. If the performance between these two periods were perfectly correlated, the data would form a 45-degree line.
This chart reveals no discernable relationship for CEOs in general. Historical performance does not appear to predict future performance, at least as measured by share price returns. The fourth-quartile results look very similar to the first-quartile results, implying that negative performance is no more persistent than positive performance.
这不是一个直观的发现 - 学术研究表明，这不是董事会的想法，特别是在发射坏表演者时。一种
2015年研究发现首席执行官经常被解雇，经过糟糕的坚定性能，因其控制而导致的因素，与标准的理性预期的标准经济理论发生冲突。当行业广泛遇到麻烦时，董事会更有可能消防首席执行官，归因于一个人实际上是一个外源经济休克。
然后，我们看过CEO，他们运行多家公司，以了解他们在第二份第一家公司的表现。猎头手和公司委员会经常寻找首席执行官，在选择雇用的人时，在另一家公司创造价值的赛道记录。但如果过去的性能没有预测未来的结果，那么他们可能正在看一个无关的变量。
To investigate this hypothesis, we filtered our database for CEOs who have headed multiple companies. We then tagged each CEO-company pair with whether it was the first, second, third, or fourth company the CEO has headed. Because very few CEOs have headed more than two companies, we separated the data into two buckets: Company 1 and Company 2 (ignoring observations beyond the first two companies). To eliminate the confounding effect of different market conditions, we adjusted returns by the performance of the S&P 500 index. Within the two company buckets, we sorted the CEOs’ market-adjusted returns into quartiles. We then identified the CEOs who were above the median twice and those who were in the top quartile twice.
一种s before, if outcomes were completely random, we would expect 25 percent of CEOs to be above-average performers across two companies (50 percent x 50 percent). Similarly, we would expect 6 percent of CEOs to be top-quartile performers across two companies (25 percent x 25 percent) by sheer luck. The actual CEO performance results are below.
再一次，从一家公司到下一个公司的首席执行官表现几乎没有持久性。再次，这些结果在控制行业和FAMA-French因素时举行。继续表现良好的首席执行官的比例符合我们在随机条件下所期望的。
所以呢？
媒体填写了关于有关产生非凡返回的愿景首席执行官的描述。过多的新闻努力是针对他们的生活来解剖。他的童年是什么样的？他的早上常规是什么？他的管理原则是什么？他使用PowerPoint吗？对于这些细节，蜷缩的群众克拉姆希望抓住一块星星的天才自己。
The cult of the CEO is difficult to resist. Management, after all, is a team sport. Just as a quarterback can control the team's offense, the theory goes, so too can CEOs control their large public companies. If enterprise value has soared, it is because the CEO is a genius visionary. If multiples have compressed, it is because the CEO is an arrogant fool. And since the CEO is the key determinant of the company’s future, virtually any level of CEO compensation is justifiable.
但是，首席执行官概况的山脉是基本速率，几乎无法从随机性中无法区分。对“伟人”的企业管理理论的关注可能会导致持续的错误。对于有利于强大的过去的CEO股票的投资者，基本速率表明这就像投注头，因为最后两个硬币翻转那样。如果他们支付这种“质量”，那就比这更糟糕了。
一种
哈佛商业评论
article，“寻找右派首席执行官的艺术和科学”列出了“经过验证的赛道记录”作为选择首席执行官的“明显”标准。但是，为了引用Sherlock Holmes，“没有比明显的事实更具欺骗性。”
记者，投资者和董事会在首席执行官章程和追踪记录中放弃了过度重点。在一个反馈丰富，随机和“脂肪尾的世界”中，“伟人”的简单叙述似乎没有太大的量化优势 - 相反，它似乎是那些被发现的人的静脉中的另一个认知偏见由Daniel Kahneman。
当然，我们不能证明CEO凭证没有对股价产生影响。这是不可能证明否定 - 什么统计学家称为零假设。我们简单地指出，没有令人信服的证据，有利于拒绝禁止的假设。美国公司通过了Jensen的想法，没有任何数据，表明激励薪酬实际上会导致更好的股票价格绩效 - 并且没有证据表明Jensen的论文在伟大的实验开始之前出现了29年来的状态。
一种n effective counterargument might be that share price return is not a good metric for CEO performance, that stock price is simply not within the control of the CEO, being driven to a large extent by factors like changes in investor sentiment and macroeconomic conditions.
This thesis would, however, imply that incentive compensation tied to stock price is ineffective. That is a thesis — unlike the elitist premise that pedigree predicts performance — that is supported by data. An
标准普尔全球报告在CEO支付和股票价格绩效之间发现没有联系。“尽管对行政薪酬的绩效广泛接受了，但我们发现没有证据表明，提交人写道，没有证据表明，高水平的总激励赔偿金（以绩效为基础的现金加股票和股票期权奖励），”作者写道。
一种braham Lincoln famously said, “I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me." Very few of our CEOs are willing to make a similar confession about the share prices of the companies they run.
但如果没有证据表明股票回报归属于首席执行官，那么他们的划分薪酬是什么理由？投资者和董事会被随机性和空心全权主义所欺骗的程度更长？
