美元享有一个八年the dominant currency within the global financial system, but now more than ever that appears set to change. It’s not something you’ll see the full effects of in the immediate future, but the dominance of the dollar is already waning. Incremental change is underway, accordingMichael Sager, Vice President, Multi-Asset & Currency Management, CIBC Asset Management， 和in this conversation with II he explains the reasons why, and what it all means for investors.
当你说美国美元的地位作为全球优势货币的时候，时间表是什么样的？
Sager:这将是一个渐进的趋势，可能在未来十年内完全发挥作用 - 但它已经开始了。您可以在付款和外汇储备周围的关键数据中看到它。尽管这一趋势在未来五到10年之前在获得真正意义之前，但并不是说对全球经济或全球投资者来说并不是对。
正如你所说，趋势的时候会发生什么？
Sager:过去80年左右，近年来一直是前所未有的，因为美元一直是主要的储备货币。在进行该运行之前，储备货币的地位在美元，英镑，法国法郎和德意志标记之间进行EBBed和流动。期待着，我们认为有各种原因建议我们将回到多汇率储备系统，美元只是将被视为全球储备货币的几种重要货币之一。其他人将包括欧元和人民币，以及一定程度的黄金。
Why is dollar dominance ebbing?
Sager:There are a number of reasons, some are homegrown in the U.S.; others the results of choices or changes occurring internationally outside the U.S. At home, the Fed has changed its inflation target framework, and now has a built-in institutional bias in favor of slightly more inflation. This makes sense at a time when the U.S. government is issuing a lot more debt, but it’s not great for the prospective strength of the dollar.
当Covid-19危机开始时，美国对GDP比率的债务约为90％，历史上是一个非常高的数量。It was 102% by the end of the year, and according to the Congressional Budget Office is expected to trend consistently higher– hitting 107% in 2023, which is the highest it will have ever been, and 195% by 2050. That’s a lot more debt that must be paid in some way. Higher taxes are not going to be the chosen route for political reasons, nor will a cut in service provisions. That leaves a little bit more inflation to undermine the real value of the debt as the path of least resistance.
Another homegrown contributor to the weakening of the dollar is what [former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury] Hank Paulson called the weaponization of the dollar through a more aggressive use of sanctions and limiting access to U.S. capital markets. I’m not suggesting the use of sanctions is right or wrong, but increased use of them implicitly encourages other countries – other users of the dollars either officially or in the private sector – to find another currency to replace the dollar. That’s already happening. If you look at bilateral trade settlement between China and Russia, for example, five years ago, 90% was settled in dollars. Earlier this year it was down to around about 45%.
美国以外的一些影响是什么促成较弱的美元？
Sager:The growth of trade within Asia is a big one – particularly Asian countries trading with China – because it signals the relevance of the U.S. economy in the global economy is diminishing, and therefore it’s only natural that the dollar’s status will diminish. Overall, the natural consequences of economic development elsewhere in the world are unavoidable, but they do tend to suggest a less dominant dollar.
谈到经济发展，较少占优势美元影响新兴市场的趋势如何？
Sager:新兴市场国家政策制定者传统上不得不一直在国内经济中保持一目以注意的是，另一个人在美国在做什么。这意味着新兴市场资产并没有以与美元或欧元相同的方式全面交易国内基本面。如果您考虑何时对全球经济震动，请在美国开始许多开始，然后通过全球经济和金融系统广泛传播。例如，全球金融危机始于美国，但美元加强，危机转变为欧洲银行和欧元更大的问题，最终几年后导致欧元财政危机。
There are many examples of how the U.S. sets policy based primarily on its fundamentals only to have that policy ripple through the global financial system and exert a negative impact on countries that are at a different stage in the global cycle. With a less dominant dollar, the global transmission of shocks will be reduced. That’s the big deal for emerging markets because they will be able to focus much more on what’s happening in their domestic economy and set policy primarily according to idiosyncratic domestic fundamentals. Then assets in those countries will trade on those fundamentals, too. You will end up with a much less correlated global financial system, and much more potential for diversification between different assets and regions. That’s an entirely positive development.
If the dollar’s status is waning, the standing of other some other currencies must be rising. Let’s start with the Euro. Not too many years ago, the Euro was in bad shape. What’s changed, and what more needs to change if the Euro is really to challenge the dollar?
Sager:当欧元金融危机处于充分的油门时，这有点不到10年前，我们今天在这里期待欧元将是多额储备系统中的货币之一。改变了两件事。首先，欧盟委员会推出了几年前推出欧元向储备货币推广欧元。其次，自成立以来，欧元和欧元区缺乏财政骨干。在美国，集中的财政能力允许各国之间转移。欧元没有，这对欧洲富北方国家的历史上是历史上的历史上 - 但已经改变了。在2020年20年代初的Covid危机初始发作，法国和德国联合宣布建立欧洲恢复基金，表面上旨在帮助各国从经济锁定的影响中恢复。该基金将促进从德国和法国的喜欢的转移到欧盟南部和东部的较难的国家。它现在看起来好像基金会成为欧元和欧盟的持续特征。虽然所涉及的数量很小，但它是先例和旅行的方向，并且它具有财政联盟开始的所有外观。
欧元还有很长的路要走。例如，这是跨境贸易解决方案中最重要的货币，但大部分贸易涉及欧洲国家。它不像美元，即使在美国没有参与时，也用于交易解决。但是基础设施就是为了欧元制定下一步。
每个人都谈到人民币作为美元的长期竞争对手。我们在哪里竞争？
Sager:Long term, the renminbi is going to be one of the currencies in the expected multicurrency reserve system, and it’s going to be a big one. But it too has a long way to go between now and then. Between 2010 and 2015, the use of the renminbi in Chinese cross-border trade increased a lot, and then it plateaued. There’s a lot more growth to come in that regard, but it will depend on continued improvement in institutional quality in China, and making sure that investors, private sector participants, and other governments are happy to accept renminbi in payment, safe in the knowledge that they can recycle them into other currencies or goods and services whenever they want.
最终，当信心持有时，人民币的国际地位将被推动。当人民币成为众多商品的记录货币时，另一个关键发展将是。对商品的最大需求来自于中国。在未来的某些时候，人民币将使美元作为多元化合约的分母取代美元是自然的。我们已经开始看到了。例如，人民币有公平的液体黄金和原油期货合约。我们开始在那里看到一场竞争。如果你看看很多亚洲和商品相关货币的行为，他们似乎与人民币相比的交易比10到15年前更密切。其他大推动人民币国际化将来自皮带和道路倡议。这旨在将中国进一步融入全球经济的中心。 China is paying for a lot of infrastructure investment in other countries, including in Asia, Africa, and Europe, to develop the network effects that are so important to the status of a global currency. Ten years from now, having spent trillions on this initiative, it’s hard to imagine China is going to let the U.S. dollar be the dominant currency within that system. It’s almost unthinkable that the renminbi won’t gain greatly from the Belt-and-Road initiative, and this is the most important indicator that it will become more and more relevant in the global system.
黄金怎么样？您是否在正在谈论的时间框架中看到其在投资组合中的重要性？
Sager:有趣的是，中央银行已经建立了多年的黄金储备，以前降低了他们的黄金股票。央行和各国政府以及私人投资者肯定有很多需求，将黄金作为美国美元的替代品。黄金已经在很长远来看了一些方面。它已被证明是对通货膨胀的体面对冲。如果美国和其他一些政府现在表现出偏见，那么有利于更多的通货膨胀，那么在您的投资组合中将黄金作为私人投资者或主权财富基金具有一些意义。
如果您在对投资组合的优惠更广泛地看出，传统上它与股票有很大的负面相关。股票主导投资组合。如果您可以平均找到具有负相关的资产，如果在投资组合中可能值得分配给他们。ETF对黄金的需求近年来大幅上升，以及机构投资者需求。亚博赞助欧冠金为投资者做了很多好东西。这不是一个完美的资产，它并不总是保护你，但平均而言。它还具有很大的流动性，没有信用风险。
让我们将齿轮从最古老的货币中的一个转换为最新状态。私人加密货币在哪里讨论了对美国未来的讨论？
Sager:You’re right to specify private, because central bank digital crypto is definitely coming, but will really just be another way to utilize fiat money in the same vein of notes, coins, credit and debit cards, and payment apps – a different way of delivering the same asset. Private crypto should be considered separately as an investment asset and as a potential player within a multi-asset reserve system.
作为投资资产,私人密码的correlation to equity risk is positive, so the opposite of gold. Private crypto has equity-like characteristics. Implied volatility for crypto is around 60% annualized, versus something like 15% for equities or much lower for the dollar. Gold has quite high volatility at around 19%, but nothing compared to private crypto. So, crypto is positively correlated to the cornerstone of investment portfolios – equities – and has very high vol. If there’s a significant place for it in institutional portfolios it probably needs to develop more liquidity. Crypto’s AUM is quite low compared to mainstream assets, but it’s moving in the right direction. We’re more skeptical about private crypto as a safe haven, for the reasons I’ve already mentioned – and we’re definitely not there yet in terms of thinking that it can become a core part of a multi-reserve currency system.
总结您认为我们将在未来几年内看到不那么占优势的美国美元的主要投资影响。
Sager:我们讨论了新兴市场资产变革的重要性。此外，我们可以突出两个其他人。首先，在短期内，定位在美元上。我们定位进一步弱点。如果你回到几年的话，每个人都认识到与其储备地位的任何变化分开，美元被高估了。当时无法定位短美元，因为美元没有催化剂削弱。美国经济相对于趋势是最强烈的，而且与其他国家相比，这种力量使美联储相对严格，为美元提供支持。那已经改变了。随着我们在2020年的春季和夏天搬迁，我们开始看到专注于中国的经济复苏，而未来几年，中国将仍将成为全球经济复苏的主要司机。换句话说，美国正在加工周期性增长领导。 And now the Fed policy has moved from dollar-supportive to incredibly loose, concurrent to massive debt issuance by the U.S. treasury. Between a current overvaluation, a loss of cyclical growth leadership, and a loose-for-long macro policy, you have a catalyst for the dollar to continue to trend weaker, beyond what we’ve seen already. Add to that a waning of the dollar’s dominant reserve currency status, and you can expect even more depreciation. So, the most immediate actionable implication of our views is that the dollar is overvalued, and as such our multi-asset and currency team at CIBC is positioned with a high conviction for the dollar to trend weaker.
长期来看，美元历史上历史上与股票等全球增长和风险资产呈现对比周期性相关性。随着美元逐渐失去其主导地位，它将变得与经济周期相关的一点 - 不完全，但更多。这对任何具有全球曝光的投资者都很重要，例如股票，债券或替代方案，因为您对您继承了这些全球资产的货币风险的投资组合的战略假设。如果相关性会发生变化，这将使这些假设无效。这将挑战全球投资者真正重新考虑他们在投资组合中接近货币风险。
最后一个问题 - 你认为美元可能会在未来几年内削弱比量化模型的建议更多。您如何将这种信念纳入您的主动货币和多资产策略？
Sager:我们在CIBC资产管理中有一个长期以来积极投资货币作为资产类别，以增加客户组合的价值。当我们这样做时，我们从两种定量模型的角度思考货币的驱动因素，从前向前看的基本分析。两者都有相关性，两者都非常重要。量型提供了一种无情感锚点，可以让您根据历史基本面，您可以了解哪些资产，便宜或昂贵的公允价值。量型是一个伟大的起点，它们是投资过程的基础 - 但他们无法捕获一切。美元的变化状态是当量型变得无视时的相关示例，因为它们通常不会向前看。未来五到十年的显着主题变化只会逐步捕获量程。因此，您需要一种期待和考虑这些变更的方法，并及时将这些见解整合到您的投资过程中。这就是为什么我们真正关注量模型的整合和前瞻性基本判断。底线是，这种方法为投资过程提供了更多的广度和严谨，以及更加全面的驱动资产的看法。 This will be a key element of our ability to consistently add value to active currency portfolios.
有关更深入的讨论，请联系：Vishal Mansukhani，CIBC机构资产管理，vishal.mansukhani@cibc.com. |
本面试中表达的观点是多资产货币队的个人观点，不应作为CIBC Asset Management Inc.的意见仅供一般信息目的提供此次访谈，并不构成财务，投资，税收，法律或会计咨询，也不构成购买或销售所提到的任何证券的要约或征集。除非另有说明，否则本文件中表达的所有意见和估算均截至发布之日，并进行更改。我们为您提供的某些信息可能构成“前瞻性”陈述。这些陈述涉及已知的和未知的风险，不确定性和其他因素，可能导致实际结果或成就与前瞻性陈述中表达或暗示或暗示的结果，表现或成就进行实际不同。